There was evidence tending to show that J. L. Rhea, in effect, conveyed the land to the defendant upon a parol trust to sell the same and apply the proceeds to the satisfaction and discharge of the judgments and costs mentioned in the complaint. Assuming this to be true, we are, nevertheless, unable to find anything in the record which warrants the judgment of his Honor declaring that the defendant held the land in trust for the feme plaintiff, and directing that he execute a conveyance to her. If, as contended, the purposes of the trust were effectuated by the trustor with other means furnished by him, it is plain that there was a resulting trust in his favor. 1 Perry on Trusts, 152. This resulting trust descended to the heirs at law of the trustor, unless the feme plaintiff can show that he transferred it to her in his life-time.
*92It is well settled that while an express trust in lands may, in this State, be created by a parol declaration made contemporaneously with the transfer of the legal title (Pittman v. Pittman, 107 N. C., 159), such trust, when created, together with the resultant interest of the trustor, can be conveyed only in the same manner as other equitable interests in real property. Patton v. Clendennin, 3 Murphy, 68; Holmes v. Holmes, 86 N. C., 208. The question then to be determined is whether the resultant interest of J. L. Rhea has been acquired by his daughter, the feme plaintiff.
The said trustor had another tract of land which he intended to give his daughter, but instead of conveying it to her he sold it and with the proceeds paid off the judgments and costs above mentioned. The feme plaintiff had no legal or equitable intei'est whatever in this land, and her father was at liberty to dispose of it as he pleased It is true that the defendant promised that, upon a sale of the same and the payment of the said indebtedness, he would convey the tract which he held to the feme plaintiff; but if we consider this as a mere agreement to convey, it is void under the statute of frauds, and if we treat it as a declaration of trust it must likewise fail, because it is not evidenced by any writing, and was not made in connection with a conveyance of the legal title. Frey v. Ramsour, 66 N. C.. 466; Pittman v. Pittman, supra. It amounted simply to a parol agreement to convey the land to the feme plaintiff, and this, we have seen, cannot be enforced where it is denied by the answer. Hollar v. Richards, 102 N. C., 545; Fortescue v. Crawford, 105 N. C., 30. It is urged, however, that the plaintiff is entitled to relief by way of subrogation or by constructive trust, but this is founded entirely upon the idea that she had some interest in the property sold by her father, and, as such was not the case, it is clear that the position cannot be maintained. Her father relied simply upon the verbal agreement of the defendant to convey, and as the latter denies the agreement it must *93follow that there was error in holding that the plaintiff acquired the equitable title to the land in question.
As the case goes back for a new trial, we think it proper to say that the other heirs at law may be made parties, and if a resulting trust be established the plaintiff may, upon petition, obtain substantial justice by requiring the heirs to account for the advancements made to them.
New trial.