delivered the opinion of the court.
Cox v. St. Louis, Springfield & Peoria Railroad, 193 Ill. App. 596 (1915)
April 16, 1915
·
Illinois Appellate Court
193 Ill. App. 596
Jerinette Cox, Infant, Appellee, v. St. Louis, Springfield & Peoria Railroad, Appellant.
(Not to be reported in full.)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Macoupin county; the Hon. Robert B. Shirley, Judge, presiding.
Heard in this court at the October term, 1914.
Affirmed.
Opinion filed April 16, 1915.
Statement of the Case.
Action by Jennette Cox, an infant, against the St. Louis, Springfield & Peoria Railroad to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff, a child, seventeen months old. From a judgment for plaintiff for nine hundred dollars, defendant appeals.
*597Abstract of the Decision.
1. Evidence, § 461 * —when evidence shows that accident tooTe place within a city. Evidence which establishes the fact that a child was injured by a train at the intersection of two streets in a certain city, the place alleged in the declaration as the place of the injury, and as being within the corporate limits of the city, is sufficient to establish the fact that the place where the accident occurred was within the corporate limits of the city.
2. Municipal corporations, § 105*—when ordinance admissible. An ordinance of a city regulating the speed of electric railroad cars within the corporate limits, which is printed in book form and purports to be published by authority of the city council of a city, is admissible in evidence in action by an infant against a street railroad company to recover damages for injuries sustained as a result of the negligence of the company in running its cars at a higher rate of speed than was authorized by such ordinance.
3. Damages, § 134*—when verdict not excessive. A verdict and judgment for nine hundred dollars, in an action by an infant seventeen months old against a street car company to recover damages for injuries sustained as a result of the negligence of the company, is not excessive where the infant’s skull was crushed to such an extent that it was necessary to remove a portion of it, the infant later completely recovering from the injury.
Plaintiff had strayed near defendant’s railroad tracks and was struck by one of defendant’s interurban cars, which was running at a higher rate of speed than was permitted by the ordinance of the city, and which crushed her skull to such an extent that it wag necessary to remove a portion' of it. The child recovered entirely from the accident.
John B. Hardaway and Rinaker & Rinaker, for appellant.
H. H. Willoughby and Peebles & Peebles, for appellee.