The issues arise upon the pleadings. The Code, §391; Wright v. Cain, 93 N. C., 296; Patton v. Railroad, 96 N. C., 455. There are no allegations in the pleadings which suggest the matter set out in the first issue, and an issue cannot be raised by evidential facts. Miller v. Miller, 89 N. C., 209. It was error to submit it to the jury.
The defendant alleges in his answer that, “Gilbert Hale, .ancestor of plaintiffs, in 1874 contracted, by parol, to sell said land to him for $125,” and that he made sundry payments and took therefor the receipts which are set out in the answer. All this is denied by plaintiff in his replication. Parol testimony was incompetent to prove the alleged agreement. Holler v. Richards, 102, N. C., 545. The contract alleged in the answer being denied, the defendant must produce legal evidence thereof, and an agreement to convey land cannot be shown by parol proof. Allen v. Chambers, 4 Ired. Eq., 125; Gulley v. Macy, 84 N. C., 434; Bonham v. Craig, 80 N. C., 224. As the law requires such contract to be in *32writing, the writing is not only the best, but the only admissible evidence. Morrison v. Baker, 81 N. C., 76.
The defendant offered the following paper-writings, which were set out in the answer. To their admission in evidence the, plaintiffs excepted:
Land- $125 00
Paid- 61 58
Balance due_. _ $ 63 42
“ Gilbert Hale.
“January 1st, 1875.”
“ Received of Charles Crawford, ten dollars and sixty-eight cents on account of his land, balance due him in settlement to this date. Gilbert Hale.
“March 23d, 1876.”
These receipts were too vague and indefinite to admit parol testimony to locate the land. Breaid v. Munger, 88 N. C., 297; Plummer v. Owens, Busb. Eq., 254; Capps v. Holt, 5 Jones Eq., 153; Murdock v. Anderson, 4 Jones Eq. 77. The defendant endeavored to help out the insufficiency of the description by testimony of one Church Moore, which was that Hale had the lines run and chopped, and that Robinson, the surveyor, wrote out a description of the land by direction of Hale, signed the same and delivered it to Hale. This paper has been lost, but admitting proof of its contents as secondary evidence, it was a mere description of the land, with nothing on its face referring to, or connecting it with, the receipts above set out. To connect it with them by parol evidence is inadmissible. Mayer v. Adrian, 77 N. C., 83; 3 Pars. Cont., 17. If the receipts had been sufficient as *33memorandums of a contract to convey, it would have been error formerly to admit them in evidence, after objection, unless registered. The Code, § 1245; White v. Holly, 91 N. C., 67. Whether the same construction will be placed, as between the parties upon a contract to convey, under ch. 147, Acts 1885, which repeals and is substituted for The Code, § 1245, we need not now decide.
It was error not to charge the jury, as requested by the plaintiffs, “ that the receipts introduced are too indefinite to admit parol testimony to locate the land mentioned therein, and they are no evidence of any contract to convey the land described in the complaint.”
The plaintiffs, upon the issues found, tendered a judgment decreeing the plaintiffs to be the owners of the land; that the parol contract was not binding in law; that the defendant recover of the plaintiffs the sum of $115, being the amount found by the jury to have been paid by defendant on the purchase-money, and declaring the same a lien on the land, and that no execution issue for possession of the land till said sum is paid, and directing that rents and profits and value of betterments placed on the land be ascertained by a reference, and that the plaintiffs recover costs. The Court refused to sign this judgment in favor of the defendant, upon which plaintiffs again excepted.
The first issue was improperly submitted, and no legal evidence was offered in support of it. The defendant having pleaded a contract by parol, and plaintiff having denied any agreement, the only issues that could be submitted were as to the amount of the purchase-money paid by defendant, and'the value of rents and profits and betterments. The judgment given should be set aside, and the plaintiffs are entitled to have judgment entered below, upon the verdict as rendered, of the tenor of that offered by them, except that defendants are entitled to interest upon the purchase-*34money, and that either party is entitled to have the issue as to rents and profits and value of betterments assessed by the jury, instead of by a referee, if they shall so choose. The Code, §§ 473-486; Daniel v. Grumpier, 75 N. C., 184.
Let this be certified that further proceedings be had in conformity with this opinion.