delivered the opinion of the court:
Objectors, Winston Development Corporation and National Bank of Austin, as trustee under Trust Number 4657, appeal from the order of the Circuit Court of Cook County which found that the Petition for Annexation was valid.
On appeal the objectors contend:
(1) That the petitioners did not meet all the requirements of the annexation statute;
(2) That the affidavit of DiMonte was insufficient to make a prima facie case;
(3) That the property sought to be annexed was not contiguous to South Barrington; and
(4) That the annexation statute was unconstitutional as applied to the objectors’ property.
On February 17, 1970, the annexation petition was filed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County. On February 19, 1970, notice of the proposed annexation was published in the Barrington Courier Review. There was no newspaper published in South Barrington. The Barrington Courier Review has a general circulation in the annexing municipality and territory. Petitioners own over 155 acres within the area sought to be annexed. Objectors own approximately 150 acres within the area sought to be annexed.
The objectors’ first contention was that the petitioners did not meet all the requirements of the annexation statute. The objectors contend that a copy of the newspaper notice was not filed with the clerk of the annexing municipality and that the notice of the annexation petition hearing was not properly published.
The statute involved specifically states in pertinent part:
“* * * This notice shall be given by publishing a notice thereof at least once in one or more newspapers published in the annexing municipality, or, if no newspaper is published therein, then in one or more newspapers with a general circulation within the annexing municipality and territory. A copy of this notice shall be filed with the clerk of the annexing municipality.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 24, par. 7 — 1—2.
The objectors rely on People ex rel. Hopf v. Village of Bensenville, 132 Ill.App. 907, 272 N.E.2d 50, for the proposition that notices required by the annexation statute are mandatory and that failure to give the required notice to the village clerk was fatal. In the Hopf case, the statute involved specifically stated that “no annexation of such land is effective unless service is had and the affidavit filed as provided in *961this section.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 24, par. 7 — 1—1.) It was clear from the language of the statute in question in the Hopf case that failure to comply with its provisions was fatal. In the case at bar there was no mandatory language which stated that annexation was ineffective unless a copy of the published notice was filed with the clerk of the annexing municipality.
It was uncontroverted that notice of the hearing on the annexation petition was published in the Barrington Courier Review. Objectors contend petitioners failed to establish that there was no newspaper published in South Barrington and therefore a jurisdictional element was missing. In the annexation petition the petitioners stated that there was no daily or weekly newspaper published in the annexing municipality, but that the Barrington Courier Review was a weekly newspaper having a general circulation within both the annexing municipality and the territory to be annexed. Objectors introduced no evidence that there was a daily or weekly newspaper published in the Village of South Barrington. The objectors were not prejudiced in any way by the petitioners’ conduct in fulfilling the notice requirement of the annexation statute.
The objectors contend that the legal description of the property in the annexation petition was defective. Objectors rely on People v. Astle, 337 Ill. 253, 169 N.E. 185, which held that where the description of the property contains a patent ambiguity, the uncertainty in the description cannot be cured by extrinsic evidence. In the Astle case, the lines constituting the boundaries did not meet and therefore the lands of the conservancy district were not completely enclosed as required.
In the case at bar, the boundaries met and enclosed the land in question. The surveyor testified that he was unable to definitely ascertain the boundaries of the area from the legal description alone. The surveyor also testified that he could definitely ascertain the boundaries of the area by checking the legal descriptions in the recorder’s office and making a field survey. The Supreme Court in People v. Knapp, 28 Ill.2d 239, 246, 190 N.E.2d 774, stated that:
"Descriptions of municipal boundaries are not construed with the same strictness as are those contained in deeds and contracts, and if the description in a petition to incorporate fairly apprises the public of the property involved, it will be considered sufficient. People ex rel. Village of Worth v. Ihde, 23 Ill.2d 63.”
In Gard v. Bosch, 4 Ill.App.3d 828, 281 N.E.2d 788, the court at pages 831 and 832 said:
“As a general rule the precision required of a legal description of real estate depends upon purpose of the document, the risk of harm and the likelihood that the parties dealing with such *962document will be misled, injured or prejudiced. Descriptions of municipal boundaries do not require the same specificity as may be required in deeds. (People ex rel. Cameron v. Neu, 214 Ill. 287, 73 N.E. 362).”
The legal description and map contained in the annexation petition fairly apprised the public of the property to be annexed and therefore was sufficient.
The objectors’ second contention was that tire affidavit of DiMonte was insufficient to make a prima facie case. The statute involved states in pertinent part:
“All petitions shall be supported by an affidavit of one or more of the petitioners, or some one on their behalf, that the signatures on the petition represent a majority of the property owners of record and the owners of record of more than 50% of land in the territory described and a majority of the electors of the territory therein described. Petitions so verified shall be accepted as prima facie evidence of such facts.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 24, par. 7 — 1—4.
DiMonte’s affidavit reads as follows:
“The undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he is one of the petitioners whose signature is subscribed to the foregoing petition, that the persons signing the petition constitute a majority of the property owners of record, the owners of record of more than fifty per cent of land in the territory described and a majority of the electors of the territory therein described. The undersigned further states that the allegations of said petition are true.”
The court in In re Petition to Annex Certain Territory, 33 Ill.App.2d 38, 178 N.E.2d 895, stated that as a general rule the averments of an affidavit which conform literally to the language of tire statute prescribing them are sufficient. The trial court heard DiMonte’s testimony concerning the petition and the petitioners. DiMonte testified that William and Ann Emerson were electors within the territory in question. DiMonte also testified that Alexander Stillman was a registered voter within the territory in question.
The petition for annexation as a whole was supported by DiMonte’s affidavit. Paragraph 8 of the annexation petition counterparts stated that “this petition may be executed in two or more counterparts, all of which shall together constitute one and the same petition.”
The objectors have failed to meet their burden to prove that the matters sworn to in the affidavit were not true. We conclude that DiMonte’s affidavit sufficiently states all matters required by Section 7 — 1—4 of the *963annexation statute to constitute the petition prima facie evidence of such facts and require the objectors to overcome the prima facie case so made.
The objectors’ third contention was that the property sought to be annexed was not contiguous to South Barrington. The statute requires that the property to be annexed must be contiguous to the annexing municipality. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 24, par. 7 — 1—1.
Certain general principles have been settled by the cases in which we have defined the term “contiguity” as used in the statute. "Contiguity” means a touching or adjoining in a reasonably substantial physical sense, however, the line of demarcation between the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a contiguity must be drawn from the facts of each case. (Western Nat. Bank of Cicero v. Village of Kildeer, 19 Ill.2d 342, 352, 167 N.E.2d 169.) The finding of the trial court as to contiguity or lack of it will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly against the weight of the evidence. (La Salle Nat. Bank v. Village of Burr Ridge, 81 Ill.App.2d 209, 217, 218, 225 N.E.2d 33.) Irregularity of the resulting boundaries in itself is not a fatal defect in determining contiguity to a village. Western Nat. Bank of Cicero v. Village of Kildeer, supra, at page 351; In re Annex. Terr. to Village of Buffalo Grove, 128 Ill.App.2d 261, 265, 266, 261 N.E.2d 746.
In the case at bar the land to be annexed touched the annexing village for over 3700 feet. The court in In re Ordinance No. 491, Annexing Territory to Loves Park, 89 Ill.App.2d 284, 232 N.E.2d 144, held that a common boundary of 835 feet constituted contiguity.
The objectors rely on People ex rel. Cooper Realty v. Burr Ridge, 81 Ill.App.2d 203, 225 N.E.2d 39, and People ex rel. Adamowski v. Village of Streamwood, 15 Ill.2d 595, 155 N.E.2d 635, which both deal strictly with street annexations and therefore do not apply to the case at bar. Wild v. People ex rel. Stephens, 227 Ill. 568, 81 N.E. 707, is easfiy distinguished from the case at bar since part of the annexed territory consisted of many ships, one of which was only 50 feet wide. In the case at bar the narrowest point is 330 feet wide and the annexed area is not made up of strips.
Objectors contend that the term “contiguity” should be given the interpretation of requiring unity of purpose and fadlities in addition to the well recognized necessity of reasonably substantial physical touching. The objectors rely on People ex rel. South Barrington v. Hoffman, 30 Ill.2d 385, 198 N.E.2d 97, as requiring unity of purpose and futilities in addition to substantial physical touching in order to have contiguity. The court in In re Annex. Terr. to Village of Buffalo Grove, 128 Ill.App. 2d 261, 272, 273, 261 N.E.2d 746, interpreted the Hoffman case as not establishing the additional requirement of unity of purpose and facilities. *964If there is reasonably substantial physical touching, there is contiguity.
In the case at bar, the property to be annexed substantially physically touches the annexing municipality and therefore the properties are contiguous.
The objectors’ fourth contention was that the annexation statute was unconstitutional as applied to the objectors’ property. The statute involved specifically states in part:
“A written petition signed by a majority of the owners of record of land in such territory and also by a majority of the electors, if any, residing in such territory, shall be filed with the Circuit Court Clerk of the county in which the territory is located, or the corporate authorities of any such municipality may initiate the proceedings by enacting an ordinance expressing their desire to annex such described territory; provided, no tract of land in excess of 10 acres in area may be included in the ordinances of a municipality initiating the proceedings without the express consent of the owner thereof unless the said tract (1) is subdivided into lots or blocks or (2) is bounded on at least 3 sides by lands subdivided into lots or blocks; a tract of land shall be deemed so bounded if it is actually separated from such subdivision only by the right-of-way of a railroad or other public utility or at a public highway.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 24, par. 7 — 1—2.
The objectors contend that tracts of land in excess of 10 acres could not have been included in an annexation proceeding initiated by South Barrington, but that any number of acres could have been included in an annexation proceeding initiated by property owners within the area to be annexed. Objectors contend that the distinction between municipalities and property owners was unconstitutional and void. It was conceded that the legislature can classify, but the classification must not be arbitrary and unreasonable.
“If there is a reasonable basis for differentiating between the class to which the law is applicable and the class to which it is not, the General Assembly may constitutionally classify persons and objects for the purpose of legislative regulation or control, and may pass laws applicable only to such persons or objects.” People ex rel. the County of DuPage v. Smith, 21 Ill.2d 572, 578, 173 N.E.2d 485.
The classification involved in section 7 — 1—2 of the annexation statute was adopted in order to prevent the owners of small parcels of land from forcing hundreds of acres of land into a municipality. Under the municipality ordinance procedure the final decision as to an annexation rests with the vote of the electors in the area. Under the petition method of annexation the 10 acre provision is unnecessary because the petition*965ers must be the owners of over 50% of the land to be annexed. The petition method of annexation protects the owner of large tracts of land from being forced into a municipality against his will.
We find that the statute preventing involuntary annexation of more than 10 acres in an ordinance initiated annexation and omitting such provision in a petition initiated annexation is not unreasonable and arbitrary.
For the reasons given, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
LYONS, J., concurs.