delivered the opinion of the court:
These five criminal cases share a common procedural element. In all, the defendants died during the pendency of their appeals. Subsequently, counsel who had represented the defendants brought independent motions seeking to dismiss the appeals and to vacate the convictions, arguing that the cases had become moot upon their clients’ deaths. The State agreed that the appeals were moot and that the appellate proceedings should be dismissed, but disagreed as to what effect dismissal would have upon the underlying convictions. Whereas defense counsel argued that the convictions should be voided as if they had never occurred (ab initio, or literally, “from the beginning”), the State took the position that the defendants’ convictions should be allowed to stand as a matter of record. We consolidated the cases and ordered the issue briefed and argued. We also ordered supplemental briefing following oral argument to address the impact of our state constitution’s 1992 “victim’s rights” amendment. See 111. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8.1. The effect of this amendment presents an issue of first impression.
FACTS
The underlying facts of the defendants’ convictions can be briefly stated.
Defendant Will Robinson, in appeal number 1 — 96—1695, was convicted of burglary. Officers testified that they observed Robinson in the act of removing a cellular telephone from the rear seat of a parked vehicle. Robinson was sentenced to serve 20 years in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections. He subsequently died in custody on April 16, 1997, while his appeal was pending.
Defendant John Dunn, in appeal number 1 — 96—2053, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for killing his wife, Patricia “Penny” Dunn, by shooting her in the mouth. Penny did not die immediately but was rendered a quadriplegic and suffered during the next eight years from her injury. Following his conviction, Dunn was sentenced to an extended term in prison of 24 years. He died at the Dixon Correctional Center of lung and throat cancer, on October 9, 1996, while his appeal was pending.
Defendant Raymond Golden, in appeal number 1 — 97—3728, was arrested for possession of less than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine. The arrest occurred after the vehicle he was driving was stopped on suspicion that it had been stolen. A pat-down search of Golden at the scene resulted in the officers discovering the cocaine. After his conviction, Golden was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections. He died on March 29, 1998, during the pendency of his appeal.
*869Defendant Amanda Wallace, in appeal number 1 — 96—3757, was convicted of the first-degree murder of her three-year-old son, Joseph. Evidence presented at trial established that Wallace wrapped an electrical cord around his neck and then hung him from a door transom. Wallace was sentenced to natural life imprisonment for her crime. Counsel subsequently informed this court that Wallace committed suicide on August 3, 1997, during the pendency of her appeal.
Defendant Glennon Dye, in case number 1 — 97—3054, was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse against his six-year-old niece. He was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment for his crimes. Dye appealed his conviction and subsequently committed suicide on October 1, 1997, prior to his appeal being resolved.
ANALYSIS
When a criminal defendant dies and thereby renders a pending appeal moot, appellate courts are faced with three possible alternatives: (1) the appeal can be dismissed, leaving the conviction to stand unabated; (2) the proceedings can be abated ab initio, thereby removing forever any stigma of the conviction; or (3) a third party can be substituted for the defendant and the case may proceed. Defense counsel argue that these cases should be abated ab initio. They note that this was the approach taken by our supreme court in People v. Mazzone, 74 Ill. 2d 44, 383 N.E.2d 947 (1978). They also note that dismissing the appeal and vacating the proceedings ab initio is, by far, the rule followed in most federal and other state courts. See generally Annotation, Abatement of State Criminal Case by Accused’s Death Pending Appeal of Conviction — Modern Cases, 80 A.L.R4th 189 (1990) (discussing cases since 1950) and Annotation, Abatement Effects Of Accused’s Death Before Appellate Review of Federal Criminal Conviction, 80 A.L.R Fed. 446 (1986).
In Mazzone, the defendant was found guilty of publicly exhibiting an obscene film and assessed a fine of $500. He died after leave to appeal had been granted but before the State had filed its brief. Noting some controversy in the United States Supreme Court on the question of what should occur when a defendant whose appeal has not yet been resolved dies (Mazzone, 74 Ill. 2d at 47, 48, citing Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 28 L. Ed. 2d 200, 91 S. Ct. 858 (1971); Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325, 46 L. Ed. 2d 531, 96 S. Ct. 579 (1976)), our supreme court held that, because Mazzone’s petition for leave to appeal had been granted and his right to challenge his conviction had *870formally vested, the proceedings must abate ab initio. 1 The court emphasized that this was the procedure followed in “the great majority of courts.” Mazzone, 74 Ill. 2d at 47.
In its arguments to this court, the State has strenuously maintained the view that a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to pursue an appeal should be considered a personal right which expires upon the defendant’s death. According to the State, a defendant’s conviction should stand because the “presumption of innocence has been erased by his conviction” and because “the ultimate disposition of defendant’s prosecution should be determined by the status quo at the time of his death.” The State urges that we distinguish Mazzone from those cases now before us because the defendant in Mazzone faced only a fine and not a prison sentence.
We reject the State’s narrow interpretation of Mazzone. We note that the cases cited in Mazzone fail to draw the distinction now advanced by the State. See Mazzone, 74 Ill. 2d at 47, citing State v. Stotter, 67 Idaho 210, 175 R2d 402 (1946) (defendant sentenced to 30 days in jail and $300 criminal fine — conviction abated in its entirety); State v. Bradley, 229 Iowa 92, 293 N.W.858 (1940) (defendant sentenced to both prison term and payment of a fine — conviction abated); State v. Blake, 53 Ohio App. 2d 101, 371 N.E.2d 843 (1977) (rejecting argument that fine should not be abated); State v. Clark, 260 N.W2d 370, 371 (S.D. 1977) (“inclusion of a fine does not operate to alter the rule of abatement of all proceedings”); Crooker v. United States, 325 E2d 318 (8th Cir. 1963) (fine and prison sentence — conviction abated in its entirety); United States v. Knetzer, 117 F. Supp. 917, 918 (S.D. Ill. 1954) (“fine is a part and parcel of the judgment or punishment, and also abated upon the death of the defendant”). It follows that the supreme court did not intend the rule of abatement ab initio to apply only to those cases involving criminal fines. We agree with the State, however, that developments in Illinois law since Mazzone was decided prevent us from adopting the sweeping view of that case now advanced by defendants’ counsel.
The cases that have abated proceedings ab initio and nullified the *871defendant’s conviction after his or her death, including Mazzone, emanate from the view that criminal prosecutions should punish the guilty and protect society from any future criminal misdeeds of the defendant. Once the defendant has died, these objectives are no longer possible. This traditional view began to change nationally, however, in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the recognition that crime victims and witnesses also have important, personal interests at stake in criminal proceedings. See C. Gaumer, Protecting the Innocent: Victim-Witness Rights in Illinois, 83 Ill. B.J. 568 (1995).
To protect the interests of crime victims and witnesses, our General Assembly passed the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 1996)) in 1984. The Act recognizes that certain “crime victims” (see 725 ILCS 120/3(a) (West 1996)), specifically those persons and their families who have been harmed by “violent crime” (see 725 ILCS 120/3 (c) (West 1996)), have legally recognized rights in criminal proceedings which are distinct from the interests of either the defendant or the state. “Violent crime” is defined by the Act to be:
“any felony in which force or threat of force was used against the victim, or any offense involving sexual exploitation, sexual conduct or sexual penetration, domestic battery, violation of an order of protection, stalking, or any misdemeanor which results in death or great bodily harm to the victim or any violation of Section 9 — 3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 [involuntary manslaughter and reckless homicide], or Section 11 — 501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code [driving while under the influence], or a similar provision of a local ordinance, if the violation resulted in personal injury or death, and includes any action committed by a juvenile that would be a violent crime if committed by an adult.” 725 ILCS 120/3(c) (West 1996). -
The Act guarantees 10 specific rights to those who have been victimized by violent crime:
(1) The right to be treated with fairness and respect for their dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process;
(2) The right to notification of court proceedings;
(3) The right to communicate with the prosecution;
(4) The right to make a statement to the court at sentencing;
(5) The right to information about the conviction, sentence, imprisonment, and release of the accused;
(6) The right to timely disposition of the case following the arrest of the accused;
(7) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused throughout the criminal justice process;
(8) The right to be present at the trial and all other court proceedings on the same basis as the accused, unless the victim is to testify *872and the court determines that the victim’s testimony would be materially affected if the victim hears other testimony at the trial;
(9) The right to have present at all court proceedings, subject to the rules of evidence, an advocate or other support person of the victim’s choice; and
(10) The right to restitution.
See 725 ILCS 120/4 (West 1996).
Subsequently, in 1992, the statutory rights afforded to the victims of violent crime were elevated to a place within our state constitution by amendment to our state’s Bill of Rights. 111. Const. 1970, art. I, §8.1.
We note that, in Mazzone, the defendant had been convicted of publicly displaying obscene material, a criminal offense that does not involve a violent crime or implicate the interests of individual crime victims. The State, therefore, even today, after passage of the Act and constitutional amendment, would have no legally recognizable interest in upholding Mazzone’s conviction once he had died. This is in stark contrast, however, to the appeals of defendants Dunn, Wallace and Dye. These defendants were convicted of manslaughter, murder and sexual assault, respectively. In these cases, individual victims suffered horrible physical and psychological injury, and their families endured almost unspeakable emotional anguish. Both the Act and our constitution now formally recognize that the families of these victims (as well as Glennon Dye’s surviving victim) continue to suffer, long after the horror of the criminal attack.
Defendants’ attorneys object to applying the victim’s rights amendment or the provisions of the Act to this case, noting that both provide that victim’s rights are not to be used as a ground for relief on appeal. See 111. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8.1(d); 725 ILCS 120/9 (West 1996). In this case, however, the State does not seek appellate relief at all. Instead, the State simply maintains that there are recently recognized public policy interests in preserving the lower court’s judgments and that these interests must include consideration of the victims’ rights to fairness and dignity before the defendants’ convictions may be vacated as a matter of routine procedure. The record certainly supports such an argument.
We are particularly struck by the victim impact statements contained in defendant Dunn’s case. Thomas Cygan, the brother of manslaughter victim Penny Dunn, wrote to the trial court on behalf of his family following Dunn’s conviction. He asked that the court impose an appropriate sentence so as to “[hjelp renew our faith in the judicial system, and help us cope with our loss.” Alice Cygan, Penny Dunn’s mother, recounted how her own health had deteriorated during her *873daughter’s long decline and expressed similar sentiments regarding the conviction and sentencing: “I just hope that Jack is punished for what he did to Penny ***. It will make me feel much better and maybe I can get my health back.” Jo Anne Hutton, Penny Dunn’s sister, also expressed hope that John Dunn’s conviction would provide some relief for her family’s suffering. She wrote:
“I’ve tried to put my feelings down on paper, but it is just too hard. Just as with sitting through the trial for those three days, the memories, happy but mostly sad, whirl through my mind.
What Penny, my family and I have gone through is pure torture in various ways. Please help us to end this nightmare by giving Penny the justice she deserves. Only then can we close this chapter and get on with life remembering Penny the way she would want.”
Clearly, a judicial order vacating the conviction and sentence of John Dunn, a defendant who is no longer able to appreciate the benefits of such a ruling, would have a senselessly harsh impact upon the psychological well being of Penny Dunn’s surviving family. It would further have the effect of eroding confidence in the criminal justice system among those victims and witnesses who participated in the trial by subjecting the trial result and circuit court judgment to the arbitrary timing of Dunn’s death. In the cases of Wallace and Dye, where the defendants deliberately took their own lives, abatement ab initio is likely to cause even more consternation among the trial participants.
In the face of such arguments, defendants’ counsel can point only to the fact that a majority of courts continue to regularly abate proceedings ab initio. Research reveals that, of the states that have addressed the issue, abatement ab initio continues to be the preferred disposition. Twenty-two states, including Illinois, as well as the District of Columbia, currently set aside the conviction as a matter of course.2 Only 14 states dismiss the appeal, leaving *874the conviction to stand.3 Eight states allow the appeal to continue by substitution for the defendant, but usually pursuant to court rule.4 It is clear from our review of the most recent cases, however, that the trend has been away from abating a deceased defendant’s conviction ab initio. See, e.g., State v. Hoxsie, 570 N.W.2d 379 (S.D. 1997); State v. Salazar, 123 N.M. 778, 945 P.2d 996 (1997); State v. Clements, 668 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1996); People v. Peters, 449 Mich. *875515, 537 N.W.2d 160 (1995); State v. Makaila, 79 Haw. 40, 897 P.2d 967 (1995) (allowing substitution on behalf of deceased defendant pursuant to rules of procedure); Perry v. Delaware, 575 A.2d 1154 (Del. 1990). We expect this trend will continue as the courts and public begin to appreciate the callous impact such a procedure necessarily has on the surviving victims of violent crime. We note that at least one state legislature has acted to change the abatement rule in order to reverse what was perceived by many in that state to be an affront to victims’ rights. “An Act Preventing A Court from Vacating Certain Convictions Based on the Death of a Defendant,” Mass. S.B. 1698, 181st Gen. Ct., 1997 Reg. Sess. (February 27, 1997); J. Ellemen, Salvi’s Record Wiped Clean, Posthumously; Charges Voided on Technicality, Boston Globe, February 1, 1997, at A1 (referring to abatement ab initio rule as being “the ultimate legal technicality” and quoting a murder victim’s daughter as saying she was “outraged” by its application).
After carefully considering the arguments presented, we conclude that the passage of the Act and the existence of the victim’s rights amendment to our state’s Bill of Rights require that the courts give formal consideration to the interests of the victims of violent crimes, weighing the memory of the deceased victims and the well being of their innocent survivors in considering whether a conviction should be abated ab initio. When such a balancing of rights is considered in the context of “violent crime,” respect for the dignity of those who have been victimized precludes abatement of convictions such as those of defendants Dunn, Wallace and Dye. Abating the proceedings ab initio, after trial, conviction and judgment, creates an unacceptable and ultimately painful legal fiction for the surviving victims that implies that the defendants have somehow been exonerated. We will not exacerbate the loss suffered by the victims of these crimes and add to their tragedy by entering a judgment that appears to absolve the defendants of their violent criminal acts.
Speaking directly, to wipe out the convictions of defendants John Dunn, Amanda Wallace and Glennon Dye on the legal technicality suggested by defense counsel would serve only to increase the misery of victims who have endured enough suffering. In our view, the law should serve as a salve to help heal those whose rights and dignity have been violated, not as a source of additional emotional turmoil. To this end, we hold that the victims of violent crime are entitled to retain whatever closure that may have been brought about by the finality of a criminal conviction.
In accord with the above, we dismiss the appeals but decline to void the convictions in case numbers 1 — 96—2053 (Dunn, voluntary *876manslaughter), 1 — 96—3757 (Wallace, murder) and 1 — 97—3054 (Dye, aggravated criminal sexual assault).
We turn to the remaining appeals, which do not involve “violent crimes.” Although the State makes a strong argument in opposition to the rule of abatement ab initio, we do not believe ourselves at liberty, as an intermediate court of review, to revisit an issue on which our supreme court has spoken directly and authoritatively. The rights of violent crime victims are not obviously implicated by the convictions of defendants Robinson and Golden, and we conclude that the doctrine of stare decisis requires the general rule of abatement ab initio be followed in such cases until our supreme court directs otherwise. The State’s arguments advocating a different rule are necessarily the same arguments implicitly considered and rejected by that court in deciding Mazzone. Accordingly, we vacate the proceedings ab initio in appeals numbered 1 — 96—1695 (Robinson, burglary), and 1 — 97— 3728 (Golden, possession).
In sum, the proceedings considered in this opinion abate ab initio as to defendants Robinson and Golden; the appeals with regard to defendants Dunn, Wallace and Dye are dismissed as moot. The convictions in these three cases stand unabated.
Appeal Nos. 1 — 96—2053, 1 — 96—3757 and 1 — 97—3054, Dismissed as moot.
Appeal Nos. 1 — 96—1695 and 1 — 97—3728, Vacated ab initio.