delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant appeals convictions entered pursuant to his negotiated pleas of guilty to driving with a revoked driver’s license (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 951/2, par. 6 — 303) and driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 951/2, par. 11 — 501). The negotiations called for the imposition of concurrent sentences of 6 months to be served at the State penal farm at Vandalia, and for the termination of probation upon another conviction not appearing in the record. There was to be no sentence imposed upon the revocation of probation. At issue is the result of the trial court’s failure to substantially comply with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 402(c) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110A, par. 402(c)) to the effect that the court shall not enter final judgment without first determining that there is a factual basis for the plea.
It is undisputed that the trial court totally failed to indicate in the record how or whether the court satisfied itself that there was a factual basis for defendant’s plea. The normal procedure under such circum*556stances is to reverse the conviction and remand to allow the defendant to plead anew (People v. Pruitt, 7 Ill.App.3d 808, 288 N.E.2d 549). However, not all failures to comply with Rule 402 require reversal of the conviction (People v. Dudley, 58 Ill.2d 57, 316 N.E.2d 773). In Dudley, there was no compliance whatsoever,, let alone substantial compliance, with the requirement that the plea agreement be stated in open court or that the judge confirm the terms of the agreement by .questioning .the defendant personally. It was held, however, that mere failure to comply with Rule 402 would not result in reversal of the conviction unless it appears that real justice had been denied the defendant. In the instant case, there is no assertion that the defendant was not driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or that the defendant was driving with a valid operator’s permit.
In light of the clearly voluntary and negotiated nature of defendant’s plea, and the absence of any harm or prejudice to the-defendant, we hold that there was no denial of justice in this case, and, accordingly, we affirm the convictions.
Judgment affirmed.
SIMKINS, P. J., concurs.