The pleadings, exhibits and evidence satisfy us, for the present purpose, that the plaintiff is the owner of the canal, basin, the site for the projected mill, elevator and water waste-way, and that its land thereabout situate is well adapted for manufacturing purposes of great importance; that the plaintiff is about to erect the mill and elevator, and that to that end, has expended and is about to expend large sums'of money, contracted for much machinery and other material for such purpose, and is constructing the short railroad complained of by the defendants, with the view and for the purpose to facilitate the projected work, its use and purpose. Whether this road is to be constructed *133entirely on the plaintiff’s own land is not entirely free from doubt, but if it be partly on a part of the defendants’ lot it cannot in any sense greatly endamage the latter by its mere construction. Whether the defendants have mere possession of parts of the plaintiff’s land, as they contend, is doubtful. And whether, in any view of the contention of the parties, the plaintiff has possession of any land of the defendants, is very questionable. So far as we can see, no serious harm can, in any event, happen to the defendants by the construction of the road; they may be amply compensated in damages, and have remedy upon the bond given by the plaintiff. The completion of the road promptly, we can well see, will greatly facilitate the enterprise, which ought not to be delayed, and which the law encourages. It is against the policy of the law to restrain, delay and hinder such industries and enterprises as develop the country and its resources. This ought not to be done, unless in cases where sei’ious harm may come to the party complaining. The plaintiff alleges, and the evidence tends strongly to prove, that the roadway is on its own land and that it is in possession. The Courts have in many cases, not unlike the present one, granted relief by injunction pending the action, and when the evidence has left the material matter in dispute in doubt, this Court has generally directed the order granting such injunction to be affirmed. Here the defence alleged by the defendants is more than doubtful, but we are not to be understood as expressing any opinion upon the facts, further than as may be proper in directing an affirmance of the order appealed from. Parker v. Parker, 82 N. C., 165; Lumber Co. v. Wallace, 93 N. C., 22; Lewis v. Lumber Co., 99 N. C., 11; Evans v. Railroad, 96 N. C., 45; Whittaker v. Hill, ibid., 2.
Affirmed.