after stating the facts: The agricultural lien set out is in the usual form, for supplies to an amount not to exceed $80, to be advanced to Bryant Wiggins during the year 1889, “ to be by him expended in the cultivation of a crop during said year upon the following described land * * * owned by W. S. Biggs, situate in Conconary township.”
The mor!gage from Biggs to Brinkley, also set out in the case, is to secure advances “in money or supplies to an amount not to exceed the sum of one dollar,” and an existing indebtedness of $280 56, due the first day of November following, and conveys, besides certain personal property, “all of the crops which may be made by him the present year on the land of his own in Halifax Count}', bounded by the lands of the Higgs tract, W. T. Riddick and W. H. *122Kitchin land, and upon any other that he may cultivate in said county,” &c.
It is insisted for the plaintiff (appellant) that the lien given by Wiggins to Weeks is void for vagueness and uncertainty in the description of the land: ‘'Owned by W. S. Biggs, in Conconary township.”
It is further contended for the appellant that if it be conceded that the instrument executed by Biggs, and attached to the lien given by Wiggins to Weeks, subordinated his interest in the crop to the debt that might be due from Wiggins to Weeks for advancements, yet, as it was not registered, it passed nothing as against creditors or purchasers for value, and to this it is replied: It passed an equity which is good against the plaintiff as to his pre-existing debt.
These are questions with which we need not trouble ourselves, for, as the note, with the mortgage securing it, was not due till November, 1889, and "was transferred to the plaintiff before it was due, and, without notice to him, he took it, discharged of any equity that either the maker or any one claiming through him might have against the payee in the note.
While Brinkley, the payee of the note and mortgagee, had actual notice of the paper signed by Biggs, releasing his preferred lien for rents to Weeks, yet Weeks had the lien executed by Wiggins duly registered, without taking the precaution to have the agreement of Biggs registered with .it as a part thereof; and, as to third parties, the agreement had no more force and effect than an unregistered mortgage or lien would have, and an unregistered mortgage or lien will not operate to the prejudice of creditors or purchasers for value — certainly of purchasers or creditors for value, and without notice. This is too well settled to need citation of authority.
The defendant says that the mortgage to Brinkley did not include the crop made on the land by Wiggins, for, as to *123that, Biggs and Wiggins were agricultural partners, and for this he cites the cases of Lewis v. Wilkins, Phil. Eq., 303, and Reynolds v. Pool, 84 N. C., 37.
There was no contract of partnership (The Code, §1744)— certainly none by express agreement — and both the lien made by Wiggins to the defendant Weeks, and the unregistered agreement by Biggs attached thereto, not only precludes the idea of a partnership by implication, but they show too plainly to admit of doubt that the relation between Biggs and Wiggins was that of landlord and tenant, or cropper.
Upon the case submitted, the plaintiff, was entitled to judgment for $46.2G, and costs.
There is error.