(after stating the case.) 1. The question of jurisdiction. It was conceeded that the riding of the Eighth Judicial District terminated with the holding of the Superior Court of Davidson at December Term, and that the Judge therein presiding had left the District and returned home before the day appointed for the hearing, and that the ridings of the Twelfth District, the Courts in which had been held by Montgomery, J., terminated on December 20th, and he had returned to his residence at Concord in the Eighth District. The jurisdiction under the statute cannot be questioned.
The Code, §336, provides that “all restraining orders and injunctions granted by any of the Judges of the Superior Court, except a Judge holding a special term in any county, shall be made returnable before the resident Judge of the district, or the Judge assigned to the district, or holding by exchange the Courts of the district where the civil action or special procedure is depending, within twenty days from date of order.”
Section 379 declares that “ a Judge of the Superior Court having authority to grant restraining orders and injunctions, .as prescribed in title 9, subchapter 3 of this chapter, shall have the like jurisdiction in appointing receivers, and all motions to show cause shall be returnable as is provided for injunctions.”
As Davidson County is one of those which constitute the Eighth Judicial District, whereof the Judge who passed on the motion was resident, and the matter was provisional and interlocutory, only looking to the preservation of the property in dispute and its fruits — a jurisdiction often necessary to be *365exercised out of term time — the defendant’s exception upon this ground cannot be sustained.
2. The second point rests upon an examination of the-proofs, which, upon nearly all the material issues of fact upon which the exercise of the judicial interference must depend, are in direct conflict. It is, however, inferable from the affidavits that there is danger of the loss of the tolls received from operating the mines, and, indeed, in ascertaining the-amount thereof. Whether they should be applied to the payment of the testator’s debts charged upon his real estate, and directed to be paid out of the proceeds of sale of the Ward and Hargrave land, it would seem to be a proper case, on the-demand of an executor of a co-executrix, to interpose, so far as to secure the fund to meet the exigencies of the estate for if the deed made to the daughter was effectually executed, and she became executrix and takes benefit under the-will, she must submit to the disposition of the land conveyed to her, made afterwards in the will.
We do not mean to intimate, much less to decide, that, such estoppel is in the way of her asserting title under the-deed, but such a condition results from the controversy as-makes it proper for the Court to provide against contingent losses. We think the order goes too far, in taking the gold mine operations from the defendant Alberta B. and placing them exclusively under a receiver, and that every legitimate beneficial object will be secured by leaving the operations to-go on as heretofore, and requiring returns to be made to the appointee from time to time as paid over, and the execution of a bond properly secured by her to account for and pay over the proceeds as'the Court may hereafter order; and, if she declines thus to secure the fund, to require him to take charge of those operations himself, and hold the funds subject to the control of the Court. Deep River Co. v. Fox, 4 Ired. Eq., 61; Falls v. McAfee, 2 Ired., 236; Parker v. Parker, 82 N. C., 165.
*366The proper limitations upon the powers conferred, upon receivers are suggested in the recent cases of Lumber Co. v. Wallace, 93 N. C.. 22, and Lewis v. Lumber Co., 99 N. C., 11.
With such modifications of the order appealed from, it is •.affirmed.
Modified and affirmed.