The act which gives jurisdiction to the Court declares, that when it shall appear to the Court J7JT that a grant had issued against law, or obtained by false suggestions, surprise, or fraud, it shall be lawful for said Court to give judgment that such grant he repealed, vacated, and made void.
In this case the jury have expressly found against the-ánswer of the defendant, ««that at the time of the defend-' ant making his entry and obtaining his grant, he had full knowledge of the prior grant to the father of the petitioners.” It follows of course, that the grant to the defendant wás fraudulently obtained, and that it was obtained against law, because it covered land which had been previously appropriated by M«/fee’s grant. It is unnecessary to say any thing about a case where the defendant had not notice. But it is objected that the statute of limitations is a bar to this petition. My answer-is, that the act of 1798 recognizes no time as a bar, nor do I think that the act of 1715 can he used for that purpose. This is not an action to recover the land, nor does the title to it come in issue, though incidentally it may be effected. by the judgment given in this case. It is said that if time and possession be not a bar in this case, it .cannot he in an ejectment hereafter brought by the petitioners. Whether that will or ought to be the result of the judgment given in this case, I give no opinion.
It is again objected, that the act of 1798 was not intended by the legislature to embrace grants that issued for lands that had been previously granted, but only on grants that irregularly issued for vacant lands. The act in words makes no such distinction, and I think there is, no reason why it should, because grants of that description, although invalid at the time of their date, might have the effect to destroy the titles of the first grantees, and they, having paid for the lands, were as much the object of legislative protection, as it was to guard against the issuing of grants for vacant lands when the purchase-*327money had not been paid, entered for the petitioners. I think judgment should be
It is first objected, that the act of 1777, the entry law, does not declare such grants as the present to be void, for that the clause in that law declaring all grants issued contrary to the provisions of that act to be void, relates exclusively to grants for vacant land. The act excludes from entry all lands heretofore granted; and the clause in question declares all grants issued-contrary to the provisions of that act, to be void. This land had been before that time granted; another grant for it, under colour of the provisions of the act, is contrary to such provisions. I think it, therefore, within the act. But, independent of the act, it is void upon common law principles. For either suggestio falsi or suppressio veri is sufficient to avoid the grants of the sovereign; and if such maxim is proper in-a regal government, where there is a permanent person to take care of sovereign rights, a fortioH it is proper in a re* publican government, where there is no such person, This grant being made upon a false suggestion, viz. that the land was vacant, is therefore void.
The next objection is, that it appears that one of the relators is barred of his right to the land by seven years possession thereof by the defendant under the grant. Without deciding whether a possession for seven years or more under a void grant obtained mala fide, shows such a want of interest in the person who would be otherwise owner, as would induce the Court to abstain from acting, as doing an act in no way beneficial to the relator, who is therefore considered as an officious intermed-ien: — without, I say, deciding this* I think thé title of the other relators, whose rights are saved by the proviso ©f the act of limitations, is sufficient for the Court to proceed on. And as the grant cannot he void as to one person and good as to another, as it may he good for ene *328 thing and void as to another; it should be repealed, or rather vacated in the whole, leaving the effect of possession under it before vacation to be settled by future adjudications. The defendant has no right to complain, that the grant is taken from him, and that he is left to his possession only. For the principle which restrains a Court from acting before it appears that the relator has an interest, is not from any tenderness to a defendant, but that the Court will not be moved to act at the instance of one in no way interested. It is not the defendant’s rights that are regarded, but the useless and unnecessary consumption of time. If the state chooses to act, no relator is necessary- The question never arises cv£ tono. She wills it, and the time is her own. I think .that the grant should be annulled for all the lands, which liad-been previously granted.
The Chief Justice concurred.-