(after stating the case.) The plaintiff alleged in his complaint a cause of action at law, and the defendants in their answer alleged a defénee equitable in its nature, and asked for equitable relief, as they might do under the prevailing system of civil procedure, and such relief was granted; but the Court went further, and required the defendants to pay the plaintiff’s judgments mentioned, .which constituted successive liens upon the land, or if they failed to do so within a time specified, if directed that the land be sold and the proceeds of the sale be applied to the discharge of the judgments. This Court so in effect directed when this case was before it by former appeal. Currie v. Clark, 90 N. C., 355. In that case it is said : “ The defence here is in effect an impeachment in equity of the' title acquired by the plaintiff, and the relief cannot go beyond the setting aside the sale and restoring the parties to the status they occupied previous thereto, and without prejudice to the plaintiff’s remedies from the lapse of time since. This is the-full measure of the defendants’ equity, and it affects the plaintiff only by depriving him of an estate which he acquired by unlawful means under the form of legal process. The sale must therefore be set aside and the land again exposed to sale, the proceeds arising from which will be paid over, according to the prioriti.s of the several executions as they existed on the day of the Sheriff’s sale, which is thus put out of the way.”
The defendants by their answer brought the judgments mentioned against them that belonged to the plaintiff", the executions issued upon them, and the sale of the land mentioned under them before the Court in this action, asking equitable relief as to the executions alleged to have been irregularly issued. The Court thus obtained jurisdiction of the judgments *328and the executions complained of and the land, and could, in the exercise of its equitable authority, grant complete relief and do justice, not only to the defendants, but as well to the plaintiff, within the scope of the whole matter thus brought before it. It appeared that the judgments had become dormant, and that hence the executions issued upon them were irregular, and that they and the sale of the land under ./them ought to be set aside, but it likewise appeared in that connection, that the judgments having been duly docketed, notwithstanding their dormancy, constituted liens upon the land in favor of the plaintiff, and he was entitled to have the land sold to discharge them, if the defendant would not pay the money due upon them as they ought to do and have done. The Court having obtained jurisdiction of the whole matter, as indicated above, had authority to enforce the lien, and the orders and judgments to that end were appropriate and lawful. It is not true, as the defendants seem to suppose, that the liens of the judgments could be enforced only by the ordinary process of executions against the property of the judgment debtor — that is the usual way prescribed by statute; but when such liens come in question in an action, as in this case, where the equitable authority of the Court is invoked, it may direct sales of the land or other property as the ends of justice may require.
The second exception seems to have no application. It does not appear in the record that any motion or application was made to the Court to set aside the execution and sale complained of, or that the Court took any notice of, or made any decision in respect to them. Nothing appears but simply the affidavit and the execution ; they do not appear to have any connection or application. The mere exception without application must go for nought. It should appear in the record that the Court made, or refused to make, some ruling, order or judgment to which it applies and has reference. Else this Court cannot see error. It would seem *329that if the affidavit was true that the execution and sale should have been set aside, upon proper application, but we are not at liberty to decide that it ought or ought not to have been, because no ruling or decision of the Court in such respect is before us for review.
We think the third exception as to the costs in the Court below must be sustained. The plaintiff failed to'recover the land, to recover which alone the action was brought. The defendants alleged, and established, an equitable defence, which rendered it expedient and just to administer certain equitable rights of the plaintiff, but the latter failed wholly to maintain the action as to the purpose for which it was brought. The case of Vestal v. Sloan, 83 N. C., 555, cited by the counsel for the defendants, is in point.
The judgment must be reversed as to costs, and in all other respects affirmed.
Affirmed, except as to costs.