(after stating the case). The first and •second’ exceptions cannot be sustained. The map was offered in evidence to prove the existence and location of certain alleged roads designated on it by appropriate indicia. It was not a public map, nor was it made in pursuance of an order of survey made in this case, nor was it to be used, so far as appears, simply to help a witness testifying to explain his testimony to the Court and jury. It had no sanction or quality that made it of itself evidence. Jones v. Huggins, 1 Dev., 223; Dobson v. Whisenhant, 101 N. C., 645.
Tiie inquiry before the Court did not involve any question of science, peculiar skill, or professional knowledge. Whether it is necessary, reasonable and just that a particular cart-way shall be allowed, involves facts plain and simple in their nature and application, that ordinary jurymen readily understand and appreciate. In such cases and matters, witnesses must testify as to facts; their opinions are not required nor allowed. Bailey v. Pool, 13 Ired., 404; DeBerry v. The Railroad co., 100 N. C., 310.
The Court properly declined to give the jury the special instructions asked for, because there was evidence before them tending to prove that the cart-way was not necessary; *121that the petitioner, the owner of the land, had placed his co-petitioner and tenant on a part of the smaller tract of land with the view to enable him to obtain the cart way for his own convenience, and that he and his tenants had an outlet, more than one, to a public road, though by a longer, rougher and not so convenient a route as that proposed, and it was for the jury to determine the weight of this evidence, under proper instructions from the Court. There was much evidence, more or less conflicting as to the necessity for the cart-way, as contemplated and allowed by the statute. (The Code §2056).
The plaintiff seems to have thought that, inasmuch as the jury found by their verdict that there was no public road leading to the smaller tract of land, on which the tenant resided, they should have found further, as a consequence, that the proposed cart-way was “ necessary, reasonable and just.” This is a misapprehension of the law applicable. The petitioner is not entitled to have a cart-way simply upon the ground that no public road leads to his land, or because it will be more convenient for him to have it; it must appear, further, that it is “ necessary, reasonable and just” that he shall have it; that he resides on the land and has no way to get to and from a public road without it. Lea v. Johnston, 9 Ired, 15; Caroon v. Doxey, 3 Jones, 23; Burgwyn v. Lockhart, 1 Winst., 269; State v. Purify, 86 N. C., 681; Warlick v. Lowman, 103 N. C., 122.
As we have seen, there was evidence from which the jury might have found, as they did, that the cart-way was not necessary, that really the owner of the land, and not the tenant, wanted it, and that he had an outlet directly from his land to a public road. It was the province of the jury, under proper instructions from the Court, to so find, or to find otherwise from the evidence submitted to them.
The plaintiff further excepted, generally, that the Court admitted incompetent evidence in favor of the defendant, *122and. in the instructions it gave the jury, but no error is specified in terms or by reasonable implication. Such exception is so uncertain and indefinite that it must go for naught. McDonald v. Carson, 94 N. C., 497; Hammond v. Schiff, 100 N. C., 161; Dugger v. McKesson, 100 N. C., 1; Lytle v. Lytle, 94 N. C., 522; Pleasants v. Railroad, 95 N. C., 195.