(after stating the facts). 1. The -first exception was to the admissibility of the testimony of Michael, to prove the agreement in parol, in regard to the proceeds off the sale of the mineral interest in the land.
The contract for the sale of the land was in writing — the-land itself was sold — but the agreement, that if the mineral interest in the land should be sold during the life-time of' the plaintiff, he should have one half of it, was not put in writing. If the contract of sale was made subject to this-agreement, as an inducement to the contract, the agreement,though in parol, may be enforced. The agreement did not pass, or purport to pass, any interest in land, and does not-fall within the statute of frauds.
*188In Manning v. Jones, Busb., 368, Jones contracted to sell Manning a tract of land at a stipulated price. It was, at the ¡same time, agreed that the defendant, Jones, should repair the plantation and houses by a day named. The deed was .executed and delivered to Manning, and, at the time of the ■delivery of the deed, Jones said he would have the repairs ¡made by the time specified. Having failed to do so, the ■plaintiff brought an action to recover on the contract.
The Court below held that parol evidence was inadmissible. Nash’ C. J., said: “ In this there is error. It is true, as a rule of evidence, that where a contract is reduced to writing, parol evidence cannot be received to contradict, add to, or explain it.
The error consists in considering the evidence in this case as offered for either of these purposes. It was offered to set up another and distinct part of the contract, which never ■was reduced to writing; a contract which was ancillary to the main one, which was the sale and purchase of the land. * * * * As soon as the deed was delivered * * * * the title passed * * * * unclogged with any conditions whatever; but it did not have the effect to discharge .Jones from his obligation to put on the premises the agreed repairs. And as the contract was in parol, it might be proved by parol. Its existence added, no new covenant to the deed, * * * nor did it contradict or explain any one that was ■contained in it.
The action is maintainable upon the contract, as to the repairs made at the time the deed was delivered.”
In Trowbridge v. Wetherbee, 11 Allen’s Mass. Rep., 361, it is said that a parol promise to pay to another a portion of the profits made by a promissor on the purchase and sale of ■real estate, is not within the statute of frauds, and may be proved by parol. See also Sherrill v. Hagan, 92 N. C., 345.
2. The second exception was to the evidence of Richards, 5n regard to the letter written by Foil to the plaintiff, but *189signed by Richards. R was competent as corroborating Michael, and also as tending to show the fact, that Foil, after' the deed from Michael to him, recognized the latter as interested in the sale of the mineral interest.
3. The defendant objected to the competency of Puryear,. because he was an attorney, and “ was in the employment either of himself, or the plaintiff and himself,” and the conversation was, therefore, confidential and privileged.
It is not denied by the plaintiff, that if Puryear had been counsel for the defendant alone, his testimony would have been incompetent, but it is insisted, and we think it so appears,, that he was counsel for the plaintiff, who alone paid the fee, and if so, the communication was privileged only as to him,, and could be removed by his consent. 1 Greenleaf’s Evidence, § 243,
But conceding that the witness was the attorney of both the plaintiff and defendant, (there is nothing to show that he-was the attorney for the defendant alone,) as between the-counsel and the plaintiff and the defendant, the matter was-not, in its nature, private and confidential; it was common to all three, “ and could, in no sense, be termed the subject-of a confidential disclosure.” 1 Greenleaf Ev., § 244.
The learned counsel for the defendant says, that if an attorney acts for several clients, he cannot testify without the-consent of all, and for this he cites several authorities. This is undoubtedly true, as between his clients, or any one of them, and third parties; “ but a communication made to counsel, by two defendants, is not privileged from’ disclosure in a subsequent suit between the two.”
We are not aware that the question, in its present form, has ever been before the Courts of this State, but in Rice v, Rice, 2 B. Monroe, 417, referred to in Greenleaf, it was directly before the Court, and after laying down the general rule, that a legal adviser will not be permitted to disclose communications or information derived from clients, as such, it is said
*190“ But does this rule apply in this case ? Here the controversy 'is between the parties themselves, and the attorney is under the same obligations to both of them. The matter communicated was not, in its nature, private, as between these parties, who were both present at the time, and consequently, so ■far as they are concerned, it cannot, in any sense, be deemed the subject of a confidential communication made by one, which the duty of the attorney prohibited him from disclosing to the other. The reason of the rule has no application in such case. The statements of parties made in the presence •of each other may be proved by their attorneys, as well as by ■other persons, because such statements are not, in their nature, confidential, and cannot be regarded as privileged communications. The testimony of the attorney was, therefore, properly admitted in this case.”
This reasoning seems to be sound, and so we say, in the ■present case, the testimony was properly admitted.
4. The fourth exception is to the refusal of the Court to instruct the jury, that the alleged agreement was void be- ■ cause not in writing. This exception cannot be sustained, for the reason assigned for overruling the 1st exception to the evidence. If it had been an agreement, to sell any interest in the land, or if, as his Honor charged, it was that the plaintiff should “ have half the mineral interest itself in the land specified,” it would have been otherwise.
5. Even if the two bonds be taken together, and construed as one transaction, his Honor instructed the jury, “ That they might consider all of the evidence, including the bonds put in evidence, and say whether the defendant had sold the mineral interest, and received the money therefor; and if so, what amount?” and this was a compliance with the plaintiff’s •prayer, as far as he was entitled to it. It was a correct enunciation of the law, as applicable to all facts as the jury should find from the evidence.
*191It is not the duty of the Court to charge the jury upon a single selected fact, nor is he hound to give the charge in the language asked for. Wilson v. White, 80 N. C., 280; Rencher v. Wynne, 86 N. C., 268; State v. Boon, 82 N. C., 637; Clements v. Rogers, 95 N. C., 248.
6. The refusal to give the third instruction, as asked for, is disposed of with the last.
■ 7. The refusal to instruct the jury that, admitting the agreement, the sale must be effected within a reasonable time, was not error. The doctrine of reasonable time applies when no time is specified.
When stated in the agreement, why should it be limited to a shorter time ?
8. The sale and conveyance of the land constituted a consideration for the agreement. Manning v. Jones, supra; Sherrill v. Hagan, supra.
This disposes of the exception to the refusal to give the 5th prayer.
9. The 6th prayer, for instruction to the jury, is disposed of with the exception to the refusal to give the 2d and 3d. It was substantially given, as far as the defendant was entitled to it.
There is no error. Affirmed.