delivered the opinion of the Court:
On the 16th of February, 1881, Patrick McGinnis, the appellee, sold to the appellants, Herbert S. Gilbert & Co., seven thousand bushels of corn, at thirty-nine cents per bushel, to be delivered in the months of August and September following. As a part of the same agreement the appellants promised to make advances on the contract to appellee of what money he might,- from time to time, require. A short time after the making 'of this agreement, appellee called on the appellants, at their business house in Ottawa, and requested an advance on the contract, as per agreement. The clerk in charge of their business told him he could have the money, and commenced writing a note for the amount, whereupon appellee stated to the clerk he would not sign a note, remarking, in effect, that if he wanted to obtain money in that way *31he could get it from the bank. Appellants refused to make the required advance unless appellee would give his note for the amount. This he declined to do, and informed the clerk at the time he would not let appellants have the corn. The corn not having been delivered within the time specified in the agreement, the appellants, on the 3d day of October, 1881, commenced an action of assumpsit, against appellee, in the circuit court of La Salle county, to recover damages for the non-delivery of the corn, which resulted in a judgment in favor of the defendant, for costs. This judgment having been affirmed by the Appellate Court for the Second District, the plaintiffs appealed to this court.
On the trial the plaintiffs offered to show there was a general custom among grain merchants to take notes from the seller for the amount of advances made under contracts for the sale of grain, like the one in question. They also proposed to prove that on previous occasions there had been contracts and dealings similar in character to the one sued upon, and that the manner of dealing between the parties was, when an advance was made, memoranda or notes should be taken for the money advanced. The court declined to admit evidence to the jury in support of either of these positions, and the ruling of the court in this respect presents the only question for determination. The same question is raised by certain refused instructions asked on behalf of the appellants.
The rule is well recognized that where a commercial contract is in any respect ambiguous, a particular custom or usage of trade known to the parties, or which, under' the circumstances, they are presumed to know, or any previous course of dealing between them that will have a tendency to disclose the real intentions of the parties, and to aid the court in arriving at its true construction, will be admissible in evidence. Such evidence is not only admissible for the purpose of explaining the terms of a contract, but also for the purpose of ingrafting, as it were, new terms into it, sub*32ject, however, to the qualification .that such new terms are not expressly or impliedly excluded by the express agreement. (1 Smith’s Leading Cases, *307, et seq.) To have this effect, however, the usage must be reasonable, and not in conflict with any general rule of law. (Macy et al. v. Wheeling Ins. Co. 9 Metc. 354.) The proof offered in this case was clearly not for the purpose of explaining any ambiguity in the contract, or for the purpose of showing that some particular word or phrase in it is used out of its ordinary signification. No claim of this kind is made. It is conceded by both parties that appellants were to make advances,—that is, let appellee have money, from time to time, as he might need it, under the contract. So far there is no controversy. But appellants contend that a custom or usage prevailed, not adverted to in the express agreement, which required the appellee to give to them his note upon receiving any such advances. The usage here sought to be shown, it is clear, was for the purpose of adding a stipulation on the part of appellee which, it is conceded, is not found in the express agreement. This, as we have already seen, may sometimes be done; but whether it could be done in this particular case depends upon whether the stipulation thus to be added is inconsistent or in conflict with that part of the agreement which is expressed, and about which there is no controversy. We are clearly of opinion that it is, and that the trial court therefore ruled properly in excluding the evidence and in refusing the instructions complained of.
An advance or payment of money on a contract of sale, without doubt, is" altogether a different thing from that of obtaining money from the purchaser on the seller’s own note. The legal effect of the transaction in the first case is to extinguish, pro tanto, the seller’s claim and the purchaser’s corresponding liability. In the second, no part of either is extinguished. Instead of collecting something on his corn, as provided by the agreement, the seller is offered a loan of *33money on his individual note, which would be a complete change of the legal relations of the parties. Whereas the seller was, before, a mere creditor of the purchaser, he at once, upon giving such a note, becomes the debtor of the purchaser, and no part of the debt due him on account of the sale is thereby discharged. Thus it is seen the legal effect in the one case is practically the very opposite of what it is in the other, and might in many cases result in the grossest injustice. For instance, had appellee given his note for the required advance, the appellants might, the next hour thereafter, have transferred it to another for value, and appellee would have been compelled to pay it, whether he ever got a cent for his corn or not. This is apparent. That one will not be permitted to prove a custom or usage the effect of which will be to add to an express agreement a condition or limitation which is repugnant to or inconsistent with the agreement itself, will hardly be questioned. This is not only the universally received doctrine on the subject, but it has been often fully recognized by this court. Cadwell v. Meek, 17 Ill. 220; Bissell v. Ryan, 23 id. 566; Deshler v. Beers, 32 id. 368; Wilson v. Bauman, 80 id. 493. In the editor’s note to Wigglesworth v. Dalleson, Smith’s Leading Cases, 309, it is said: “Evidence of usage, though sometimes admissible
to add to or explain, is never to vary or to contradict, either expressly or by implication, the terms of a written instrument,”—citing in support of the proposition, Magie v. Atkinson, 2 M. & W. 442, Adams v. Worldley, 1 id. 374, Freeman v. Loeder, 11 A. & E. 589, and Gates v. Pym, 6 Taunt. 445. The rule here stated is equally applicable to a verbal contract, where the terms of it are definitely fixed, as they are in the present case.
It follow's from what we have said, and the authorities cited, the judgment of the Appellate Court must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.