The purpose to except from the older grant mentioned some part of the land within its boundary is manifest. The exceptive provision of that grant is found therein in immediate connection with the detailed description of the land granted by metes and boundaries, and is in these words: “ Containing in the whole 35,280 acres, 5,000 acres of which, being previously entered by citizens, is hereby reserved.” The words “ hereby reserved ” can have no other reasonable meaning or purpose than that the five thousand acres referred to, having theretofore been entered, were excepted from the grant — were not granted by it — that land was left to be subsequently granted to the persons who had entered the same. If it had turned out that, in fact, no previous entry of the excepted land had been made, the exception would *644have been void for uncertainty, and all the land within the boundary would have passed by the grant. But it appears that such previous entry had been made, locating and describing the lands particularly and definitely by metes and bounds. The exception had reference to the previous entry — the latter gave the former certajnty and definiteness, rendered it operative, just as if the land excepted had been described in the grant by location, metes and bounds. This exception had such reference to the entry, and must be taken in connection with it and the subsequent grant based upon it. So that, in this case, the older grant does not, and cannot, embrace the land so excepted. As the Court below aptly said: “The exception in the grant applies to the boundary as -well as to the land itself.” This must be so, because the location and boundary had been established by the definite entry and the subsequent grant thereupon. Waugh v. Richardson, 8 Ired., 470; McCormick v. Monroe, 1 Jones, 13; Melton v. Monday, 64 N. C., 295, throw light in this connection on the subject of void and valid exceptions in grants.
It is contended by the appellants that the mesne conveyance from Matthew Robins and his wife and that from William Battye and his wife to “The North Carolina Estate Company (Limited),” conveyed to the latter not simply the unsold lands embraced by the grant of older date mentioned, but as well and as certainly, also, so much of the land embraced .by the grant of subsequent date mentioned as is situate within the boundary of the older grant, and within the exception to which reference has been made. We cannot so decide. The two conveyances, just above referred to, plainly and certainly refer to, and only to, and intend to convey, “all the land remaining unsold and contained within the boundary of the 30,080-acre tract of land granted,” &g. Express and careful reference is made in both of them to the older grant; like particular and careful reference, for the *645purpose of description of the land conveyed, is also made to the boundary of the grant, but not to the full boundary of it- — the boundary is limited, so as to exclude the land excepted from the grant, and to exclude all purpose to convey any interest therein. Else, why so limit the boundary? Why such studied particularity of description ? If the purpose was to embrace the land excepted, why did the parties fail to specify “the boundary of the 85,080 acres granted?”
It is insisted, however, for the appellants that the boundary referred to in these conveyances is that particularly specified in the older grant, and that this embraces the exception therein, and designated in the pleadings as the “Stevely land,” and, therefore, this land is embraced by the description, “all the land remaining unsold and contained within that boundary.” But what was that boundary, as. intended and made by the grant? It did not consist necessarily and merely of the external metes and bounds of the grant — it embraced, as well, its internal metes, bounds and limit's, and hence it embraced also the location, the metes and bounds of the land excepted from the grant — the “ Stevely land.” It had such internal boundary. The grant referred to the excepted land — the entry thereof — its metes and hounds, and these became a part of its own boundary, as much as if the same had been specifically set forth in the grant itself. Hence, “all the land remaining unsold, and contained within the boundary of,” &c., implies the boundary including that that excludes the exception, that embraced the “Stevely land.” Such is the meaning of the terms and phraseology employed in the conveyances referred to, and such was the clear intent of the parties to the same.
Judgment affirmed.