delivered the opinion of the court:
The plaintiff, Peoria Housing Authority, brought a forcible entry and detainer action against the defendant, Norma Sanders, for possession of *612premises occupied by the defendant. The action was based upon failure to pay rent. The defendant filed an answer, affirmative defense, and a counterclaim in which it was alleged that the plaintiff’s rental policy was unconstitutional and that damages based upon a retroactive recovery of rental payments made in compliance with the policy should be awarded. Subsequently the defendant withdrew her answer and affirmative defenses. The trial court granted possession of the rented premises to the plaintiff and ruled that the counterclaim did not state a cause of action and was further not germane to the distinctive purpose of the proceedings. It was from this order of the circuit court of Peoria County that the defendant appeals.
In this appeal the defendant has raised the following constitutional issues: (1) that the plaintiff’s statement of policy on modified fixed rents and income limits deprives the defendant of “life, liberty or property” without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States (U.S. Const., amend. XIV, Sec. 1) and section 2 of article II of the constitution of Illinois 1870 (Ill. Const. (1970), art. II, sec. 2); (2) that said statement of policy results in an invidious classification of the Authority’s tenants as proscribed by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States (U.S. Const., amend. XIV, sec. 1).
The defendant further argues that the plaintiff’s statement of policy on modified fixed rents and income limits contravenes the letter and spirit of the Illinois Housing Authorities Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 6772, par. 1 et seq.). The defendant also argues that if it is held that the counterclaim is not germane to the principal action under the Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 57, par. 1, et seq.) then said Forcible Entry and Detainer Act has denied the defendant procedural due process of law.
Refore we consider the constitutional issues raised by the defendant or consider the letter and spirit of the Illinois Housing Authorities Act we must first determine whether these issues are germane to the plaintiff’s principal action for possession.
Under the Illinois Civil Practice Act a defendant is generally empowered and encouraged to join in a principal action any claims or demands which he may have against the plaintiff.
“Subject to rules, any demand by one or more defendants against one or more plaintiffs, or against one or more codefendants, whether in the nature of set-off, recoupment, cross-bill in equity, cross demand or otherwise, and whether in tort or contract, for liquidated or unliquidated damages, or for other relief, may be pleaded as a cross *613demand in any action, and when so pleaded shall be called a counterclaim.” Ch. 110, Sec. 38 (1), Ill. Rev. Stat.
These apparent liberal provisions regarding joinder of actions are, however, limited with respect to a number of “extraordinary” proceedings which carry with them their own procedural restrictions which govern the filing of counterclaims. One of these extraordinary proceedings so limited is the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act.
“Section 1. Scope of Act.) The provisions of this Act apply to all civil proceedings, both at law and in equity, except in attachment, ejectment, eminent domain, forcible entry and detainer, garnishment, habeas corpus, mandamus, ne exeat, quo warranto, replevin, foreclosure of mortgages or other proceedings in which the procedure is regulated by separate statutes. In all those proceedings the separate statutes control to the extent to which they regulate procedure, but this Act applies as to matters of procedure not so regulated by separate statutes. As to all matters not regulated by statute or rule of court, the practice at common law and in equity prevails.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 110, par. 1.
As a result of the foregoing language contained in the opening section of our Civil Practice Act we must direct our attention to the provisions contained in the separate statute governing procedure in actions of forcible entry and detainer.
“The defendant may under a general denial of the allegations of the complaint give in evidence any matter in defense of the action. No matters not germane to the distinctive purpose of the proceeding shall be introduced by joinder, counterclaim or otherwise: Provided, however, that a claim for rent may be joined in the complaint, and judgment obtained for the amount of rent found due.” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1969, ch. 57, par. 5.
It should be noted that in the case before us on review the only relief sought by the plaintiff in the forcible entry and detainer action was the recovery of possession of the premises which had been leased to the defendant. The Forcible Entry and Detainer Act has been in existence in our state for many years and the general rule of law is well established that the action involves solely the question of the right to restitution of premises of which one is unjustly deprived. See Woodbury v. Ryel, 128 Ill.App. 459; Truman v. Rodesch, 168 Ill.App. 304; Chicago Ry. Equipment Co. v. Wilson, 250 Ill.App. 231; Van Winkle v. Weston, 276 Ill.App. 66; Sauvage v. Oscar W. Hedstrom Corp., 322 Ill.App. 427, 54 N.E.2d 725; Burton v. Firebaugh, 344 Ill.App. 548, 101 N.E.2d 616.
The defendant contends that nothing could be more “germane” *614to an action in forcible entry and detainer than a determination as to whether or not the standard used by the plaintiff in determining its rentals was valid. We find the law to be clear in Illinois that the defendant cannot withhold her rental payments as determined under a lease and hope to procedurally use them as an offset in an action for possession. Excess rents, if any, paid by a tenant could not be considered as a defense in a landlords forcible detainer action to recover possession of her apartment after obtaining the requisite certificate from the area rent director. (Burton v. Firebaugh, supra.) Neither does the acceptance of late rental payments by the plaintiff present an issue for review. In the case before us this point was set forth in the defendant’s affirmative defense which was later voluntarily withdrawn; however, even if properly before the court the matter of the acceptance of such late rental payments would not have been properly interposed by way of defense to an action for possession. Geiger v. Brown, 167 Ill.App. 534.
Several cases are cited by the defendant in support of the contention that the counterclaim filed in the case before us was germane to the proceedings. (Those cases are as follows: Melburg v. Dakin, 337 Ill.App. 204, 85 N.E.2d 482; Allensworth v. First Galesburg N. B. & T. Co., 7 Ill.App.2d 1, 128 N.E.2d 600; and Rosewood Corp. v. Fisher, 46 Ill.2d 249, 263 N.E.2d 833.) In the Melburg case the defendant was permitted to assert an equitable defense, but a landlord-tenant relationship being involved the defense went to the heart of the paramount question, namely, the right to possession of the premises involved. The Allensworth case involved the right of the plaintiff to claim the real estate in question and the court held it proper for equitable relief to be permitted by the granting of the prayer of a counterclaim for an injunction. Again the direct question involved was one as to right of possession. In the Rosewood Corp. case the defendants were members of the Negro race who entered into installment contracts for purchase of rental properties. In discussing the Forcible Entry & Detainer Act our Supreme Court stated:
“Limiting ourselves to a consideration of the act only so far as it applies to contract purchasers of land, this case is, so far as we can ascertain, one of first impression in this court. It is our opinion that the defenses going to the validity and enforcibility of the contracts relied upon by the plaintiffs were germane to the distinctive purpose of the forcible entry and detainer actions and were improperly stricken. That purpose, to repeat, is to restore possession to one who is entitled to the right of possession. ‘Germane’ has been judicially defined as meaning ‘closely allied,’ and is further defined in Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary, p. 767, as meaning: ‘closely related; closely connected; relevant; pertinent; appropriate.” Where as *615here, the right to possession a plaintiff seeks to assert has its source in an installment contract for the purchase of real estate by the defendant, we believe it must necessarily follow that matters which go to the validity and enforcibility of that contract are germane, or relevant, to a determination of the right to possession. This is particularly true for two reasons. First, because a contract buyer becomes the equitable owner of the property upon execution of an installment contract (Shay v. Penrose, 25 Ill.2d 447, 449, 185 N.E.2d 218,) and thus by such an action may be stripped of his equitable ownership as well as possession; second, the contract purchaser is faced not only with the loss of possession, but, unlike a tenant, trespasser or squatter, is likewise faced with the loss of the equity accumulated by payments made on the contract. Here, for example, the Fishers had paid approximately $10,000 toward satisfaction of their total contract obligations. On the other side of the coin, a contract seller claiming and seeking to enforce a claimed right of possession should not be permitted to prevail on the basis of such contract so long as its validity and enforcibility is questionable under the law. Should a contract purchaser not be permitted to defend upon the very contract upon which the seller relies, in our judgment the result could be, as argued, a direct denial of constitutional rights and an indirect denial of civil rights. We believe that contract buyers may plead equitable defenses and be given equitable relief if it is established that the contracts are unconscionable or in violation of civil rights as here contended. Cf. Horner v. Jamieson, 394 Ill. 222, 68 N.E.2d 287; Stein v. Green, 6 Ill.2d 234, 128 N.E.2d 743. * * *
It does not escape us that the construction we have placed upon the act may interfere with the summary aspects of the remedy, when it is invoked against contract purchasers. But the right of such purchasers to be heard on relevant matters, and to be secure in their constitutional rights, as well as the desirable purpose of preventing a multiplicity of suits, is, and must be, superior to the desire to provide a speedy remedy for possession.”
It appears clear that the Rosewood Corp. case has not scuttled the prompt remedy provided in the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act but on the contrary again the counterclaims must show a defense which is germane to the question of the right to possession. It is also apparent that our Supreme Court has differentiated between cases involving lessees, renters, and those involving purchasers.
From an analysis of the cases it is clear that the defendant by counterclaim to an action for possession may assert a paramount right to possession, may deny the breach of any agreement vesting possession *616in the plaintiff or may even question the basis upon which the plaintiff’s right to possession is founded. In the instant case the defendant’s counterclaim pursues none of these avenues but instead seeks declaratory relief and money damages which have no real relation to the possessory rights of the parties. We therefore find that the issues raised by the defendant’s counterclaim are not germane to the plaintiff’s action in forcible entry and detainer.
The defendant next argues that if the counterclaim is held not to be germane to the plaintiff’s action then Section 5 of Chapter 57 of the Illinois Revised Statutes is unconstitutional in that it denies the procedural due process of law as provided by our State and Federal constitutions.
Due process does not mean a particular procedure but rather requires only that certain safeguards exist in whatever procedural form is afforded. These safeguards are described in detail in People v. Niesman, 356 Ill. 322, 190 N.E. 668, when the court stated:
“Due process of law implies the administration of equal laws according to established rules, not violative of the fundamental principles of private right, by a competent tribunal having jurisdiction of the case and proceeding upon notice and hearing. McGehee on Due Process of Law, p. 1. The guaranty of due process of law requires that every man shall have the protection of his day in court and the benefit of the general law, — a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds not arbitrarily or capriciously, but upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial, so that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society.”
The fourteenth amendment prohibits the state from denying any person life, liberty or property without due process of law, but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another. (United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588.) The amendment in no way undertakes to control the power of a state to determine by which process legal rights may be asserted or legal obligation be enforced, provided the method of procedure adopted for these purposes gives reasonable notice and affords fair opportunity to be heard before the issues are decided. Iowa Central Ry. Co. v. State of Iowa, 160 U.S. 389, 16 S.Ct. 344, 40 L.Ed. 469.
The refusal of the State of Illinois to allow the joinder of non germane claims in proceedings for the restoration of possession to real estate merely precludes the defendant from one procedure without closing the door on any other substantive rights she may possess. The defendant has available other procedures which lead to an impartial *617forum where any substantive rights she may possess can be determined. Due process requires nothing more and we therefore find that the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act of the State of Illinois (111. Rev. Stat., ch. 57, par. 5) is not unconstitutional on the basis that it denied procedural due process of law as required by our State and Federal constitutions.
For the reasons herein set forth the order of the circuit court of Peoria County is hereby affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
ALLOY, P. J., concurs.