First National Bank of Princeton v. Ficklin, 185 Ill. App. 381 (1914)

March 10, 1914 · Illinois Appellate Court · Gen. No. 19,079
185 Ill. App. 381
First National Bank of Princeton, Defendant in Error, v. Joseph C. Ficklin, Plaintiff in Error

First National Bank of Princeton, Defendant in Error, v. Joseph C. Ficklin, Plaintiff in Error.

Gen. No. 19,079.

(Not to be reported in full.)

Abstract of the Decision.

1. Continuance, § 50 * —when affidavit that defendant's attorney was engaged, insufficient ground for. Where defendant’s attorney *382of record was absent when the case was duly called for trial, held that an affidavit presented in support of a motion for a continuance on the ground that the attorney was engaged was wholly inadequate to warrant a continuance.

*381Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Hosea W. Wells, Judge, presiding.

Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1913.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed March 10, 1914.

Statement of the Case.

Action by the First National Bank of Princeton against Joseph C. Ficklin on a promissory note. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant brings error.

Benjamin F. J. Odell, for plaintiff in error.

Miller, Starr, Packard & Peokham, for defendant in error; Robert C. Wheeler, of counsel.

Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.

*3822. Bills and notes, § 373 * —when introduction of note makes prima facie case for plaintiff. Where the execution of a note is not denied, the note when offered in evidence makes a prima facie case for plaintiff, including the fact of plaintiff’s ownership, notwithstanding a stamped indorsement thereon to a third party which, under the statute, the owner was privileged to strike out.

3. Bills and notes, § 375 * —proof of consideration. In a suit on a promissory note, proof of consideration is not essential to a prima facie case; want of consideration is an affirmative defense for defendant to establish.

4. Costs, § 67 * —damages for prosecuting a writ of error for delay. Ten per centum of the amount of the judgment allowed as statutory damages under R. S. ch. 33, § 23, J. & A. 2737, for suing out and prosecuting a writ of error for delay, it appearing that the contentions for reversal were obviously untenable and devoid of merit.