(after stating the case.) The appellant’s counsel contended on the argument that the words “ also all the property of all descriptions that I have heretofore willed to my wife,” as used in the fourth clause above recited of the will mentioned, properly interpreted, embraced the sum of one thousand dollars given to the wife of the testator by the third clause thereof recited above. No doubt such words might in some connections embrace money as well as other property certainly embraced by the term property, but do-they as employed in the will before us ?
The testator’s intention must prevail, and in ascertaining what it is, words and phrases must be allowed to have the meaning and effect he intends to give them, if this can be done consistently with settled rules of law. Hence, to a large extent, the interpretation of every will must depend upon what is in and intended by it, without strict regard to the ordinary legal or common meaning of the words or the general rules of interpretation. Every will must, in large measure, be interpreted by itself.
The third, and so much of the fourth clause of the will before us as has reference to the property embraced by the-*587third, must be construed together — they have a direct bearing each upon the other, and dispose of the property first to the testator’s wife for life, and after her death to his daughter Margaret. It will be observed that, in the third clause, he classifies the property he intends his wife to have. First, he devises to her certain lands for her natural life; secondly, he gives her divers kinds and quantities of personal property,, particularly designated and adapted to particular purposes and thirdly, he gives her “ one thousand dollars, to be paid to her out of my (his) estate.”
It is apparent from the nature and the manner of the gift of the personal property, other than the money, that the testator intended his wife to use and apply it for the purposes to which it was adapted and intended, in the ordinary view of it, and not to sell or otherwise dispose of it, so that-when the wife should die the daughter might have so much of it as should not be worn out by the ordinary use of it or consumed in the use. It was otherwise, however, as to the money given. In its nature, it could not be used, worn and partly consumed and partly left like the other property.
Money is intended for and adapted to the purposes of exchange — it is to be parted with from time to time, as occasion may require, for property or advantage of some kind. The-testator intended, nothing to the contrary appearing, that his wife should have and enjoy the money as money is ordinarily enjoyed. He does not say that she shall have the interest that may accrue upon it; he gives it to her — directs it. “ to be paid to her,” thus implying the absolute gift of such peculiar property. He gives point to his meaning, in that he directs this legacy to be paid “out.of my (his) estate”; and in the twelfth clause of his will directs that “ property shall be sold for cash” and his “ notes and accounts” be collected, and this and like legacies be paid out of the fund so-arising.
*588While the term “ property,” in its broad legal sense, embraces money in its ordinary acceptation, among people not familiar with legal terms and phraseology it does not — they use that term as applicable to things, such as horses, oxen, cattle, wagons, plows, hoes, corn, hay, things to be eaten, and the like. Money, among such people, and generally, indeed; is regarded and treated as different from “property,” accepting the broadest legal meaning of that word.
We think the testator, in the will before us, did not use the term “ property,” in the fourth clause of his will, in such sense as to embrace money — he intended it to appy to mules, horses, wagons, carriages, farming implements, and the like. Pippin v. Ellison, 12 Ired., 61; Webb v. Bowler, 5 Jones, 362; Cole v. Covington, 86 N. C., 295.
There is no error, and the judgment must be affirmed.
Affirmed.