Noble v. People, 1 Ill. 54, 1 Breese 54 (1822)

Dec. 1822 · Illinois Supreme Court

1 Ill. 54, 1 Breese 54

William D. Noble, Plaintiff in Error, v. The People, Defendants in Error, on an indictment for Forgery.

ERROR TO ST. CLAIR.

An opinion formed, if not expressed, does not disqualify a juror. „

A person whose name is forged, is a competent witness to prove the forgery, although upon conviction, he receives one-half of the fine imposed. His credibility is left to the jurjc

All persons who believe in the existence of a God and a future state, though they disbelieve in a punishment hereafter for crimes committed here, are competent witnesses.

Opinion of the Court by

Justice John Eeynolds.

William D. Noble was indicted for forgery, and found guilty in the St. Clair circuit court. To reverse that judgment, Noble prosecuted this writ of error, and assigned four errors, to wit:

1. A juror, Moses Short, formed an opinion but had not expressed it.

2. David Rankin, the person intended to be injured by the forgery, and the person who would in case of conviction, receive a moiety of the judgment, was admitted as a witness against said Noble.

3. On account of the religious principles of said Rankin, he not believing in the doctrine of receiving punishment after death for crimes done in this life, although he believed in the existence of a God and a future state.

4. The record of a civil suit was admitted in evidence, to show the amount that said Noble intended to defraud said Rankin of.

On the first point the law and constitution provide that all men shall be tried by an impartial jury; but as the mind of man is so organized, it is almost impossible for a jury to be perfectly impartial. Slight impressions will appear on the minds of any person who will at all think of any subject—this is unavoidable. These impressions will go on step by step on the mind, until they are confirmed into complete opinions. Yet the law can not draw any distinction between the most hasty impression, and a confirmed opinion ; therefore all these grades of opinion must be treated alike, and ought not to disqualify the person from acting on the jury. It is quite different when these opinions are expressed—every person wishes to appear to the world consistent-—therefore there is a strong partiality for these opinions when expressed, so much so, that it disqualifies. a person so situated from acting on a jury. This pride of opinion to act consistent, exists in every person, but as there was in this cas^ no expression of this opinion, I think there is no error in this respect, ^(a) ⁽¹⁾

The second point presents a question important to the public, yet I think one of easy solution. From necessity and public policy, the person on whom the forgery was committed must be admitted to prove it, although our statute gives such person one-half of the judgment so recovered against the accused. If this were not the law, forgeries would go unpunished. This is an exception to the general rule of an interested person being a witness. This interest must be left to his credit. If the witness be manifestly biased by his interest, the jury can detect him. With this view of the subject, I think Rankin was a competent witness ; therefore in this there is no error, ^(b) ⁽²⁾

The third error brings in discussion the religious principles of said Rankin. I conceive the law to be, that all persons who believe in the existence of a God and a future state, are on this account good witnesses. The witness believed in a God and a future state of existence, yet he did not believe in being punished hereafter for crimes done in this life ; yet as he believed in the great essential matters as the law requires, he is considered a good witness, ^(c) ⁽³⁾

On the fourth point I will barely remark, that the record appears to me to be the best evidence to prove the amount which the said Noble intended to defraud the said Rankin of. Therefore on all these matters I am of opinion the judgment of the court below ought to be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

(a) Jurors must be free from all exceptions. 2 Johns. Rep., 194. The proper question to be propounded to a juryman is, “ Have you made up and delivered an opinion, that the prisoner is guilty or innocent of the charge laid in the indictment 1” 1 Burr’s Trial, 418.

(1) The law in relation to disqualification of jurors from having formed opinions is very fully discussed in the case of Smith v. Eames, 3 Scam., 77. Breese, Justice, who delivered the opinion of the court in that case, said: “ If a juror has made up a decided opinion on the merits of the case, either from a personal knowledge of the facts, from the statements of witnesses, from the relations of the parties, or cither of them, or from rumor, and that opinion is positive and not hypothetical, and such as will probably prevent him from giving an impartial verdict, the challenge should be allowed. If the opinion be merely of a light and transient character, such as is usually formed by persons in every community upon hearing a current report, and which may be changed by the relation of the next person met with, and which does not show a conviction of the mind and a fixed conclusion thereon, or if it be hypothetical, the challenge ought not to be allowed; and to ascertain the state of the mind of a juror, a Ml examination, if deemed necessary, may be allowed.” The principles enunciated in this case have, ever since, been adhered to by our court. Gardner v. The People, 3 Scam., 83. Sellers v. Same, id., 412. Vennum v. Harwood, 1 Gilm., 659. Baxter v. The People, 3 Gilm., 368. Neely v. The People, 13 Ill., 687.

In Thompson v. The People, 24 Ill, 60, a person was called as a juror who, on being examined on oath as to his qualifications, said he had conversed with a witness in the case, and formed an opin: on as far as he heard—that he believed what he heard, but that he had not formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner. It was held by the court that he was not incompetent.

(b) The English rule is, that a party whose signature is alleged to be forged can not be received to testify in support of an indictment for the forgery. 2 Stark. on Ev., 582. This rule is adhered to in Connecticut, Vermont and North Carolina. In New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and New York, he is held to be competent. 4 Johns. Rep., 296.

(2) The present statute in relation to qualifications of witnesses in criminal trials is as follows : “ The party or parties injured shall, in all cases, be competent witnesses, unless he, she or they shall be rendered incompetent by reason of his, her or their infamy or other legal incompetency other than that of interest. The credibility of all such witnesses shall be left to the jury as in other cases ” Scates' Comp., page 377. Purple’s Statutes, 361, Sec. 15.

(c) The proper question to be asked of a witness is, whether he believes in God, the obligation of an oath, and in a future state of rewards and punishments. 1 Stark. Ev., 82, note (r)

The witness must believe that divine punishment will be the consequence of perjury. Ibid., 80.

(3) A person who has no religious belief, who does not acknowledge a Supreme Being, and who does not feel himself accountable to any moral punishment here or hereafter, but who acknowledges hi.; amenability to the criminal law, if he foreswear himself, can not become a w.tness. Central Military Tract R. R. Co. v. Rockafellow, 17 Ill., 541.

The unbelief of such a person is best established by the testimony of others ; though he may be permitted, sworn or unsworn, to explain any change of belief, and leave the court to determine as to his competency. Id.

The authorities on this question are stated fully in the opinion of Scates, C. J., in this case.