delivered the opinion of the court.
Borgerson v. Chicago Railways Co., 187 Ill. App. 65 (1914)
May 20, 1914
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Illinois Appellate Court
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Gen. No. 18,861
187 Ill. App. 65
Ludwig M. Borgerson, Appellant, v. Chicago Railways Company, Appellee.
Gen. No. 18,861.
(Not to he reported in full.)
Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Edward M. Mangan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1912.
Affirmed.
Opinion filed May 20, 1914.
Statement of the Case.
Action by Ludwig M. Borgerson against Chicago Railways Company to recover for injuries sustained by plaintiff resulting from a collision while attempting to pass one of defendant’s westbound cars on his motorcycle. It appeared that plaintiff was following the car, and when it stopped at a street intersection to discharge passengers he attempted to pass it on the side next to the eastbound track, and while approaching the front end of it a passenger came out the front door of the car on that side and stepped to the street in front of plaintiff so that he was unable to avert a collision and he was thrown to the pavement and in*66jured. Plaintiff recovered a verdict for five hundred dollars, and not being satisfied with the amount recovered appeals from the judgment.
Abstract of the Decision.
1. Appeal and ebbob, § 1523 * —when giving of erroneous instructions harmless. In an action for personal injuries, the giving of erroneous instructions on the right of appellant to recover are harmless where the jury found that issue for him.
2. Appeal and ebbob, § 1241*—when party cannot complain of instructions based on same theory as his own. Where a party induces the court to give instructions on a theory of the case, he cannot complain that instructions on the same theory were given at the instance of his adversary.
3. Damages, § 242*—when judgment will not be reversed for inadequacy of damages awarded. A judgment will not be reversed for the reason that the damages awarded are inadequate, where the damages claimed are of a class where no definite measure exists and the verdict of a jury is ordinarily conclusive, the reviewing court not being able to say that the verdict is so disproportionate to the damages as to warrant it in awarding a new trial, or to indicate that the jury were influenced by passion, prejudice or other improper motives.
Morse Ives, for appellant
Charles L. Mahony and Alfred B. Davis, Jr., for appellee; John R. Guilliams and Frank L. Kriete, of counsel.