delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Jimmie Lee Akins, was charged by indictment, filed in the circuit court of St. Clair County, with the offenses of armed robbery and aggravated battery. Following a jury trial, the trial court entered judgments of conviction for each of the offenses but sentenced defendant to five to 15 years’ imprisonment only on the armed robbery conviction. Defendant appeals the judgment entered by the trial court.
On appeal, defendant contends that his aggravated battery conviction must be vacated because the conduct constituting this offense arose out of the same conduct as, and was not independentiy motivated or otherwise separable from, the acts comprising the armed robbery. The State responds by contending that this court is without jurisdiction to entertain defendant’s contention. We first address the State’s contention.
The State argues that since no issue is raised on appeal concerning the final judgment entered by the court on the verdict of armed robbery, this court may not consider defendant’s contention concerning the incomplete judgment entered on the verdict of aggravated battery. Defendant’s timely notice of appeal is taken from both convictions. By filing a notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court defendant complied with the only jurisdictional act required of him. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 606.) Despite the fact that no sentence was imposed on defendant’s aggravated battery conviction, this case is properly before us on appeal from his conviction for armed robbery. (People v. Lilly, 56 *945Ill. 2d 493, 309 N.E.2d 1; People v. Shanklin, 26 Ill. App. 3d 167, 324 N.E.2d 711; People v. Gamboa, 30 Ill. App. 3d 242, 332 N.E.2d 543; People v. Clelland, 12 Ill. App. 3d 912, 299 N.E.2d 48.) That defendant failed to raise any issue with regard to his armed robbery conviction does not affect this court’s jurisdiction to hear his claim regarding the related aggravated battery conviction. (See People v. Clelland, 12 Ill. App. 3d 912, 299 N.E.2d 48.) Accordingly, we consider the merits of defendant’s contention.
The evidence at trial establishes that defendant confronted Leroy Porter with a gun in an alley behind Porter’s restaurant in East St. Louis. Defendant then forced Porter to enter the restaurant. Inside were four people, including a grill man, Jean Kicker. Kicker, unaware that defendant was holding a gun at Porter’s back, approached defendant. Without provocation, defendant struck Kicker in the head with the gun causing a wound requiring four stitches to close. Immediately after taking the day’s receipts, *380 in cash, defendant and his accomplice fled.
The force exerted against Kicker was entirely separate and distinct from the force and intimidation directed against Porter to effectuate the armed robbery. Separate conduct was shown supporting each of the charges and different men were the victims of each offense. Under the circumstances, two crimes were committed and there can be two convictions. (People v. Prim, 53 Ill. 2d 62, 128 N.E.2d 601, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 37 L. Ed. 2d 144, 93 S. Ct. 2731; People v. Terry, 38 Ill. App. 3d 517, 347 N.E.2d 869; People v. Butler, 64 Ill. 2d 485, 356 N.E.2d 360.) Consequently, we find no merit to defendant’s contention.
One further issue is presented by the State. The State contends that the trial court should have imposed a sentence on defendant’s aggravated battery conviction and that a remand with directions to do so is the proper disposition of this case. In urging this contention, the State is in the posture of an appellant. Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 604(a)(1)) strictly limits the Státe’s right to appeal. The Rule does not allow the State to contest the propriety of the imposition of a sentence on a criminal defendant. (People v. Kent, 40 Ill. App. 3d 256, 350 N.E.2d 890.) Had defendant not brought this appeal, the State thus could not even have suggested the issue it seeks to present. Accordingly, we do not consider it now.
For the foregoing reasons we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County.
Affirmed.
KARNS, P. J., and JONES, J., concur.