State v. Gray, 17 N.C. App. 131 (1972)

Dec. 20, 1972 · North Carolina Court of Appeals · No. 7221SC809
17 N.C. App. 131
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN ROSS GRAY

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN ROSS GRAY

No. 7221SC809

(Filed 20 December 1972)

Criminal Law § 23— plea of guilty

Defendant’s plea of guilty to second degree murder was freely, understandingly and voluntarily entered, without undue influence, compulsion or duress, and without promise of leniency.

Appeal by defendant from Gambill, Judge, 8 May 1972 Session of Superior Court held in Forsyth County.

Defendant was charged in a bill of indictment, proper in form, with the felony of murder. At the 1 May 1972 Session of Superior Court held in Forsyth County, defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. The jury did not recommend that punishment be by imprisonment for life. On 5 May 1972, Judge Chess, the presiding judge, upon defendant’s motion, set the verdict aside as being contrary to the weight of the evidence. During the second week of the 8 May 1972 Session, defendant was arraigned before Judge Gambill at which time he entered a plea of guilty to second degree murder. Judge Gambill sentenced defendant to imprisonment for a term of not less than 25 nor more than 30 years. Defendant appealed.

Attorney General Morgan, by Assistant Attorney General Banks, for the State.

Whicker, Vannoy & Moore, by J. Gary Vannoy and Hoio-ard C. Colvard, Jr., for the defendant.

BROCK, Judge.

Defendant argues that his plea of guilty was not freely and voluntarily entered. Counsel’s arguments have been ingenious but we are not convinced. The Assistant Attorney General clearly and concisely answered each argument. We see no purpose to be served in discussing them seriatim.

The record clearly and fully supports the judge’s findings that the plea of guilty was freely, understandingly and voluntarily entered, without undue influence, compulsion or duress, and without promise of leniency.

*132We have further examined the face of the record proper and conclude that no prejudicial error appears.

No error.

Judges Campbell and Graham concur.