(after stating the facts). If the Justice of the Peace had authority to take the bond in question, it was, in legal effect, a recognizance, although not so in form. State v. Edney, 2 Winst., 71; State v. Houston, 74 N. C., 174; State v. Houston, Ib., 549. But we are of opinion that he had no such authority.
The Constitution (Art. IV, § 27), recognizes and establishes the office of Justice of the Peace, and prescribes the jurisdiction of that officer in certain respects, but it expressly leaves it to the General Assembly to prescribe regulations to be observed.in the exercise of the authority conferred, and the jurisdiction may, to a limited extent, be increased by statutory provision. The jurisdiction thus conferred, and that may be conferred, is special — not general — and the officer is limited in the exercise of his authoritjr by the regulations and methods of procedure prescribed by statute, subject to the constitutional provision. That is, a Justice of the Peace can only exercise the powers conferred upon him by the constitution and statutes in harmony with it; his jurisdictional authority is not enlarged by principles of law ap*441plicable only to Courts of general jurisdiction; nor can he adopt methods of procedure, or exercise his authority in ways not strictly allowed by law — he may do only what the statute allows him to do, and his official acts will be upheld, however informal, if they embody the substance of the thing or purpose intended.
Now, the statute (The Code, §§ 1132, 1139, 1144,) provides that certain classes of officers, including Justices of the Peace, “shall have power to issue process for the apprehension of persons charged with any offence, and to execute the powers and duties conferred by this chapter,” (that in respect to criminal proceedings) and that “ the Magistrate' before whom any such person shall be brought, shall proceed, as soon as may be, to examine the complainant,” &c., and that “ if the offence charged in the warrant be not punishable with death, such Magistrate may take from the person so arrested a recognizance with sufficient sureties for his appearance at the next term of the Court having jurisdiction, to be held in the county where the offence shall be alleged to have been committed.” And how such recognizance shall be certified to the Court is prescribed. There are divers provisions permitting such Magistrates to allow bail and take recognizances, but there is none that allows them to do so pending the postponement of the examination by them of a person charged with a criminal offence, with a view to holding him to answer for the offence charged before a proper Court, if there shall appear to be sufficient cause. If it was intended that they should allow bail in such a case, why the omission to so provide? And why make special provision conferring authority as to some cases and not as to that last mentioned, similar in its nature to them? The strong inference is, that it was not contemplated or intended that such authority should be exercised.
When a person charged with a criminal offence is apprehended, it is intended that the proper Magistrate, before *442whom he is taken, “shall proceed, as soon as may be, to examine the charge,” and that the accused party shall remain before him or in the custody of the Sheriff, or other officer who arrested him, until he shall be committed, let to bail, or discharged. Bail is not deemed necessary or allowable during the examination. The Magistrate shall proceed as promptly as the nature of the case will allow, to complete the examination, but he may take reasonable time for the purpose, and may, in the mean time, direct the officer to continue the person charged in his custody in some convenient, clean, suitable, safe place, as the jail, “guard house,” or other place of safety, so that he may be forthcoming when the examination shall be resumed. Such has generally, if not uniformly, been the practice in such respects in this State in all the past, and such, substantially, was the practice in England, whence the law and practice in this State were derived. The practice in England, however, was modified by statute, (11 & 12 Vict., ch. 42, § 21,) so that a Justice of the Peace there, may now let the accused party to bail and take his recognizance with surety, pending the postponement, if need be, of the examination. 1 Arch. Cr. Pr. & Pl., 37, 38 (6 Ed.); 1 Chit. Cr. Law, 73, 74.
As the Justice of the Peace in this case had no authority to allow the accused party to give bail during the postponement of the examination, he could not lawfully take the “ bond ” in question. It was therefore inoperative and void.
The Court, in effect, sustained the appellee’s plea of nul tiel record. There is no error. Let this opinion be certified to the Superior Court according to law. It is so ordered.
No error. Affirmed.