delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from a burglary conviction of Jerry L. Williams, in a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Henry County. It is also an appeal from a subsequent order revoking defendant’s probation as a result of a prior theft "conviction of defendant. A sentence of 20 months to 5 years in the penitentiary was imposed as a result of the burglary conviction and a sentence of from 2 to 6 years was imposed as a result of the prior felony-theft conviction, following the revocation of probation. The court directed that the probation revocation sentence was to run consecutively to the burglary sentence.
Defendant asks for reversal on the basis of two contentions: (1) that the failure of defendant’s court-appointed counsel to move for discovery constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) that the trial court erred in refusing to grant defendant a new trial in light of newly discovered evidence impeaching the credibility of the State’s principal witness. A review of pertinent evidence in the case is essential to an understanding of the issues before us.
From the record, it appears that defendant Williams and a companion, Michael Rodak, were at "the- Martin Engineering Company,- where defendant Williams was employed, Rodak testified that Williams gained access to the building by use of a wire arid took some tools. Williams denied that he took the tools but stated that Rodak took the tools without *860his knowledge. The tools were later found in the premises of Dr. Terry, which were burglarized. Following the visit to the Martin Engineering Company, Rodak and Williams proceeded to Kewanee, and in the early morning hours of October 10,1973, the Rodak vehicle, in which they were riding, was parked across from the office of Dr. Terry. Rodak testified that he and Williams then proceeded to the building containing the office of Dr. Terry and climbed up on the roof of the building, forced open the skylight, and that Rodak entered the Terry premises through the skylight from the roof of the building. He.stated that Williams waited on the roof. Williams said that he remained in the car. A burglar alarm which had been installed in the building was activated by Rodak’s entrance, and when Rodak called for help in getting out of the building, Williams helped him out through the skylight to the roof from which they both fled thereafter. Williams stated that he climbed up on the roof and helped Rodak out when he heard the call for help;
The testimony of Rodak was impeached by defendant.by admission of a prior burglary conviction into evidence. Rodak also admitted that he was a drug user. The chief of police of Kewanee stated that defendant Williams had voluntarily surrendered himself to police and admitted his “involvement” in the burglary. Defendant also stated that he accompanied Rodak to the scene of the burglary because Rodak claimed there was a party in the area. Defendant, however, admitted that Rodak had talked to him about burglarizing Dr. Terry’s office earlier in the day. Defendant also admitted that he went up on the roof of the building, but asserted that he did so to assist Rodak in getting out of the building after the burglar alarm went off and Rodak called for help.
After defendant’s trial for burglary he was removed to the Henry County Jail. While he was in the Henry County Jail he received (by way of a jail trusty) two written notes from Michael Rodak, his accomplice in the burglary, who was also the State’s principal witness against defendant at the trial. One note from Rodak read:
“Listen, I wouldn’t sign a statement on you when they brought me in. I signed a statement, however, that said I did it by myself. O’Connor said he was going to subpoena me so l would have to tell the truth. This is the subpoena.
He didn’t make any kind of deals with me. I just went over and pleaded guilty to get the fuckin’ matter cleared up. You see they had me for burglary out in Colo, and I would have to go out there for maybe 10 yrs. When I came home that night and your’e [sic] things were all gone & you split without telling me a fuckin’ thing, I flipped out! I thought the cops had you and I knew I had to split *861fast or they would be on my neck. So I busted into the safe to get $ to split.
I’ve got to serve a 2 to 5 in the pen, now. Only cause I made restitution for the stolen $. It’s a bitch we got it for burglary because nothing was taken. I was telling O’Connor you was a good cat, but Watson [unintelligible] and told him you would never change.
Satch”
The other note from Rodak contained a question from defendant Williams and a reply from Rodak in the following language:
“Are you sure you were to [sic] messed up to remember anything? I thought you only had a joint?
J.L.W.
Jerry, I wuz drinkin firewater & smokin! Anyway I can’t remember what really fuckin’ happened as to the matter & I told the State Attorney so!
M.R.”
Both notes were written after the trial and after the conviction and, also, after Rodak had pleaded guilty.
It is first contended, because defendant’s court-appointed attorney did not file a motion for discovery prior to defendant’s burglary trial, that defendant was represented by incompetent counsel. On the issue of competent counsel, the defendant cites People v. Morris, 3 Ill.2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810. In that case our supreme court determined that in order to show inadequacy of court-appointed counsel, defendant must show “actual incompetency of counsel, as reflected by the manner of carrying out his duties as a trial attorney,” and “substantial prejudice resulting therefrom without which the outcome would probably have been different,” The same test was reaffirmed by the supreme court in People v. Stepheny, 46 Ill.2d 153, 263 N.E.2d 83. The judgment of counsel in trial, as to trial tactics does not afford a basis to uphold a . contention of incompetency (People v. Wesley, 30 Ill.2d 131). While it might be concluded under some circumstances that failure to seek discovery could constitute incompetence of counsel, the facts of each case should be reviewed carefully to determine whether or not there was such competence. As we have also indicated, the court should not conclude that there was inadequate representation, unless counsel demonstrates actuál incompetence, as reflected in the record in the cause, in the manner of carrying out his duties as trial attorney. It must also be shown that substantial prejudice would result from any omission of counsel-in carrying out his duties but *862for which there would probably be a different result in the trial. People v. Georgev, 38 Ill.2d 165; People v. Gray, 33 Ill.2d 349.
The record indicates that defendant was represented by counsel who handled the procedures in the trial in a manner which was competent and that Williams did not express dissatisfaction with his attorney at any time during the trial. It is apparent from the record and from the cross-examination of Rodak by the attorney for defendant that he had conferred with Rodak as well as with the defendant and was fully aware of the issues of the cause. This complete familiarity obviously may have caused him to conclude that a motion for discovery was unnecessary since he was advised of all the potential issues which, might be raised in the case. As a matter of fact, the attorney for defendant forced Rodak to admit, on cross-examination, that he had promised the attorney that he would not testify as against Williams and that Rodak had also promised the father of defendant that Rodak would not testify against Williams.
It was made apparent to the jury from such examination that Rodak had lied to the attorney and to Williams’ father or had thought at such time that he would not testify but discovered that he was required to do so by reason of the subpoena. In Rodak’s nóte to defendant, which was submitted as a basis for the motion for a new trial, Rodak indicates that he had tried to keep from having defendant directly involved in the burglary and stated that he had said he did it himself. He also stated in the note, however, that O’Connor, the State’s attorney, said he was going to subpoena Rodak “so I would have to tell the truth.” He also said, immediately following that statement, “This is the subpoena.” Apparently he either‘sent it or intended to send the subpoena to show defendant why he had to take the stand and tell the truth. He also points out in this statement that O’Connor did not make any kind of deal with him, and he further stated, in the same note, “It’s a bitch we got it for burglary because nothing was taken” indicating that he felt that both he and Williams were participants in the burglary.
In the second note, defendant had written an inquiry which asked Rodak whether he was “to messed up to remember anything? I thought you only had a joint?” Rodak apparently replied, as a means of seeking to cooperate with defendant, that “I can’t remember what * * * happened as to the matter” and that he told the State’s attorney so.
It is obvious that nothing which could have been developed by discovery contended for by defendant could have aided defendant since any statement which had been made to the State’s attorney by Rodak in the first instance was preliminary to his final recognition that he had to “tell the.truth” after he received the subpoena from the State’s attorney.
A determination of the issues as to whether substantial prejudice was *863shown to have resulted to defendant by omission of the attorney to seek discovery should be considered in Conjunction with the second issue raised by defendant, where he contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant him a new trial in light of this alleged "newly discovered evidence” which impeached tire credibility of the State’s witness Kodak. As we have noted, Kodak’s credibility had been substantially impeached by the defense attorney, not only in the introduction of his prior record but also by obtaining admission from him that he had told the attorney and the father of the defendant that he would not testify against defendant. The efforts on the part of Kodak to cooperate or explain his position to defendant as disclosed by the two notes obviously indicated that he was telling the truth when he testified in court.
A new trial is not warranted unless the new evidence is of such conclusive nature as would probably change the result on retrial. The evidence must be material to the issue and not merely cumulative (People v. Holtzman, 1 Ill.2d 562; People v. Baker, 16 Ill.2d 364, 374.) The burden is on a person in the position of defendant in this cause to rebut the presumption that a verdict is correct and show that there has beeri no lack of diligence. Under such circumstances, the question of granting a new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and the exercise of such discretion will not be disturbed unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion. (People v. Reese, 54 Ill.2d 51, 59; People v. Holtzman, 1 Ill.2d 562.) A distinction is to be drawn between evidence which simply impeaches a witness in the sense that it affects his credibility and evidence that presents a state of facts which differs from that to which the witness testified. (People v. Holtzman, 1 Ill.2d 562, 568.) Newly discovered evidence which simply seeks to contradict a witness does not afford a basis for a new trial. Such evidence would only warrant á new trial if there is a sufficient showing that such evidence would probably produce a different result from the one obtained at the trial.
In People v. Holtzman, by way of illustration, defendant was charged with receiving stolen property which consisted of Seven shirts worth a total of $20 which were sold to defendant. Following the conviction of defendant of receiving stolen property, affidavits as filed by two persons stated that the individual who originally sold the property, stated he sold the shirts to defendant two at a time. If such evidence had been produced at trial, defendant might have been guilty only of the less serious offense of receiving stolen property valued at less than $15. Even in that case, the supreme court held that the new evidence had the sole effect of impeaching a witness and was not sufficient to require the granting of a new trial.
With even a more liberalized standard applied, it is apparent that we *864would not be justified in stating that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied defendant’s motion for a new trial. The evidence offered as a basis for the new trial was cumulative to the testimony of defendant that he did not participate in the burglary, since its most favorable interpretation would be that Rodak had made a previous statement that he had committed the offense by himself. His note, however, states that he was impelled to tell the truth by reason of the service of the subpoena, even though he had tried to protect defendant. As indicated in Holtzman, the type of evidence which could result from the Rodak note would not establish the basis for a new trial. There was nothing presented at the hearing in the trial court other than the notes to which we have made reference. We should also observe that this case is clearly distinguishable from People v. Cotell, 298 Ill. 207, cited by defendant. The evidence of impeachment in the Cotell case was devastating in nature and was not at all of the character involved in the cause before us, as observed in the Holtzman case where the supreme court discussed Cotell. The supreme court there stated that Cotell went further than mere impeachment, but went to the very foundation of the People’s' case.
As outlined in the Holtzman case, applications for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence are not looked upon with favor by the courts. In order to prevent a possible fraud and imposition, which defeated parties may be tempted to practice as a last resort to escape the consequences of an adverse verdict, the application should always be subjected to the closest scrutiny by the court. The determination of the potential effect of the newly discovered evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and the court’s decision On this issue should not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a manifest abuse. See People v. LeMorte, 289 Ill. 11.
On the basis of the record before us, therefore, we see substance in the contention of the prosecutor to the effect that to allow a hand-scribbled note passed between convicted criminals, neither based on affidavits nor supported by extrinsic evidence, as a basis for granting a new trial would open the door for a flood of such notes. Accordingly, in view of the record before us, we find no reversible error either in the denial by the trial court of a new trial or on the issue raised as to competency of defendant’s counsel in the trial of this cause.
For the reasons stated, the judgments of the Circuit Court of Henry County are affirmed.
Affirmed.
BARRY, J., concurs.