The statute {The.Code, § 1754) prescribes that “when lands shall be rented or leased by agreement, written or oral, for agricultural, purposes, or shall be cultivated'by a cropper, unless otherwise agreed between the parties to the lease or agreement, any and all crops raised on said lands shall be deemed and held to be vested in possession of the lessor or his assigns at all times, until the rents for said lands shall be paid, and until all the stipulations contained in the lease or agreement shall be performed,” etc., and it further gives the landlord .and his assigns a civil rein-*757edy prescribed in case the lessee, cropper .or the assigns, or either them, “ shall remove the crop, or any part thereof,” from the lands without the consent of the lessor or his assigns, etc. The same statute (The Code, §1755) gives the lessee or cropper, or.the assigns of either, a like civil remedy against the lessor or his assigns in case he or they “shall get the actual possession of the crop, or any part thereof, otherwise than by the mode prescribed in the preceding section,” etc., and refuse upon notice “to make a fair division of said crop, or to pay over to such lessee or cropper, or the assigns of either, such part thereof as he may be entitled 1o under the lease or agreement,” etc. These and other like statutory provisions extend to leases of turpentine trees. The Code, § 1762.
The purpose of the statute (The Code, § 1759), which makes it a misdemeanor on the part of the lessee or cropper, or the assigns of either, to remove the crop, or any part thereof, without the consent of the lessor or his assigns, etc., and likewise on the part of the landlord to “unlawfully, willfully, knowingly and without process of law, and unjustly, seize the crop of his tenant when there is nothing due him,” etc., is to render the statutory provisions and regulations above referred to more effective, and this penal provision must be interpreted in that light and in that view. It embraces both the landlord and the tenant, and intends the more effectually to secure their respective rights as prescribed.
It appears that the prosecutor had leased turpentine trees from the defendants and made the crop, but had not gathered the whole thereof; that his term of lease was not over, but he was out of the possession of the trees and the land on which they were situate; that he had paid the defendants all the rents due them, and owed them nothing for advancements or expenses; that he sent his servants back to gather and remove the remaining ungathered part of the crop; that they went to do so and the defendants forbade them to gather the crop so remaining, and accordingly they did not; that *758the defendants, before the prosecutor’s lease was over, leased the same trees to tenants for the next ensuing year, and these tenants were allowed to take the balance of the prosecutor’s crop and use it for their own purposes.
The defendants had possession of the land,- the turpentine trees and the boxes in them containing the prosecutor’s ungathered crop of turpentine. Such being the facts, clearly the prosecutor might have maintained his civil action, as allowed by the statute above mentioned, against the defendants to recover the ungathered part of his crop. The defendants had no shadow of right to detain it, or prevent the owner .or his servants from gathering and removing it. We are also Of opinion that the defendants, in the just sense and contemplation of the statute {The Code, § 1759), “unlawfully, willfully, knowingly, and without process of law, and unjustly,” seized the crop of their tenant, the prosecutor, when there was nothing due them, and thereby committed a misdemeanor. They violated the spirit and certain purpose of the statute first above referred to, and did that which the penal provision just cited intends to prevent. They had possession of the turpentine trees, the boxes in them containing the ungathered crop of the prosecutor that he had a right to gather, and when they refused to allow his servants to gather the same they thereby manifested their purpose to, and did, in contemplation of the statute, “seize,” take possession and control of such ungathered crop. The word “seize” is used' in the sense of taking unlawful actual possession of the crop by force actually used or plainly implied. To constitute the offence, it is not necessary that the landlord shall take possession of the crop manu forti, or manual possession of it at all; it will he complete in this respect if ho takes possession and control thereof in such way as prevents and excludes the tenant from gathering and removing his crop in a peaceable and orderly manner. This the statute intends he shall have the right to do.
*759The defendants’ asserted their purpose to have and take the exclusive possession when the}'' forbade the prosecutor to remove his crop, and the latter, on that account, desisted from doing so. That such was their purpose was made the more manifest by the fact that they let the turpentine trees to other tenants and allowed them to take the prosecutor’s remaining crop. .
We are, therefore, of opinion, that upon the special verdict, the Court should have decided that the defendants were guilty.
It was contended on the argument that an appeal did not lie in this case in favor of the State, because, as suggested, there was a verdict of not guilty. This contention is founded in misapprehension. It very obviously appears from the record that the jury intended to, and certainly did, render a special verdict embodying all the material facts of the case. This they did, and no more; and this it was their province to do. This verdict remains, and appears as part of the record, and the judgment of the Court is founded upon it. The jury could not go further and render two verdicts — one special and the other general — so that both might prevail at the same time. To do so would involve'practical absurdity. The Court did not set the special verdict aside. It, in effect, simply decided that upon this verdict the defendants were not guilty, and gave judgment in their favor. The entry of the verdict “ not guilty ” was not the finding of the jury; it was the order of the Court upon the special verdict, and was not necessary — perhaps it might, ought, to have been omitted — as it served no useful purpose. State v. Moore, 7 Ired., 228.
On the argument it. was brought'to our attention that some confusion and inconsistency have prevailed in the numerous decisions of this Court in respect to special verdicts in criminal cases. We have examined the cases cited, and others, and upon mature consideration we think it better that, upon *760the special verdict in a case, the Court should simply declare its opinion that the defendant is guilty or not guilty, and enter judgment accordingly. Indeed, the simple entry of judgment in favor of or against the defendant would be sufficient. This is substantially the practice as pointed out in State v. Moore, supra. It is plain and convenient, will prevent further conflict of decision, and should be observed.
Error.