(after stating the case.) The motion in arrest of judgment was upon the ground that the bill charged two distinct offences, to-wit: “ The intent to steal the goods, chattels and money of T. B. Lyman, and also with intent to steal the goods, chattels and money of Mrs. Anna W. Lyman.”
The indictment is under section 996 of The Gode, and the entering the house “ with intent to commit a felony or other infamous crime therein,” constitutes the gravamen of the charge. He was not charged with larceny. The offence charged is the felonious entering the dwelling house with intent to steal, and if that entry was with the intent to steal anything of value, whether one thing or many things, or from one person or many persons, it constituted but one offence, but one crime, and whether convicted or acquitted he could not be again put upon trial for the entry and intent. But at all events the objection comes too late after verdict. State v. Brown, 2 Winston, 54; State v. Fore, 1 Ired., 378; State v. Tytus, 98 N. C., 705.
The exception to the refusal of the Court to exclude the testimony of Mrs. Lyman was properly overruled by the Court below.
*756The facts testified to by her were sufficiently connected with other facts to render them competent as tending to show defendant’s guilt.
The first exception in regard to the charge of his Honor was to the refusal to give the third instruction asked. Assuming that the fact that the defendant was found concealed in the house could only raise a suspicion of some guilty intent, and was not sufficient by itself to warrant a verdict of guilty upon a charge of entering with any specific felonious intent, the facts that money hád been stolen, that the defendant had been frequently in the house, that he had been paid money and knew where it was kept, that he had on his person a key that unlocked the drawer in which 'it was kept, and other facts testified to, constitute some evidence — much more than a mere scintilla or suspicion — of guilt, and tend to give direction to the intent of the defendant. The able counsel for the defendant, in his earnest argument, pointed to the fact that the evidence showed that the drawer in which the monkey was kept was often left unlocked, and that servants had access to it, and it might have been stolen by them. That is true; and the single isolated fact that money was missing, if standing alone, would constitute no evidence to go to the jury, but when taken in connection with other facts and circumstances, no one of which alone would warrant a verdict of guilty, yet, when taken all together, may amount to full and conclusive proof. It is the union of many facts and circumstances, each one insufficient in itself, that often makes the strongest proof. Money is stolen — this fact by itself would convict no one. B. knew where the money was — this is a circumstance, but would not by itself be sufficient to go to the jury upon a charge against him; he is afterwards seen about the place where the missing money was kept — this may create a suspicion; he conceals himself — another suspicious circumstance; a key is found upon his person that opens a drawer near by where he was concealed — another very *757suspicious circumstance, but by itself too weak to justify a conviction.. Circumstances accumulate, each one by itself of.no great strength, but when united, like the.bundle of twigs in the fable, they become very strong. State v. White, 89 N. C., 462, and cases there cited.
Counsel relies upon The State v. Wilkerson, 72 N. C., 376. In that case there is no evidence of asportation, which was a necessary ingredient in the crime with which the defendant was charged. There was no evidence that connected the defendant with the killing of the hog, and only the circumstances of looking upon the dead hog and flight that pointed to defendant’s guilt. In the case before us there were many circumstances, and it may be easily distinguished from the case of State v. Wilkerson; and we are not called upon to express an opinion upon the sufficiency of the evidence to convict in that ease, in'regard to the correctness of which I myself entertain doubt.
There was no error in refusing, for the reasons stated, the third prayer for instructions, and for the same reasons there was no error in refusing the fourth and sixth instructions asked for.
The seventh prayer was properly refused because it asked the Judge to charge upon an isolated fact. If the concealment had been the only evidence it might become material for us to consider the exception, but there was other evidence.
The eighth prayer was given in the charge of his Honor in language unmistakable and fully as strong as could be properly asked by the defendant.
The tenth prayer for instruction was also properly rejected. There was evidence to goto the jury, and its sufficiency was for them. State v. Powell, 94 N. C., 965, and the cases there cited.
We have examined with care the charge of his Honor as given, and can see no error of which the defendant can complain. Affirmed.