[1] The claim based upon respondeat superior having been eliminated from the case, the determinative question presented by this appeal is whether plaintiffs evidence tends to show that some independent negligence of defendant Sheriff proximately contributed to plaintiffs intestate being killed by Deputy Braswell. Plaintiff contends that the evidence tends to show defendant’s negligence in three respects, the first of which was failing to protect plaintiffs decedent from an attack by Billy Braswell after promising her that such protection would be provided. This theory of legal liability is authorized by our law, though the general rule is that ordinarily law enforcement officers have no duty to protect individuals from criminal attack, their duty being only to the public at large. In Coleman v. Cooper, 89 N.C. App. 188, 366 S.E.2d 2, disc. rev. denied, 322 N.C. 834, 371 S.E.2d 275 (1988), it was held that the general rule is subject to two exceptions: The first, obviously not applicable to this case, is based on the special relationship that exists between an undercover agent, informant or a State’s witness and the police when a person dangerous to the cooperating person is being investigated or prosecuted. The other exception, a “special relationship” exception of another type, arises when (1) police protection is promised to an individual; (2) the protection is not forthcoming; and (3) the individual’s reliance on the promise of protection is causally related to the injury suffered. This exception to the general rule was adopted because it is unjust to deny redress when a victim of violence is lulled into not taking steps for his or her own safety by voluntary assurances of protection by the police. Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y. 2d 255, 260, 505 N.E.2d 937, 940, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 375 (1987).
Plaintiff’s contention that his evidence prima facie establishes the three elements of the foregoing exception to the general rule is well taken, and a new trial on the issues raised by this claim is ordered. The evidence as to the first two elements — that defendant promised to protect plaintiff’s intestate from Billy Braswell *236and did not do so — is both obvious and plenary. The argument that the evidence as to the Sheriffs promise of protection should be disregarded because it is erroneously based upon the hearsay statements of Lillie Braswell has no basis. The court received the hearsay statements into evidence after making the determinations required by Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), N.C. Rules of Evidence, and all of the determinations are well supported by evidence and reason. As to the third element of this claim — that the reliance of plaintiff’s intestate on the promise of protection was causally related to her death — the evidence, though not without conflict, supports the inference that she did rely on the promised protection and that her death causally resulted therefrom. Leaving aside the evidence that indicates that she sometimes doubted that defendant was keeping his promise to protect her, since for the purposes of the appeal contradictions and inconsistencies in the evidence unfavorable to the plaintiff must be disregarded, Murray v. Murray, 296 N.C. 405, 250 S.E.2d 276 (1979), this element is supported by evidence that though Braswell had threatened to kill her she did not leave the county or go into hiding; did not have or seek to obtain a traveling companion; did not carry a weapon or quit going to her job; did not file an action under Chapter 50B of the General Statutes to restrain him from molesting her; and stated on the morning she was killed that she was going to be safe. These actions and words tend to show that she believed that the Sheriff’s officers were monitering her movements and those of her husband; that under their protection she could safely continue to live and work in the county; and that because she followed that belief without taking any other steps for her own safety Braswell was able to shoot her in broad daylight on a public highway.
[2] The second respect in which the evidence indicates defendant Sheriff was negligent, so plaintiff contends, was in failing to protect Lillie Braswell, a reported victim of domestic violence, in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 50B of the General Statutes. His argument is that Chapter 50B, entitled Domestic Violence, establishes an affirmative duty on the part of law enforcement agencies to protect victims or threatened victims of domestic violence upon request and that a breach of that duty gives rise to a cause of action. We do not so understand this legislation, and overrule this argument. In gist, Chapter 50B does the following: By G.S. 50B-2 it authorizes one threatened with domestic violence to file a civil action and seek the court’s protection; by G.S. 50B-3 it *237authorizes the court to hear and determine such actions; by G.S. 50B-4 it provides for enforcing the court’s orders; by G.S. 50B-5(a) it authorizes one allegedly threatened with domestic violence to request the assistance of local law enforcement agencies, requires a law enforcement agency so requested to respond as soon as practicable and authorizes such agencies to advise complainants of sources of shelter, recommend treatment facilities, transport them to such facilities when feasible, and to take such other steps as are reasonably necessary to protect a complainant from domestic violence. G.S. 50B-5(b), especially relied upon by plaintiff, reads as follows:
In providing the assistance authorized by subsection (a), no officer may be held criminally or civilly liable on account of reasonable measures taken under authority of subsection (a).
G.S. 50B-6 states in pertinent part, “This Chapter shall not be construed as granting a status to any person for any purpose other than those expressly stated herein.” G.S. 50B-7 provides that the remedies are in addition to others authorized by law, and G.S. 50B-8 concerns protective orders. None of these provisions, in our opinion, nor all of them collectively, make it the affirmative duty of a law enforcement agency to assist anyone threatened with domestic violence. Their effect, it seems to us, is limited to enabling such persons to more readily obtain the court’s protection and such assistance as any local agency approached sees fit to give. The provision of G.S. 50B-5(b) absolving officers from liability if reasonable measures are taken cannot be construed as a directive to take such measures. See Turner v. City of North Charleston, 675 F.Supp. 314 (D.S.C. 1987). In all events Chapter 50B has no application to this case because Lillie Braswell sought no relief under it by filing the authorized civil action.
[3] The final negligence of the defendant that plaintiff contends his evidence tends to show was continuing Billy Braswell in his employ and failing to properly supervise him after learning that he was unfit to carry a gun. Recovery from a law enforcement agency under this theory has been authorized by some courts under certain circumstances. Bonsignore v. City of New York, 683 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1982) and Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973) stand for the proposition that a law enforcement agency or other employer can be liable for a shooting injury or death which was proximately caused by the employer’s negligence in hiring, training, retaining, or supervising the officer. In both *238cases, the shootings occurred while the officers were off duty, their service revolvers were the fatal weapons, and each officer was required by regulation to have his service revolver with him at the time involved. Assuming arguendo that this theory of legal liability is valid here, it cannot benefit plaintiff because the evidence does not indicate that Lillie Braswell’s death proximately resulted from Billy Braswell being entrusted with a gun by the Sheriff. For the evidence does not indicate either that he was required by defendant to carry a gun while off duty, as he was at the time of the shooting, or that his service revolver was the fatal weapon. Whether Billy Braswell killed her with the service revolver furnished by defendant or with one of the several other guns that he owned, the evidence does not show. Thus, entrusting Billy Braswell with a police revolver has not been shown to be a proximate cause of him shooting plaintiffs intestate, and this claim was also properly eliminated from the case.
New trial.
Judge COZORT concurs.
Judge GREENE concurs in part and dissents in part.