Two causes of action are set out in the complaint — one for damages for breach of the contract, and the other for its specific performance. The Court held, upon demurrer, that neither of the said causes of action could be maintained.
1. As to the cause of action against the defendant Davenport, we think that there was error in the ruling that the contract for the sale of the trees was void for want of consideration.
The paper-writing sued upon is substantially an offer to sell the trees at a certain price -within sixty days. There being no consideration for the offer, it could have been withdrawn at any time within the period mentioned before acceptance by the plaintiff. The offer, however, was not so withdrawn, and the plaintiff having accepted it within the stipulated time, it became a binding contract, for the breach of which the said defendant is answerable in damages. *7161 Benjamin on Sales, 50, and the numerous cases cited in the notes.
The offer of the plaintiff to pay the price and mark the trees was sufficient, in our opinion, to constitute a valid acceptance. There was, therefore, error in the ruling as to this cause of action.
2. The second cause of action is for specific performance, both against Davenport, who executed the contract, and Thrash, who purchased of him with notice of the claim of the plaintiff.
The true principle upon which specific performance is decreed does not rest, in all cases, simply upon a mere arbitrary distinction as to different species of property, but it is founded upon the inadequacy of the legal remedy by way of pecuniary damages. This principle is acted upon (1) where there is a peculiar value attached to the subject of the contract which is not compensable in damages. The law assumes land tobe of this character “simply because” (says Pearson, J., in Kitchen v. Herring, 7 Ired. Eq., 191) “it is land, a favorite and favored subject in England and everjr country of Anglo-Saxon origin.” The law also attaches a-peculiar value to ancient family pictures, titles, deeds, valuable paintings, articles of unusual beauty, rarity and distinction, such as objects of vertu. A horn, which time out of mind had gone along with an estate and an old silver patera, bearing a Greek inscription and dedicated to Hercules, were held to be proper subjects of specific performance. These, said Lord Eldon, turned upon the pretium affectionis which could not be estimated in damages. So for a faithful family slave, endeared by a long course of service or early association, Chief Justice Taylor remarked that “no damages can compensate; for there is no standard by which the price of the affections can be adjusted and no scale to graduate the feelings of the heart.” Williams v. Howard, 3 Murphy, 74 (80).
*717The principle is also applied (2) where the damages at law are so uncertain and unascertainable, owing to the nature of the property or the circumstances of the case, that a specific performance is indispensable to justice.
Such was formerly held as to the shares in a railway company, which differ, it was said, from the funded debt of the government in not always being in the market and having a specific value. Also a patent (34 Conn., 325), and a contract to insure (4 Sanf., ch. 408), and like cases.
The general principle everywhere recognized, however, is that except in cases falling within the foregoing principles, a Court of Equity will not decree the specific performance of contracts for personal property; “for,” remarks Pearson, J., in Kitchen v. Herring (supra), “if with money an article of the same description can be bought -x- * * the remedy at law is adequate.” See also Pomeroy Spec. Perf., 14.
Applying these principles to the facts alleged in the complaint, it must follow, we think, that this is not a case which calls for the exercise of the equitable power of the Court. The trees were purchased with a view to their severance from the soil and thus being converted into personal property. It is not shown that they have any peculiar value to the plaintiff, nor does there appear any circumstances from which it may be inferred that the breach of the contract may not be readily compensated for in damages. Neither is it shown that other trees may not be purchased, but it is simply alleged that they are scarce at the contract price. The simple fact that they are near a water-course does not .alter the case, for the conveniences of transportation are elements, which may be considered in the estimation of the damages. Neither is the circumstance that th'e plaintiff purchased a “few trees of like kind” in the vicinity, sufficient to warrant the equitable intervention of the Court. We can very easily conceive of cases in which contracts of *718this kind may be specifically enforced, but we can see nothing in this complaint which calls for such extraordinary relief. The ruling of the Court, as to this branch of the case is sustained.
As to the other cause of action, it is reversed.
Reversed.