Itcannot be doubted, that the words, as charged in either count of the declaration, are actionable, if taken by themselves; and the inquiry then is, whether the explanation and reference of them, as found by the jury, so qualifies their meaning as to render them innocent. This depends solely on the question, whether writing the letter sot forth would amount to a forgery. . That it would at common law, is apparent from the definition of that offence, which might bo committed in respect of any writing whatever, by which another might be defrauded. Whatever doubt might formerly have existed on the subject, was completely removed by the decision in Wood’s case, in which the distinction is taken between forgery and fraud; that the last must actually take effect» while the first was complete, though no one was actually injured, if the tendency and intent to defraud were manifest. (2 Ld, Ray. 1461.) The tendency and intent of the letter imputed to the plaintiff, are evidently to render the supposed writer liable to Tisdale for a sum of money; and supposing the letter to be genuine, Tisdale might have recovered upon its face, without any extraneous proof, sufficient damages to carry the costs. But it is needless to pursue the inquiry, because it seems *589now to bo understood, that it is not necessary, to constitute forgery, that there should be an intent to defraud any J particular person, but that a general intent to defraud will suffice. (3 Term lisp. 176,.) On this part of the case, therefore, I am of opinion, that the words are actionable, as explained by the finding of the jury. But it is objected, that the slanderous words are not stated in the declaration as they were uttered, according to the finding of the jury. It is to bo observed, however, thát the words laid are actionable per sc, and the additional circumstances stated in the special verdict are only explanatory of the subject in reference to which the words were spoken; for as the jury must judge whether the words were innocently or maliciously uttered, it is proper to give in evidence the occasion and manner of speaking them. Where the additional words dó not qualify the words laid in the declaration, or divest them of their slanderous character, it is not necessary that they should be charged. In Higges v. Austen, (Yelv. 152.) the words are, “thou hast stolen as much wood and timber as is worth twenty pounds.” The jury found the words with this addition, “off my landlord’s ground,” and it was adjudged for the plaintiff; for the words found by the jury, more than were in the declaration, do not qualify the first words. And in the King v. Brake, (2 Salk. 661.) it was held, that where one declares for words spoken, variance in the addition or omission of a word is not material; and it is sufficient if so many of the words are proved and found as are in themselves actionable. In Maitland v. Goldney, (2 East 438.) Mr. Justice Lawrence says, “I take the rule in actions of this sort to be, that though the plaintiff need not prove all the words laid, yet he must prove so much of them as is sufficient to sustain his cause of action, and it. is not enough for him to prove equivalent words of slander.” For these reasons I think the judgment should be affirmed.
It was formerly doubted whether counterfeiting writings inferior to deeds and wills was forgery at common law; but it seems now to be settled, that counterfeit any writing with a fraudulent intent, whereby another may be prejudiced, is forgery at common law. (2 East Cr. Law 359. 861. 2 L. Ray. 1461. 2 Str. 747.) Accordingly, to counterfeit the letter set forth in this special verdict, with a fraudulent intent, is forgery at common law. because an injury might thereby accrue to the defendant. Suppose Tisdale had sued the defendant for money had and received to his use, this letter would be evidence against him; and although it does not specify any sum received by the defendant,.yet it is proof that he received something, and might be the foundation of a verdict against him for a nominal amount, and subject him, both to trouble and cost.
For these reasons I concur in the opinion that judgment should be rendered for the plaintiff.
Henderson, Judge, concurring also,
Judgment affirmed.