after stating the case: Whatever may be the nature and merits of the plaintiffs’ cause of action, it was not barred by any statute of limitation, because the deed under which they claim, and by this action seek to have benefit-of, purported to convey to them the fee-simple in the land in question. As they were husband and wife, they were not tenants in common and did not take by moieties, but by entireties — they were seized, if seized at all, of the entirety per tout et non per my. They owned the land, or whatever interest they acquired in it, as one person. They could not sell or dispose of it, or any interest in it, but by their joint action. The husband could not encumber it or at all prejudice the wife’s estate by his laches or his positive acts. Bruce v. Sugg and Phillips v. Hodges, and the cases there cited, at the present term.
The statute of limitations could not bar or affect the rights of the feme plaintiff because, as a married woman, she was-under disability. The husband had no interest or estate separable from hers, nor, as we have seen, could his laches affect her rights adversely.' The nature of the estate and interest of the husband and wife are so thoroughly identified as one and the same as to each, that the right of the husband cannot be barred without the like bar of the right of the wife. Her right cannot be barred, and no.more, can that of the husband. Such causes of action as that the sub-, ject of this action are not subject to the statute of limitations, because the married woman’s rights are not.
The Court ought, therefore, to have given judgment, as the parties appeared to be entitled without regard to the statute, of limitations. ' Error.