delivered the opinion of the court:
The petitioner, Charles R. Rhodes, has asked this Court to review and reverse an order of the Pollution Control Board entered on September 16, 1971. The Board’s order, promulgated under the provisions of the Environmental Protection Act (Ch. 111½, Sec. 1001 et seq., Ill. Rev. Stats. 1971), ordered the petitioner to refrain from future violations of specific rules enacted by the Department of Public Health and imposed a fine in the amount of $1,500.00. The Board’s order was entered after the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) filed a complaint against Mr. Rhodes and conducted extensive hearings at which Mr. Rhodes was represented by counsel.
The petitioner has filed a three-page handwritten argument with this Court that we have accepted as his brief on appeal. In seeking to reverse the order of the Board, Mr. Rhodes has proceeded on two main theories. First, he has argued that he was not in violation of the Rules and regulations for Refuse Disposal Sites and Facilities (hereinafter referred to as Rules) and second, that the Rules in question were not applicable to his particular landfill. The pro se nature of petitioner’s appeal coupled with the fact that no abstract or excerpt from record was filed has caused us to examine the record on appeal in detail to determine whether or not the petitioner’s allegations are meritorious. We shall first consider *76the petitioner’s contention that no violations were established by the record.
The Pollution Control Board found that the petitioner was guilty of four areas of violation: (1) that a floodgate near the landfill site was often clogged with brush and debris and therefore incapable of serving its intended function1; (2) that Mr. Rhodes did not confine the dumping of refuse to the smallest practical area 2; (3) that refuse was not covered daily3; and (4) that salvage operations at the landfill site were not carried out in a sanitary manner and salvaged materials were not removed *77from the landfill on a daily basis.4 Judicial review of decisions entered pursuant to the provisions of the Environmental Protection Act is governed by Sec. 41, Ch. 111½, Par. 1041, Ill. Rev. Stats. 1971, which provides that review shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Review Act. (Ch. 110, Sec. 264 et seq., Ill. Rev. Stats. 1971), Sec. 274 of that Act provides, in part, that “the findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and correct.” Therefore, we may not reverse the findings of the Board in this case unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. (Sturgeon v. Powell (1971), 1 Ill.App.3d 130, 132, 273 N.E.2d 617; John Sander, Inc. v. Donnelly (1964), 53 Ill. App.2d 172, 177, 203 N.E.2d 20; Turro v. Carpentier (1960), 26 Ill.App.2d 156, 163, 167 N.E.2d 568.) The record in this cause indicates that there was evidence to support each facet of the Board’s order and the violations in question were observed on more than one occasion. There is simply nothing before us to suggest in any manner that the findings of the Board were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Sturgeon v. Powell, supra.
The petitioner has argued that the rules in question could not be complied with in every instance due to factors beyond his control such as inclement weather. However, a review of the testimony in this case reveals that the days on which infractions of the rules were noted were not days on which petitioner’s operations were impeded by the elements. The final assertion made by the petitioner is that the rules in question were wrong and unreasonable when applied to his particular landfill. The Act, however, provides that once a violation is shown then the burden of proof is on the violator “to show that compliance with the Board’s regulations would impose an arbitrary or unreasonable hardship.” (Ch. 111½, Sec. 1031 (c), Ill. Rev. Stats. 1971.) This burden was not met by the petitioner.
For the reasons expressed herein, the order of the Pollution Control Board is affirmed.
TRAPP, P. J., and SMITH, J., concur.