delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in favor of defendant Gerald Protko, a tavern operator, in an action brought under section 14 of article VI of the Liquor Control Act, commonly referred to as the Dramshop Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 43, par. 135).
Plaintiffs, Marvin R. and Imogene Ragan, are the parents of Cyrus Ragan, deceased, who was 21 years old at the time of the accident that is relevant to this cause. The instant action was commenced to recover for injury to their “property” resulting from the intoxication of their son. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 43, par. 135.
The primary issue on appeal is whether parents of a son of legal age can recover for his medical, hospital and funeral expenses as injury to their “property” under the Dramshop Act where their payment of the expenses is not made pursuant to a preexisting legal liability for such charges.
The record reveals that Cyrus Ragan patronized defendant’s tavern near Taylorville, known either as “Bea’s Junction” or “Freddies” between 7 p.m. and 12 p.m. on July 24,1973. While there, he consumed four or five mixed drinks (Harvey Wallbangers) and six to eight beers. Before leaving the tavern, Cyrus asked a fellow employee, Malcolm McClung, to follow him as he drove his car home to Pana, Illinois. Malcolm McClung observed that once Cyrus’ car was beyond the city limits of Taylorville, it drew rapidly away from McCIung’s vehicle which was traveling at 55 m.p.h. Cyrus Ragan’s car then began weaving to both sides of the road while its lights went off and on. Cyrus was thereafter involved in a one-car collision, receiving serious head and chest injuries.
Cyrus Ragan was under constant medical care for his injuries in the next eight months until his death on March 24, 1974. He never regained consciousness. Cyrus was initially placed in the intensive care unit in St. John’s Hospital in Springfield, Illinois for 18 days. During that time his parents stayed in the care unit’s lounge and took their meals in the hospital cafeteria. In late October of 1973, Cyrus and his parents were flown by air ambulance to the Mayo Clinic in Minnesota. The plaintiffs spent the first night in a hotel and the rest of the time in a motel nearer the clinic. After eight days treatment, Cyrus was returned to Taylorville where he remained until his death. During the periods of Cyrus’ hospitalization in Springfield and Taylorville, his parents visited four or five times weekly, round-trip distances being 100 miles to Springfield and 40 miles to Taylorville.
Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 3, a hospital form, contains the following declaration signed by plaintiff Marvin Ragan:
“I hereby authorize payment directly to St. John’s hospital of the Hospital benefits otherwise payable to me but not to exceed the hospital’s regular charges for this period of hospitalization. I *259 understand that I am financially responsible to the hospital for charges not covered by this authorization.” (Emphasis added.)
Marvin Ragan testified that it was his understanding when he signed the form that he would be responsible for any bills that Cyrus incurred. His sentiments were, “What father isn’t going to take care of his son.” Mr. Ragan assumed that he signed similar financial responsibility forms with respect to other charges. On cross-examination, Mr. Ragan stated that no one specifically told him that he had a legal responsibility for these bills but he assumed that he did.
Offered into evidence were numerous cancelled checks of the plaintiffs’ for medical charges and funeral expenses and insurance vouchers showing the amounts of individual claims and the benefits actually paid thereon.
In this action the plaintiffs sought to recover Cyrus’ medical, hospital and funeral expenses and the expenses for meals, lodging and transportation which they incurred while attending to Cyrus during his medical treatment. They also sought to recover for the destruction of Marvin Ragan’s 1972 Chevrolet Vega automobile.
It was also adduced at trial that Cyrus Ragan was a full-time college student at Monmouth College. He had a State scholarship for approximately *1,000 but the remainder of his yearly college expenses, some *4,000 to *5,000 was paid by his parents. During the summer breaks, Cyrus lived with his parents in Pana and worked for the Christian County Highway Department. He paid no living expenses and used the *700 or *800 that he earned at his summer job as spending money. Cyrus was claimed as a dependent on his parents’ income tax returns for 1972 and 1973.
There are very few dramshop decisions that have any relevance to the issue presented for our resolution.
In Fortner v. Norris (1958), 19 Ill. App. 2d 212, 153 N.E.2d 433, the appellate court held that the trial court had erred in dismissing an “injury in property” dramshop action brought by a wife on the basis of her legal liability for the medical, hospital and funeral expenses of her husband. Plaintiff’s husband’s injuries and death had resulted from gunshot wounds inflicted upon him by an allegedly intoxicated patron of defendant’s tavern.
The court, noting that the family expenses act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, ch. 68, par. 15) imposed an absolute legal liability on the plaintiff for her husband’s hospital, medical and funeral expenses, held that she had sufficiently alleged an “injury in property” within the meaning of the Dramshop Act. It specifically rejected the proposition that a direct physical injury to one’s tangible real or personal property is required in order for a person to be “injured in property.”
*260In reaching its decision the court discussed two previous dramshop cases where recovery had been sought and allowed on the basis that the plaintiffs had become legally obligated for certain expenses because of their relative’s or another’s intoxication, Danley v. Hibbard (1906), 222 Ill. 88, 78 N.E. 39, and Haw v. 1933 Grill, Inc. (1938), 297 Ill. App. 37, 17 N.E.2d 70.
Three years later, in Shepherd v. Marsaglia (1961), 31 Ill. App. 2d 379, 176 N.E.2d 473, the Appellate Court, Second District, was confronted with a similar issue but with the significant difference that the claim was made by parents for sums spent in curing their minor son of injuries which he received in a car accident that occurred upon his leaving defendants’ taverns.
The court there also held that the plaintiffs’ “property” cause of action was improperly dismissed even though they had not specifically pleaded the family expense statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, ch. 68, par. 15).
The court stated in pertinent part:
“This act [family expense act] imposed a legal liability on the plaintiffs, Edwin L. Shepherd, Sr., and Priscilla M. Shepherd, to pay medical and hospital expenses incurred in the treatment of their minor son,1 Edwin L. Shepherd, Jr., and we conclude that assets or money used for the payment of such expenses and the incurring of liability for the payment of same is property within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Dram Shop Act.” (Emphasis added.) 31 Ill. App. 2d 379, 385, 176 N.E.2d 473, 476.
Most relevant to the factual situation presented here is the decision of Sapp v. Johnston (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 119, 303 N.E.2d 429.
In Sapp, 21-year-old Charles C. Sapp, Jr. filed a complaint under the Dramshop Act based on injuries he received while a passenger in a car driven by Michael Minch, who was allegedly intoxicated after visiting defendants’ taverns. While a motion for summary judgment was under consideration, Sapp filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint. The amendment would have added plaintiff’s father, Charles C. Sapp, Sr., as a party plaintiff and an allegation of injury in the property of the father in that he would be required to pay for medical services provided for his son. The court thereafter granted the motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiff’s motion to amend, finding that the proposed amendment was banned by the limitations period of the statute.
The appellate court declined to consider whether the limitations ruling was correct since it believed that the claim for medical expenses by the father was baseless.
The court specifically found that the father did not incur liability for *261the payment of his adult son’s medical expenses. In doing so, the court examined the statutes expressly relied on in the proposed amendment and the common law. It found that the father was not liable for the cost of medical services under section 7 — 6 of the Illinois Public Aid Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 23, par. 7 — 6), and that he was not liable under the family expense section of the husband and wife act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 68, par. 15) because the son was not a minor child. The court concluded that “the liability of a parent for medical services furnished to a child does not extend to an adult child capable of earning his own living at the time of reaching majority.” 15 Ill. App. 3d 119,124,303 N.E.2d 429, 432.
From the foregoing cases, we conclude that in order for a parent to recover for his child’s medical and funeral expenses, he must be legally liable for the charges, and the basis for such liability must exist prior to the creation of the charges and not arise due to a voluntary assumption of financial responsibility after the fact.2 Practically speaking once a child has reached majority, his parents are no longer legally liable for his medical bills (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 1015; Graul v. Adrian; Sapp v. Johnston), and they cannot be injured in their property within the meaning of the Dramshop Act when they either pay or assume liability for medical or funeral expenses caused by their offspring’s intoxication.
The plaintiffs do not argue in this court that any obligation on their part for the instant bills arose by operation of law. They recognize that the interpretation of the case law which we have made would preclude them from recovery of the medical, hospital and funeral expenses of their son. They assert, however, that the essential element of this type of action according to the court in Fortner is the lessening of one’s estate, and that such lessening is sufficiently shown under Fortner and Shepherd whenever one has either paid or incurred liability for medical bills and related expenses regardless of the basis for such payment or obligation. We cannot agree. A close reading of both of these cases discloses that these principles are inextricably linked to the plaintiff’s legal liability for the expenses arising by operation of law.
The statute requires that the plaintiff be injured in property “by an intoxicated person.” As stated by the court in Hernandez v. Diaz (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 393, 399, 202 N.E.2d 9, 13: *262The causal relation, should plaintiffs’ theory be accepted, would be attenuated to an impermissible degree. For instance, in the present situation one can easily see the connection between the act of Cyrus Ragan and the creation of the charges; however, there is no direct connection between the act and the alleged injury to plaintiffs. They became liable for the charges solely as a result of their voluntary assumption of liability for them. Their “injury” simply was not caused “by an intoxicated person.” There is no such break in the causal connection when the plaintiffs become legally liable for the intoxicated persons medical expenses by operation of law.
*261“ *[B]y’ as used in the Liquor Control Act is the equivalent of a causal relation between an act of the intoxicated person and the injury.”
*262Logic guides us to the conclusion that since the instant medical and hospital expenses are not compensable under the Dramshop Act, the personal expenditures of the plaintiffs made during Cyrus’ treatment are similarly noncompensable. We make no finding as to whether such expenses would ever be recoverable. The case law does not provide any answer to this question. We do note, however, one factor which weighs against their allowance, namely, the extent to which such expenditures are within the exclusive control of potential plaintiffs.
The final item for discussion is whether the trial court erred in entering a judgment which denied plaintiffs’ recovery for the loss of the automobile as well as for the other items already discussed.
The defendant concedes in its brief that the loss of the instant 1972 Vega automobile would be recoverable under the act if sufficient evidence of its value were admitted at trial, but asserts that the trial court’s judgment must be affirmed because plaintiffs did not adequately prove the amount of damages. We agree.
It has been stated that when personal property cannot be economically repaired, the measure of damages is the difference between its market value before the injury and the market value of the wreckage. (Trailmobile Division of Pullman, Inc. v. Higgs (1973), 12 Ill. App. 3d 323, 297 N.E.2d 598; Janicek v. Szmitke (1964), 48 Ill. App. 2d 214,198 N.E.2d 694.) More specifically, it has been held that the measure of damages for an automobile damaged beyond repair is the fair cash value of the automobile at the time of the collision less the fair cash market value of the salvage thereof. Noel v. Hale (1961), 33 Ill. App. 2d 286,177 N.E.2d 886 (abstract).
In this case the only evidence with respect to the damages to the automobile was supplied by plaintiff Marvin Ragan. He testified that he thought the value of the car was $2,500 at the time it was wrecked and that it was a total wreck.
It is fundamental that the plaintiff has the burden of proving his damages by a preponderance of the evidence. Plaintiffs have failed to meet this burden here. •
*263 Plaintiffs presented no evidence whatsoever of the salvage value of their vehicle. Moreover, with respect to the preinjury value, only the unsubstantiated and uncertain opinion of the plaintiff was offered. No basis was laid for this opinion. Under these circumstances no knowledge of values is revealed sufficient to qualify Mr. Ragan as a witness as to the value of the car. (Adams v. Ford Motor Co. (1968), 103 Ill. App. 2d 356, 361, 243 N.E.2d 843, 846.) Consequently, no damages may be awarded based upon his opinion.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Christian County.
Affirmed.
KARNS, J., concurs.