(after stating the case). It is the exclusive province of the Judge of the Superior Court to find the facts of the matter in applications to “ relieve a party from a judgment, order or other proceeding taken against him, through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect,” as allowed by the statute ( The Code, § 274), and such findings of the facts are not reviewable by this Court.. And if the facts so found in any such case, in a,ny reasonable view of them, constitute such “ mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect,” and if the Judge grants the motion, in the exercise of his sound discretion, this Court has no authority to reverse or disturb his action, because the statute makes the discretion his. . It is, however, the duty of this Court on appeal, to determine’whether or not the facts as found by the Judge below, in any reasonable view of them constitute such “ mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect,” and if they do not, then the order of the Court allowing the motion will be reversed; or, if the Court below denies the motion, upon the ground that the facts do not present a case for the exercise of his discretion in allowing or disallowing it, then this Court may review his decision,, and if it decides that there is error, then the Judge below must exercise his discretion and allow or disallow the motion. *98This is settled by numerous decisions. Branch v Walker, 92 N. C., 91; Foley v. Blank, Id., 476; Beck v. Bellamy, 93 N. C., 129; Winborne v. Johnson, 95 N. C., 46.
It seems to us clear that the facts found in the case show excusable neglect on the part of the appellees in their failure to interpose their objection to the motion of the plaintiffs for an order of re-sale of the land at the June and November Terms of i 888 of the Court. They were not, regularly, parties to the action, and were not brought into it by summons; nor were they brought into it for any of its principle purposes; they were simply notified, not by the process or under the direction of the Court, as to a matter and motion incidentally affecting them as purchasers of the land, and such a purpose as the plaintiffs might, in their discretion, abandon at their pleasure, without 'having the Court make any order, or entry of record, or take any action in respect to it, and hence, they might discharge the parties of the notification given altogether, or for a time specified, or until they should receive further notice. The appellees were not in Court and parties to the action by virtue of any regular or other process of the Court; they had only notice of the plaintiffs, which the' latter could control.
The appellees, in pursuance of the notice to them, attended the Court at the June Term thereof of 1888, but did not appear in the action. While they were there, intending to make resistance to the proposed motion of the plaintiffs for a re-sale of the land, the counsel of the latter, who had authority in law so to do, and who was also one of the commissioners who sold the land, assured them “ that no judgment would then be asked for against them; that he was satisfied that his co-commissioner would arrange matters before the term following,” and the impression was made on their minds by the counsel that the purpose “was to coerce his co-commissioner into a settlement, and that *99be certainly would not ask for an order of re-sale without further notice to them.” This is found as a fact. No further notice was given; nevertheless, at the next November Term of the Court the order of re-sale was taken, but not spread upon the record; the Clerk of the Court did not know that the Court had signed it, nor was it filed among the papers in the action, and the appellees knew nothing of it until in December next afterwards.
Now, in view of the nature of the proposed motion, the relation of the appellees to it when made, the character of the-notice given them, the assurances given them that no action -would be taker) until further notice, coming from the plaintiffs’ counsel, they might well — certainly not imprudently — delay to employ counsel until the plaintiffs had settled their purpose to move for the order of re sale of the land, and give them further .notice accordingly. Moreover, the other commissioner, who seems to have been in some serious default, assured them “ that it was entirely unnecessary for them to employ counsel, and that the land had, in each case, been fully paid for, and could not be re-sold.” This commissioner was one of the agents of the Court, and, in a sense, of the plaintiffs, to sell the land, and the appel-lees being ignorant men — it .appears that they were — might not, unreasonably, the more readily act upon the assurances given them by the plaintiffs’ counsel. They certainly intended to resist the motion, and the facts show that they confidently expected to make serious opposition to it, and this the plaintiff and their counsel knew. Their purpose was not captious and trifling, but. serious. We cannot hesitate to decide that the Court below properly held that there was excusable negligence.