Defendants contend the trial court erred by granting the motion for summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings in plaintiff’s favor. We do not agree and affirm the judgment entered.
Where a motion for summary judgment is made along with a motion for judgment on the pleadings and the record on appeal contains no affidavits, answers to interrogatories, or anything else other than the pleadings upon which to base the decision, the court’s entry of judgment will be deemed to have been made under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(c), of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Reichler v. Tillman, 21 N.C. App. 38, 203 S.E. 2d 68 (1974).
Justice Huskins stated for our Supreme Court in Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 136-37, 209 S.E. 2d 494, 499 (1974):
“Motion for judgment on the pleadings is authorized by Rule 12(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(c) (1969). The motion operates substantially the same as under the code system before adoption of the new rules of civil procedure. See Powell v. Powell, 271 N.C. 420, 156 S.E. 2d 691 (1967); Reidsville v. Burton, 269 N.C. 206, 152 S.E. 2d 147 (1967); Edwards v. Edwards, 261 N.C. 445, 135 S.E. 2d 18 (1964); 6 Strong, North Carolina Index 2d, Pleadings, § 38 (1968).
North Carolina’s Rule 12(c) is identical to its federal counterpart. The rule’s function is to dispose of baseless claims or defenses when the formal pleadings reveal their lack of merit. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is the proper procedure when all the material allegations of fact are admitted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain. When the pleadings do not resolve all the factual issues, judgment on the pleadings is generally inappropriate. 5 *461Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1367 (1969).
Judgment on the pleadings is a summary procedure and the judgment is final. See James, Civil Procedure § 6.17 (1965). Therefore, each motion under Rule 12(c) must be carefully scrutinized lest the nonmoving party be precluded from a full and fair hearing on the merits. The movant is held to a strict standard and must show that no material issue of facts exists and that he is clearly entitled to judgment. Southern Ohio Bank v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 479 F. 2d 478 (6th Cir.1973).
The trial court is required to view the facts and permissible inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. All well pleaded factual allegations in the nonmoving party’s pleadings are taken as true and all contravening assertions in the movant’s pleadings are taken as false.”
Accepting defendants’ factual allegations as true, we, nevertheless, affirm the trial court’s entry of judgment.
G.S. 105-381(a)(l), (2), and (3) provide:
“Taxpayer’s remedies. — (a) Statement of Defense. — Any taxpayer asserting a valid defense to the enforcement of the collection of a tax assessed upon his property shall proceed as hereinafter provided.
(1) For the purpose of this subsection, a valid defense shall include the following:
a. A tax imposed through clerical error;
b. An illegal tax;
c. A tax levied for an illegal purpose.
(2) If a tax has not been paid, the taxpayer may make a demand for the release of the tax claim by submitting to the governing body of the taxing unit a written statement of his defense to payment or enforcement of the tax and a request for release of the tax at any time prior to payment of the tax.
*462(3) If a tax has been paid, the taxpayer, at any time within three years after said tax first became due or within six months from the date of payment of such tax, whichever is the later date, may make a demand for a refund of the tax paid by submitting to the governing body of the taxing unit a written statement of his defense and a request for refund thereof.”
The answers of defendants failed to raise any defenses as provided by G.S. 105-381(a)(l). Defendants did not allege that they, as taxpayers, have made demand for release of the taxes claimed by submitting to the Town of Bladenboro a written statement of their defense to payment or enforcement of the taxes. See G.S. 105-381(a)(2).
Justice Barnhill (later Chief Justice) stated for our Supreme Court in Development Co. v. Braxton, 239 N.C. 427, 429, 79 S.E. 2d 918, 920 (1954): “Ordinarily the sovereign may not be denied or delayed in the enforcement of its right to collect the revenue upon which its very existence depends. This rule applies to municipalities and other subdivisions of the State Government.”
The General Assembly, through the enactment of G.S. 105-381(a), has directed the course a taxpayer must follow in a case where the governing body of a taxing unit has instituted an action to enforce its right to collect taxes.
The trial court, in reviewing the answers in the light most favorable to defendants and giving defendants all permissible inferences, correctly concluded that plaintiffs Rule 12(c) motion should have been allowed. We are aware that defendants denied owing the taxes for the years 1971, 1972, and 1973; however, such general denials were not sufficient to withstand plaintiff’s motion in light of the above statutory restrictions. Defendants did not elect to amend their answer prior to a hearing on the motion of plaintiff by the trial court. If defendants had paid the taxes in question, they were under a duty pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8(c), of the Rules of Civil Procedure to allege payment as an affirmative defense.
The trial court considered the statute in question, compared defendants’ answer with the statute, and found that no statutory defenses or payment were alleged. The Town met the standard of *463Rule 12(c) that no material issue of fact existed and that it was entitled to judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
Judge ARNOLD concurs.
Judge CLARK dissents.