A Justice of the Peace, a Constable or a Sheriff is, unquestionably, authorized to arrest without warrant one who commits a felony or breach of the peace in his presence. State v. Hunter, 106 N. C., 798; State v. Freeman, 86 N. C., 683; 3 Wharton C. L., section 2927. But in State v. Hunter where the right of a policeman to arrest under the provisions of the charter without warrant for a violation of a city ordinance, was declared the same as in cases of breaches of the peace, the Court say that “they (policemen) must determine at their peril, preliminary to proceeding without warrant, whether a valid ordinance has been violated,” and that the question of good faith on the part of an officer comes to his aid only where he is resisted in making a lawful arrest. The rule is different when arrests are made by officers for felonies, however, because reasonable ground to believe a felony has been committed or a dangerous wound inflicted, is sufficient to justify an officer in arresting.
If the assault with the stick described was committed in the presence of the officer Severs, and he was known to the defendant to be a Justice of the Peace, it was not unlawful to arrest without informing the offender of the nature of the charge, as well as without warrant. 3 Whart. Cr. L., section 2829. We concur with the Judge below in the view expressed in his charge, that, if the defendant struck his wife with the stick described by the witness at a point so near to the officer that he could distinctly hear what was said and the sound made by the blow, it would be considered in law a breach of the peace in his presence, though he could not at the time actually see the former, because it was too dark. State v. Hunter, 8 Lawyers’ Reports, 530, and notes.
*817The principal evil intended to be avoided by restricting the right of arrest to breaches of the peace committed in the officer’s presence, was depriving a person of his liberty except upon warrant issued on sworn information, or upon the actual personal knowledge of the officer that the offence was committed. The reason of the law is as fully met, therefore, if the officer heard enough to satisfy him that the law was violated, as if he had acquired the information through his sense of sight. He incurred the risk of subjecting himself to indictment for assault if the defendant did not in fact strike his wife with the stick, and, under the instruction given by the Court, the jury must have found that the defendant did commit an assault upon his wile with the same stick afterwards drawn over the prosecutor. The stick that was raised over the head of the prosecutor was a piece of the limb of a sycamore tree from four to five feet in length and from one to two inches thick, 'there was evidence tending to show, and sufficient it seems to satisfy the jury, that the defendant struck his wife with that stick. His Honor in his charge left the question of striking with the stick to the jury, and made the guilt of the defendant dependent upon it, and the defendant had no reason to complain of such instruction. State v. Huntley, 91 N. C., 617. If the defendant raised the stick described, in striking posture over the prosecutor’s head, and caused the prosecutor to step aside to avoid an apprehended blow, it was an assault. State v. Shipman, 81 N. C., 513 There was evidence tending to show that the defendant committed an assault — first, upon his wife in presence of the prosecutor, and secondly, that he committed an assault upon the prosecutor, who was attempting to arrest him, and was known to the defendant to be a peace officer. The jury passed upon the disputed facts. There is no error, and the judgment is affirmed.