While to attach a trust to a legal estate by parol, or to convert a deed absolute in form into a security merely, and perhaps in other cases invoking the exercise of equitable judicial functions for relief, more proof is required than that which preponderates and governs in the trial of ordinary questions of .fact, as held in Ely v. Early, 94 N. C., 1; Smiley v. Pearce, 98 N. C., 185, and in numerous other cases, we think the evidence of the fraud in procuring the deed to be falsely drawn, fully meets the requirements of the rule.
While the plaintiff was not permitted to relate what passed between her father and her husband’s father, at the time of the drawing and executing the deed, a witness, one James Byers, who was present, testified that he heard the said John C., when the said Griffin announced his readiness to write the deed, say “he wanted a deed written to the plaintiff for the land in controversy; that he did not want Jesse’s name in it, and did not want it made so it would be liable for Jesse’s debts; if it was, it would soon be gone, and *477that to this Griffin Summerlin replied that he knew how to write it, and that paper and ink were gotten, and they were about writing the deed when he left.”
This found corroborative support in proved antecedent declarations of the donor’s intention thus to provide for his daughter, and in subsequent declarations of what he understood he had done in carrying out his purpose.
If this evidence be accepted as true by the jury, it afforded full warrant for their conclusion that a false instrument was palmed upon the old man, and his credulity imposed on in executing the deed that was in fact made.
The second objection, resting upon the delay in bringing the suit after the plaintiff’s liberation from the disability of coverture, is more serious and difficult.
The defendant, in his first answer, alleges, as a bar to the action, the lapse of ten years, and in his amended answer the lapse of semen years since it occurred, referring, we suppose, to the limitations prescribed in The Code, §§153 and 158. These enactments do not apply, since the present cause of action originated in the false and fraudulent substitution of the deed in fact made in place of that intended by the donor, and which he supposed he was making, and hence comes under the limitations, if there be such, applicable of the previous law, as declared in section 136.
If it were otherwise, and the. present enactment applied, the defence would be unavailable, since the statute did not begin to run against the plaintiff while under disability (sec. 163, par. 4), and as this was removed by her husband’s death in July, 1879, the shorter period .of seven years had not passed when the action was begun in August, 1885.
The former limitations were put alone upon the different forms of actions at law, yet, in analogy, the same limitations, according to the subject matter, were recognized and enforced when the remedy was sought in a Court of Equity, with the *478like reservations in favor of persons under disability. Thompson v. Blair, 3 Murph., 583; Falls v. Torrence, 4 Hawks, 412; Leggett v. Coffield, 5 Jones Eq., 382.
As the present suit belongs to the equitable jurisdiction of the Court, and any analogy to be found in the statute determining the periods within which legal remedies must be pursued or rights lost upon a presumption of abandonment, must be, we think, traced to the provision which raises a presumption of abandonment — Rev. Code, chap. 65, § 19— after an inaction, unexplained and not rebutted, for the space of ten years. While the operation of this statute is not suspended because of the coverture of one against whom it runs, notwithstanding the disability as decided in Johnson v. England, 4 D. & B., 70; Headen v. Womack, 88 N. C., 468; Houck v. Adams, 98 N. C., 519, yet, when adopted as a measure of time in which an action must be brought, it must, by reason of the same analogy, be accompanied with the qualification attaching to all limitations, and mentioned-in section 9 preceding.
This section contains a general saving as to all the statutory limitations, except when penalties are sought to be recovered in favor of any person who, at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, is “ within the age of twenty-one years, feme covert, non compos mentis,” &c, reserves to such the right to bring the same action within the times as before limited,, “ after his coming to or being of full age, discovert, of sound memory,” &c., “as other persons having no such impediment might have done.”
If a statutory limitation can be deduced from the effect as evidence to which is given the force of a presumption of abandonment, and placed as an obstruction in the way of the plaintiff’s action, it should be in subordination to the conditions which are annexed and incident to limitations, whenever any as such are prescribed.
But aside from these suggestions, the defendant relies on his averment — first, that ten, and then that seven years have *479elapsed since the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued and before she began — allegations literally true, but which are met by the fact that, during all this period, except a month more than six years, she was laboring under a disability recognizing the former, as well as the present limitation, which arrested the running of the statute at the start, and which, when set in operation, did not run even for the shorter time before she commenced her suit.
The defence therefore fails, and the Court erred in ruling to the contrary. The judgment is reversed, and a new trial must be had in the Court below; and so it is adjudged.
Error.