delivered the opinion of the court.
Cohn v. Bernstein, 205 Ill. App. 325 (1917)
April 16, 1917
·
Illinois Appellate Court
·
Gen. No. 22,762
205 Ill. App. 325
Isidor Cohn and Herman Cohn, trading as Cohn Brothers Cigar Company, Appellees, v. S. Bernstein and A. Swidler, Appellants.
Gen. No. 22,762.
(Not to he reported in full.)
Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago-; the Hon. Dennis W. Sullivan, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1916.
Affirmed.
Opinion filed April 16, 1917.
Rehearing denied April 30, 1917.
Statement of the Case.
Action by Isidor Cohn and Herman Cohn, trading as Cohn Brothers Cigar Company, plaintiffs, against S. Bernstein and A. Swidler, defendants, upon a written guaranty to the extent of five hundred dollars of credit of Charles Piantry. From a judgment for plaintiffs for five hundred dollars, defendants appeal.
Smith, Fake, Levinson & Hoffman, for appellants; Eugene R. Cohn, of counsel.
Blum, Wolfsohn & Blum, for appellees.
*326Abstract of the Decision.
1. Guaranty—when evidence sufficient to show execution of contract as sureties. Evidence held sufficient to warrant the finding that defendants executed the contract of guaranty sued on as sureties.
2. Appeal and error, § 269 * —what are final appealable orders. Where after entry of judgment against defendants they filed motion to set aside the judgment and grant a new trial, which was denied, held that defendants had the right to two appeals, one from the original judgment and one from the denial of the motion, as the orders for both entry of judgment and denial of the motion were final appealable orders.
3. Appeal and error, § 19*—when review on appeal confined to original judgment. Where, after a motion for new trial and in arrest of judgment against defendants was denied and judgment was entered against them, and thereafter a motion to set aside the judgment and grant a new trial was also denied and thereupon defendants prayed and were allowed an appeal and filed an appeal bond, which recited that the appeal was prosecuted from the original judgment entered, held that review on such appeal would be confined to the original judgment and would not embrace the final order denying the motion to set aside the judgment and grant a new trial.