delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal by the respondent, The Baby Fold, Inc. (Baby Fold), and the intervenors, Richard and Priscilla Riley, of an order entered by the circuit court of McLean County after a hearing on a habeas corpus petition filed by Linda Fay Regenold, the natural mother of Jason Regenold, a minor. The trial court found that petitioner was entitled to custody and control of the child, and ordered intervenors to return the child to petitioner. This court has stayed the trial court’s order pending a decision on appeal.
On October 20, 1975, petitioner, a 19-year-old mother who had been divorced on September 23,1975, contacted and visited The Baby Fold, a child welfare agency, relative to her infant son, Jason (bom August 2, 1974). On October 22, 1975, petitioner returned to Baby Fold with her son, signed what is entitled “Final and Irrevocable Surrender For Purposes of Adoption” and surrendered custody of her son to a worker of Baby Fold. On October 24,1975, petitioner again visited Baby Fold, was informed of the placement, and gave certain medical history information *41about the child to the staff at Baby Fold. On October 26,1975, petitioner visited a married couple who had known her since birth, and sought their aid in procuring the return of her child. By October 28,1975, an attorney representing petitioner had contacted Baby Fold seeking the return of the child. On December 1,1975, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A hearing was conducted January 26, 1976, after which, on February 13, 1976, the trial court invalidated petitioner’s surrender and consent to adoption, and ordered the child returned to petitioner.
The facts are in dispute as to the reason petitioner contacted Baby Fold. Petitioner testified that she wanted to talk to someone. She introduced evidence indicating that she was living raider a great deal of stress at the time of placement; she was a 19-year-old mother who had then been divorced for one month; her husband had communicated to her through various letters indicating that he was unable to accept the finality of their divorce; her parents, with whom she lived, constantly argued; her mother was divorcing her father, and intended to force petitioner and her child out of the home; she had to adjust to the responsibility of a new position at her job; she had conflicts with her mother over the responsibility of rearing her three-year-old brother; the brother was a threat to her son’s physical well-being; she faced various financial difficulties; she was under medication and feared that she faced a partial hysterectomy if the medication was ineffective. Psychiatric testimony was introduced which concluded that petitioner was suffering from severe stress and “transient situational disturbance.” Petitioner’s position is that Baby Fold brought up the subject of adoption as a solution to her problem, and that due to the severe emotional duress under which she was living and of which Baby Fold was aware, Baby Fold’s hasty actions in accepting her surrender without exploring other solutions constituted fraud or duress which invalidated her surrender.
Baby Fold’s position is that it did nothing out of the ordinary, and that petitioner contacted Baby Fold for the purposes of surrendering her child. Baby Fold introduced evidence indicating that the procedure it followed is not unusual. Plaintiff was counseled on Monday, October 20, 1975, at which time she filled out and signed a family history form. A witness for Baby Fold testified that, at "that time, the alternatives of short term foster care or permanent adoption were discussed. Petitioner was asked during the October 20, 1975, interview if she wanted to consider her action and someone “suggested Wednesday.” Exactly what was meant by “suggested Wednesday” is unclear from the record, but apparently the phrase referred to the date of surrender of the child. On Wednesday, the surrender papers were signed and the child was surrendered. The surrender form was read to the petitioner before she signed it.
*42On the basis of the evidence, the trial court invalidated petitioner’s surrender stating:
“The court finds, in the circumstances present in this case, that the surrender is invalid in that it was not executed as the free and voluntary act of the petitioner.
The execution of the surrender was a reaction to the severe environmental stress and pressure under which the petitioner was operating. Her action in signing the surrender was neither voluntary or understanding. There is no doubt that, in the circumstances present here, the petitioner was not exercising her own free will in signing the surrender. The emotional disturbance that she was experiencing and the evironmental stress and pressure upon her combined to produce a result which was the product of duress.”
Besides the problems facing petitioner as enumerated above, the trial court observed and found that Baby Fold:
“[B]y failing to make meaningful attempts to solve the petitioner’s problems; by acting with unseemly haste in taking the surrender, and by accepting a surrender from someone subject to the assorted pressures facing petitioner thereby became a subtle, but active participant in the chain of events which denied the petitioner the exercise of her free will and deprived her of her infant son.”
Respondent appeals, contending that the decision of the trial court is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Section 11 of the Adoption Act was amended in 1973 to provide in pertinent part:
“A consent * * * shall be irrevocable unless it shall have been obtained by fraud or duress on the part of the person before whom such consent, surrender, or other document equivalent to a surrender is acknowledged* * *.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 4, par. 9.1 — 11.)
Petitioner persuasively argues that section 11 is constitutionally void under due process and equal protection standards in that it legislatively precludes invalidation of actions performed under duress, depending on the source of the duress. We note that the trial court, by its findings, clearly invited a comprehensive review of the statute as amended. Although we entertain serious doubts as to the constitutional validity of the statute, we need not resolve that issue. We conclude that the stress petitioner has established, regardless of its source, as a matter of law does not amount to the duress which is necessary to vitiate her consent.
Duress, in the context of consent for adoption, has been defined in numerous decisions. This court’s most recent statement on the subject can be found in In re Sims (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 406, 332 N.E.2d 36, incorporating previous supreme court pronouncements:
*43« < # # #,
“Duress has been universally defined as a condition which exists where one is induced by the unlawful act of another to make a contract or perform or forego an act under circumstances which wiU deprive him of the exercise of his free will. There must be such compulsion affecting the mind as shows that the execution of the contract or other instrument was not the voluntary act of the maker. Such compulsion must be present and operate at the time the instrument was executed. The burden of proving such duress is on the person asserting it. [Citations.]
Mere annoyance or vexation will not constitute duress, but there must be such compulsion affecting the mind as shows that the execution of the contract or other instrument is not the voluntary act of the maker. [Citations.]” ‘Mere advice, argument or persuasion does not constitute duress or undue influence if the individual acts freely when he executed the questioned documents though the same would not have been executed except for the advice, argument or persuasion. [Citation.]’ ” 30 Ill. App. 3d 406, 410-411, 332 N.E.2d 36, 39-40.
Moreover, whether the stress under which an individual acts amounts to the duress necessary to invalidate a consent for adoption must be determined in the context of the public policy favoring finality in the adoption process. We note that the Adoption Act’s consent provision has evolved over the years in response to the recognized need for providing a stable and secure environment for the adopted child (In re Wojtkowiak (1957), 14 Ill. App. 2d 344, 144 N.E.2d 760), and to protect the parties from the complex psychological problems inherent in permitting a natural parent to withdraw consent. (People ex rel. Drury v. Catholic Home Bureau (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 84, 213 N.E.2d 507; In re Adoption of Hoffman (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 569, 338 N.E.2d 862.) In Drury, the Illinois Supreme Court noted:
“Admittedly, a mother’s decision to consent to her child’s adoption by a couple to her unknown must be a most difficult one to make. Strong emotional factors militate against it. Once done, misgivings not only may occur, but are probable, and it is not unlikely that attempts to rescind such consent will be made at a time when the child has been placed in an adoptive home, and new attachments formed.” (34 Ill. 2d 84, 93-94, 213 N.E.2d 507, 512.)
Our legislature has balanced the needs of the adoption system against the natural inclinations of consenting parents and concluded that such consent is irrevocable in the absence of fraud or duress. We are compelled to enforce such policy, and where the evidence fails to establish fraud or duress, the consent must be given effect.
*44 The record before us reflects a young mother of normal intelligence and normal emotional development. The record also reflects a number of disturbing and vexing problems which she faced. The record is devoid, however, of any evidence suggesting that petitioner’s consent was the product of third-party persuasion, inducement, deception, or domination. In Sims, this court found duress under conditions quite dissimilar to the instant case. In Sims, the compulsion to consent to adoption was in the form of a specific mandate. There the natural mother’s parents “conditioned their parental love of their daughter and their fulfillment of their legal obligation to support her during her minority on her consenting to the adoption.” (30 Ill. App. 3d 406, 411, 332 N.E.2d 36, 40.) The instant record demonstrates, at most, that the possibility of adoption was suggested by an employee of Baby Fold after petitioner, on her own initiative, contacted and visited Baby Fold’s place of business. In In re Petition of Huebert (1971), 132 Ill. App. 2d 793, 270 N.E.2d 464, duress was found where adoption had been suggested to the mother by a close friend who had become involved with the mother’s husband and who was able to exert undue influence and control over her. There the natural mother’s consent was taken during one brief interview at the Department of Public Aid. We agree with the Huebert court and the trial court below that the time period within which the respective consents to adoptions were effected constituted unseemly haste. We are critical of that kind of procedure in such a sensitive area. We encourage the legislature to establish standards commensurate with the importance of the decision involved. We must hold, however, that as a matter of law, mere haste coupled with environmental stress does not constitute duress. Upon the record before us we cannot conclude that petitioner’s actions were performed under duress as heretofore defined. Accordingly, we hold that the findings of the trial court were contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
The judgment of the circuit court of McLean County is reversed.
Reversed.