[1, 2] Defendant first argues that plaintiff is not entitled to set aside her own judgment. While this was arguably the law according to former G.S. 1-220 which provided for relief to “a party from a judgment . . . taken against him,” Rule 60(b) has no language suggesting that the movant for relief from a judgment must be the losing party. It appears, therefore, that in general “any party may seek relief under the rule.” W. Shuford, N.C. Civil Practice and Procedure § 60-4 (1975). However, defendant contends that the motion of the plaintiff was improperly granted on the facts of this case because the unenforceability of the judgment, which formed the basis for plaintiffs motion, resulted from plaintiffs own failure to comply with statutory notice requirements. In support of this argument, defendant makes three assignments of error.
*409Defendant’s first contention is that the court erred in finding that the plaintiff followed the law when she obtained a judgment against Moore without giving notice to Nationwide.
While it is true that this Court held in Love v. Nationwide, supra, that the judgment which had been entered was in fact a default judgment in spite of the fact that no entry of default was made, it does not follow that plaintiff acted in violation of the law. There is no indication that plaintiff acted in bad faith since she did not know that the judgment would be held to be a default judgment, this case having been one of first impression. Neither was the plaintiff informed by Nationwide that its insured was an assigned risk. Thus, plaintiff acted in compliance with the facts and law as she reasonably understood them in giving notice only to Moore.
Defendant next argues that the court erred in finding that all necessary evidence is still available to Nationwide to defend the action. This finding, defendant contends, is contradicted by the undisputed fact that defendant Moore is now deceased, having died in 1978. In view of the fact that Nationwide had actual notice of the accident shortly after it occurred, and participated in negotiations with plaintiffs attorney regarding her claim, we find this argument unpersuasive. Nationwide had ample opportunity to depose its insured or to take whatever other action it deemed appropriate to preserve evidence favorable to Moore’s defense. While it is true that not all of the evidence available in 1973 is now available to defendant, the court did not err in finding that all evidence necessary to trial is still available.
Defendant’s third contention is that the court erred in vacating the judgment against Moore and authorizing notice to Nationwide more than seven years after the original complaint. In supporting this contention, defendant characterizes plaintiff’s failure to give notice to the insurer as a “voluntary and conscious choice” designed “to circumvent the law of North Carolina.”
While it is clear, in retrospect, that plaintiff should have given notice to Nationwide, her failure to do so hardly raises a presumption of insidious design. Plaintiff had no knowledge of the fact that defendant’s insured was an assigned risk although defendant had opportunities to apprise her of the fact. Neither could she know that her understanding of the law with regard to the *410entry of default judgments would prove erroneous in light of a subsequent holding of this Court. Finally, plaintiff knew that Nationwide had actual notice of the pendency of a claim arising from the accident in question since negotiations had been conducted between the parties. Moreover, if the statute is construed as placing the burden on the claimant to ascertain whether an insured is an assigned risk in order that the claimant may comply with the notice requirements thereby imposed, failure to do so is, in all likelihood, a matter of attorney neglect. As this Court has clearly stated, “[t]he neglect of the attorney will not be imputed to the litigant unless he is guilty of inexcusable neglect.” (Emphasis added.) Kirby v. Asheville Contracting Co., Inc., 11 N.C. App. 128, 132, 180 S.E. 2d 407, 410 (1971). We do not find the failure to inquire as to whether defendant’s insured was an assigned risk to have been inexcusable neglect under these circumstances.
In its second question presented, defendant challenges the court’s assertion of jurisdiction over defendant’s insured.
[3] Defendant first contends that notice to Moore was insufficient because his middle name was incorrect in the published notice. We agree with defendant that such an error takes on greater significance in a case such as this where the defendant failed to appear, and was not personally served with process, than in cases where process is personally served and/or the defendant appears. However, defendant does not claim that it was unaware of the identity of its insured or of its own potential liability for the injury to plaintiff. Moreover, defendant made no attempt to correct plaintiff’s misunderstanding as to the name of its insured during negotiations on plaintiff’s claim or at any other time.
While it is possible that Moore would have been misled by the error in the published notice, this risk was reduced by the inclusion in the notice of details of the accident. We find, therefore, that notice did not fail, on the facts of this case, as a result of plaintiff’s mistake as to the middle name of defendant’s insured.
[4] Defendant’s final argument is that service of process by publication was a violation of due process under the circumstances of this case. We find this to be the most persuasive of defendant’s arguments.
In determining the constitutional sufficiency of notice afforded defendant’s insured, the question is whether the notice given *411was “of a nature reasonably calculated to give [him] actual notice and the opportunity to defend.” Royal Business Funds Corp. v. South Eastern Development Corp., 32 N.C. App. 362, 369, 232 S.E. 2d 215, 219, cert. denied 292 N.C. 728, 235 S.E. 2d 784 (1977).
Notice by publication is generally justified only when more adequate means of service have been exhausted. Publication clearly is not a dependable means of putting a defendant on notice. Here, plaintiff attempted personal service on defendant’s insured without success before resorting to notice by publication. A reasonable argument might be made that plaintiffs efforts were not sufficiently diligent to fulfill the demands of due process. Plaintiff could have inquired of Nationwide as to the whereabouts of its insured and/or could have given Nationwide formal notice of the action against its insured so that it could exercise its right to come in and defend. Plaintiff’s failure to do this weighs against her. However, in view of defendant’s actual notice of the claim, and plaintiffs good faith efforts to comply with the law as she reasonably understood it at the time, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that plaintiff be permitted to pursue her claim in court.
Affirmed.
Judge Webb concurs.
Judge VAUGHN dissents.