In State v. Wilson, 94 N. C., 839, and State v. Talbot, 97 N. C , 494, it was held that though an entry on land was peaceable and even with permission of the owner, if, after getting upon the premises, the defendant uses violent and abusive language and does acts calculated to intimidate, he is guilty of a forcible entry; that though “ not at first a trespasser he became such as soon as he put himself in forcible opposition to the owner.”
Apply that to the case before us. The only difference is that here personal property was taken possession of peaceably, but carried off forcibly by intimidation and in a manner calculated to produce a breach of the peace. The defendant^ *793who was on horseback and who had ridden up to the premises of another, procures possession of a due bill of the lady of the house by asking to see it, he puts it in his pocket, asserting his intention not to pay it, and when she demands it back “he began,” the special verdict states, “using rough language to her, and she did not attempt to take it back from him because she was afraid.” When she sent one of the children to call her husband, the defendant rode off, carrying the paper with him.
In State v. Barefoot, 89 N. C., 565, citing State v. Armfield, 27 N. C., 207, it is held that forcible trespass is the taking personal property by force from the possession of another in his presence, and that it is not essential that the owner should forbid it if taken against his will; and in State v. Pearman, 61 N. C., 371, it is said that it is not necessary that the owner should actually be put in fear if such taking is in a manner calculated to intimidate, alarm or put in fear, or to create .a breach of the peace. Here the facts are found that the lady did forbid the carrying off .of the property, demanding it back repeatedly, and that she did not attempt to take it back “ because she was afraid.”
This case differs from State v. King, 74 N. C., 177, for in that case there was nothing calculated to intimidate or put in fear — no weapon or inequality of force — but bare words only, and it is not made to appear, as in the present case, that the prosecutor did not attempt to retake possession of the goods because deterred by inequality of force or being actually put in fear. This case is more nearly on “ all-fours ” with State v. McAdden, 71 N. C., 207, where the defendant was held guilty who got possession of the prosecutor’s cow peaceably in his temporary absence, but drove her off after his return against his remonstrance, he not offering actual resistance because of inequality of force. Upon the special verdict, judgment should have been entered against the defendant.
Error.