The sole issue raised by this appeal is whether the trial court erred in deciding that the doctrine of last clear chance was inapplicable as a matter of law to the facts of the case. We find that the evidence required submitting the issue of last clear chance to the jury and the trial court erred in directing a verdict for defendants.
The plaintiff must prove the following four elements to be entitled to a jury instruction on last clear chance:
(1) the pedestrian, by his own negligence, placed himself in a position of helpless peril, (2) the defendant was aware of, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered, plaintiff’s perilous position and his incapacity to escape, (3) the defendant had the time and means to avoid injury to the plaintiff by the exercise of reasonable care after he discovered or should have discovered the situation, and (4) the defendant negligently failed to use the time and means available to avoid injuring the pedestrian.
Schaefer v. Wickstead, 88 N.C. App. 468, 470-71, 363 S.E.2d 653, 655 (1988), quoting, Watson v. White, 309 N.C. 498, 308 S.E.2d 268 (1983).
There is no dispute that plaintiff, who has loss of right field of vision in both eyes, did place herself in a position of helpless peril. Id. The crux of the issue before us is whether defendant-driver, by the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered *104plaintiff’s perilous position and her incapacity to escape in time to avoid injury.
The plaintiff’s evidence included expert testimony from an accident reconstruction expert to the effect that the stopping distance for defendant’s automobile on that street at the estimated speeds would be from approximately 29 to 42 feet, which, at the estimated speeds, would take less than one second. Headlights on low beam illuminate for approximately 300 feet and, for a roadway 18 feet wide, an object 6 feet off the highway would be illuminated from 150 feet away. The expert testified that the average reaction time for a driver is between 1 and 1.5 seconds. The expert also stated that the average walking speed of a pedestrian is 4 feet per second, and that that was also the speed he measured for plaintiff. Plaintiff was hit by defendant-driver when she had walked 14 feet into the road. Therefore, she was actually in the roadway for about 3.5 seconds before she was hit and was walking from 6 feet off the roadway 5 seconds before impact. The expert testified that, assuming the car was in a skid for the last second, and that the average driver has a reaction time of 1.5 seconds (or 2 seconds because of darkness), that defendant-driver had 2 seconds reaction time from the point when plaintiff was 6 feet off the road. He described this as “ample reaction time.”
Two questions arise at this juncture. At what point in crossing the street was plaintiff in a position of “helpless peril,” and what duty does a driver have to look outside of his own lane of travel? We disagree with defendants’ argument that plaintiff was in no peril until she walked into defendant-driver’s lane of travel. A pedestrian who is walking across the street, and is about to walk into the path of an oncoming car, and who does not see the car, is obviously in peril before she steps directly in front of the car. It is also plain to us that the driver of an automobile has a duty to look ahead outside his or her immediate lane of travel. In Exum v. Boyles, 272 N.C. 567, 158 S.E.2d 845 (1968), Justice Lake stated the following:
For the present it is sufficient to note that a motorist upon the highway does owe a duty to all other persons using the highway, including its shoulders, to maintain a lookout in the direction in which the motorist is traveling.
Id. at 576, 158 S.E.2d at 852-53 (citations omitted).
*105Assessing the expert testimony with these principles in mind, and viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we think the evidence was sufficient to create a jury question regarding the application of the doctrine of last clear chance to this case. Even if defendant-driver were held not to have a duty to observe plaintiff until she entered the road, there would still be a jury question as to the application of the doctrine. We recognize, as defendant points out, that there is a distinction between last “clear” chance and last “possible” chance. Sink v. Sumrell, 41 N.C. App. 242, 249, 254 S.E.2d 665, 670 (1979). As this Court said in Sink v. Sumrell, “it must be such a chance as would enable a reasonably prudent man in a like situation to act effectively.” Id. at 249, 254 S.E.2d at 670. Every case must turn on its particular facts. Exum v. Boyles, supra. In this case, we believe there is adequate evidence for a jury to conclude that if defendant-driver had kept a proper lookout she reasonably could have acted effectively to avoid hitting plaintiff. The trial court’s finding that defendant-driver did all she could after seeing plaintiff begs the question of when defendant-driver reasonably should have discovered plaintiff and ignores the evidence that she could have seen plaintiff a few seconds sooner. It is noteworthy that defendant-driver stated that she did not see plaintiff until “a split second” before impact when plaintiff had been in the road for 3.5 seconds and crossed 14 feet of it.
We hold that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of last clear chance, and that the trial court erred in taking that issue from the jury and directing a verdict for defendants.
New trial.
Judge COZORT concurs.
Judge LEWIS dissents.