Snite v. Gehrke, 189 Ill. App. 382 (1914)

Nov. 9, 1914 · Illinois Appellate Court · Gen. No. 19,737
189 Ill. App. 382
Albert P. Snite, Plaintiff in Error, v. Robert C. Gehrke, Defendant in Error

Albert P. Snite, Plaintiff in Error, v. Robert C. Gehrke, Defendant in Error.

Gen. No. 19,737.

(Not to be reported in full.)

Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John J. Rooney, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1914.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed November 9, 1914.

Statement of the Case.

Action of replevin by Albert P. Snite against Robert C. Gehrke to obtain household goods in the possession of defendant under a distress warrant. The trial court held adversely to plaintiff and a writ of retorno habendo was ordered to issue. To reverse the judgment, plaintiff prosecutes a writ of error.

The chattel mortgage purported to have been made by Catherine D. Pearce and George C. Pearce, but the clerk of the Municipal Court, before whom the acknowledgment was made, certified that the persons acknowledging it before him were Arthur D. Pearce and George C. Pearce'. The mortgage also purported to have been given to secure a note of even date which, by the language of the mortgage, became “due and payable on or before 35 months after date of option of the legal holder thereof.”

Snite & Longenecker, for plaintiff in error; Joel F. Longenecker, of counsel.

Frederick H. Gansbergen and William C. Rigby, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.

*383Abstract of the Decision.

1. Chattel mortgages, § 68 * —when acknowledgment insufficient. Where a chattel mortgage is not acknowledged by one of the mortgagors, it will not be effective as against the claim of a third party.

2. Chattel mortgages, § 36 * —when statement as to maturity of note defective. A provision in a chattel mortgage that the note secured thereby “became due and payable on or before 35 months after date of option of the legal holder thereof,” held to state no time for the maturity of the debt and to constitute a defect of which a third party may take advantage.

3. Replevin, § 44 * —necessity of demand. Where defendant is in possession of goods, under a distress warrant, his possession is lawful and a demand is necessary before replevin can be brought.