delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a proceeding under section 72 of the Civil Practice Act to set aside the admission of a will to probate and to contest its validity. The petition was filed in the estate of the decedent more than nine months after the admission of the will to probate. The petitioners appeal from an order which struck and dismissed their petition.
On March 5, 1962, Anna G. King, in a conservatorship proceeding in the Probate Court of Cook County, was adjudicated “an incompetent” and “incapable of managing her person and estate.” Donald E. Nichols was appointed conservator of her estate and person. She died on December 5, 1965, in a nursing home. She had been married only once, and then to Roy D. King, who had predeceased her. No children were born to her, and her heirs at law were three nieces and a nephew. She was then eighty-nine years of age. As she had never been restored, the *344conservatorship proceedings were still in effect at her death.
On December 10, 1965, in the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County, an order was entered admitting to probate a purported will of Anna G. King, dated June 28,1965. Letters testamentary were issued to the Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company, and it entered upon its duties as executor. The will devised and bequeathed her entire estate to her nieces and nephew, all respondents here.
Thereafter, on December 21, 1966, petitioners filed their “petition for relief pursuant to the provisions of Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act of Illinois, and Sections 5, 69, 90,112 and 126 of the Probate Act of Illinois,” in the estate proceedings which were still pending. Petitioners sought to vacate and set aside the order entered on December 10, 1965, admitting to probate the purported will of Anna G. King, deceased, dated June 28, 1965, and to have that will “decreed to be a nullity and of no legal effect”; and to have a prior will dated July 25, 1961, admitted to probate as the last will and testament of Anna G. King, deceased.
The petitioners are relatives of Anna G. King’s deceased husband and are legatees under the will dated July 25, 1961. This will was never submitted for admission to probate and was filed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Probate Division, on December 27, 1965. Petitioners allege that they had no notice of the death of the decedent or of the admission to probate of the will dated June 28, 1965, or of the existence of the prior will dated July 25, 1961, until after the expiration of more than nine months after the admission to probate of the will dated June 28,1965.
In sum, the grounds alleged for relief are based on (1) fraud in the admission of the will to probate, and (2) fraud and undue influence in the execution of the will.
*345As to the first of these contentions, petitioners allege that respondents and their counsel fraudulently and improperly concealed and failed to disclose decedent’s incompetency to the court at the time they sought the admission of the will to probate. Petitioners assert, under section 69 of the Probate Act, that if the trial court had been properly informed of decedent’s incompetency at the time her will was submitted for admission to probate, it would have barred the admission to probate of the will of June 28,1965.
As to the second of their contentions, petitioners allege that respondent’s counsel were subscribing witnesses to the will of June 28, 1965, and respondents and their counsel procured the execution of the will by fraud and undue influence. Petitioners assert that the fraud and concealment of decedent’s incompetency at the will hearing operated to suspend or toll the 9-month limitation period for the contesting of her will under section 90 of the Probate Act, and their petition was timely filed to contest the will.
The record includes the testimony taken at the hearing on the admission of the will to probate on December 10, 1965. The original transcript sets forth the testimony of John W. Damisch and Stephen Jurco, two of the four subscribing witnesses. Both witnesses were attorneys and members of the law firm representing the executor. Both witnesses testified as to the execution of the will on June 28, 1965, and their belief that Anna G. King “was of sound mind” when she signed the will. They stated she talked “intelligently and rationally” and “rationally and coherently,” and that they believed “she knew what she was doing.”
John W. Damisch also testified that when the decedent signed the will, the persons present included Harold W. Collins, Junie L. Sinson and Stephen Jurco. Stephen Jurco stated that Anna G. King “had a very keen sense of *346humor,” and on being questioned by Harold Collins, appearing on behalf of the executor, Jurco replied affirmatively to the questions: “Did you discuss with the decedent the nature and extent of her property?” “Was she aware of the nature and extent of her property?” “Did she know the specific purpose of her business there?” “She knew she was making a will?”
At the hearing of the section 72 petition, Collins stated to the court that the transcript of the testimony of the will hearing was not complete, and after some colloquy between court and counsel, he stated, “Reading from this court record, Mr. Collins — that being myself — directing his remark to the attention of the Court, states that, ‘The decedent was a ward of this court, a conservator having been appointed in 1962 ....’” Except for the foregoing, no reference was made of the conservatorship in the petition or in the proceedings for the admission of the will to probate.
The record further shows that at the hearing of the section 72 petition, the trial court reviewed the record at length and pertinent authorities and remarked, “It has been shown that counsel here introduced evidence to show that this person had been declared incompetent. That’s been admitted. There were two people who were subscribing witnesses to a will who testified that in their opinion — as read here by counsel previously and which the Court will take judicial notice of for its own record— this person was of sound mind, memory, and so forth.” In sustaining the motion to strike the petition for relief, the court found “that the statutory requirements for the admission of the will to probate under Section 69 of the Probate Act have been complied with.”
Petitioners contend the basic issues presented for review are:
“(1) Whether the nine (9) months’ period of limitations under Section 90 of the Probate Act of Illinois *347for filing a petition to contest the admission of a Will to probate, operates, not as a jurisdictional limitation upon the part of the Circuit Court to entertain such a petition, but only as a Statute of Limitations subject to such exceptions as would, as here by reason of fraud, bar the tolling or running of a Statute of Limitations ?
“ (2) Whether under the facts and circumstances here presented there was such ‘fraud . . . compulsion or other improper conduct’ in connection with the execution by the decedent of her Will dated June 28, 1965, as well as lack of notice to the petitioners-appellants, and/or such unrebutted continued presumption of insanity upon the part of the testatrix in connection with her execution of her said Will dated June 28, 1965, as would bar the admission to probate of said Will of Anna G. King, deceased, dated June 28, 1965, under Section 69 of the Probate Act of Illinois ?
“(3) Whether, under the facts and circumstances here presented, the Petitioners-Appellants as contestants to the admission to probate of said Will of Anna G. King, deceased, dated June 28, 1965, can properly submit evidence in support of their Petition for Relief under Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act of Illinois to vacate, set aside and hold for nought the Order of the trial court of December 10, 1965 admitting said Will to probate, where the subscribing witnesses and proponents of said Will are themselves parties to the ‘fraud, . . . compulsion or other improper conduct’ in connection with the execution of said Will, and the admission of said Will to probate ?”
The respondents contend that the execution of the will and its probate complied with all the statutory requirements. They assert there was no duty on the part of *348respondents to inform the court as to the alleged “senile dementia,” because if such a condition existed, it would only be evidence from which lack of testamentary capacity could be inferred — since the only evidence admissible at the hearing was that of the attesting witnesses, it was not incumbent upon the respondents or their counsel to go into the matter. They also assert that evidence as to the conservatorship of the testatrix was not admissible on the hearing to admit the will to probate, and there can be no duty to inform the court concerning matters as to which no evidence could be received.
At the outset, we note that section 72 of the Civil Practice Act states that relief “shall be available in every case by proceedings hereunder, regardless of the nature of the order, judgment or decree from which relief is sought or of the proceedings in which it was entered . . . statutory or otherwise,” and “in the same proceeding in which the order, judgment or decree was entered but is not a continuation thereof.” From this, it is our opinion that section 72 may be appropriately used in probate proceedings and for the relief sought here.
We are of the opinion, also, that petitioners, as devisees and legatees of a prior will of the decedent, were “interested persons” within the meaning of section 90 of the Probate Act for the purpose of contesting the validity of the will of June 28,1965.
The disposition of property by will is not an inherent or natural right but is purely statutory and is presently regulated by the Probate Act of 1939, as amended (36 ILP, Wills, § 2). The Probate Act sets forth (1) the required capacity of a testator (§ 42); (2) the requirements and manner of executing a will (§ 43); (3) the procedure for the admission of a will to probate and the testimony of witnesses (§§ 63-69); and (4) the procedure for the contest of a will within nine months after the admission to probate by “any interested person,” by *349filing “a petition in the proceeding for the administration of the testator’s estate to contest the validity of the will” (§90).
We do not agree with petitioners that the 9-month period provided under section 90 for the filing of a petition to contest the validity of a will is a general statute of limitations. It has been well settled in this state that the power of a court to entertain a petition to set aside a will is purely statutory and “can be exercised only in the manner and within the limitations prescribed by statute.” (McQueen v. Connor, 385 Ill 455, 457, 53 NE2d 435 (1944).) “The time within which such a proceeding may be brought is considered to be a condition essential to the jurisdiction of the court,” and the court has no jurisdiction or power to entertain such a proceeding after the statutory period has passed. (Heuberger v. Schwartz, 41 Ill App2d 28, 31, 190 NE2d 163 (1963).) “Statutes providing for contests within a prescribed period have been held not to be statutes of limitation, but grants of jurisdiction.” (95 CJS, Wills, § 359, p 214.) See, also, Pedersen v. Dempsey, 341 Ill App 141, 142, 93 NE2d 85 (1950); Masin v. Bassford, 381 Ill 569, 572, 46 NE2d 366 (1943).
We conclude that as the instant petition was not filed within nine months after the admission to probate of decedent’s will, the Probate Division, under the provisions of section 90, had no jurisdiction to consider the petition to contest the validity of the will.
Considered next is petitioners’ contention that the Probate Court had jurisdiction to consider their petition under section 69, because the alleged facts showed “fraud, forgery, compulsion or other improper conduct” by respondents and their counsel, sufficient to invalidate or destroy the will.
Although respondents assert that at the will hearing the court was informed as to the pendency of the con*350servatorship of the testator, we shall consider that issue as if the court had not been informed and in the light of the Probate Act and pertinent authorities of this state.
In In re Estate of Weedman, 254 Ill 504, 98 NE 956 (1912), the question arose as to whether evidence of the mental capacity of the testatrix was competent at the will hearing, and the court said (p 506):
“The will was executed in legal form and the testimony of the subscribing witnesses fulfilled the requirements of the statute for its admission to probate. No other evidence as to the mental capacity of the testatrix was competent. . . .
“The object of a hearing when a supposed will is presented for probate is to determine whether it has been executed with the formalities required by law, and the statute prescribes the amount and kind of proof which is sufficient to admit the will to record, —that is, the testimony of two subscribing witnesses to the execution of the will and to their belief that the testator or testatrix was of sound mind. No other evidence is required and no contradictory evidence is admissible, though the statute reserves the right to show fraud, compulsion or other improper conduct sufficient to invalidate the will. Therefore no part of the proceedings for the appointment of a conservator or of the testimony of Mrs. Weedman was admissible for the purpose of showing that she was not of sound mind.”
At page 507:
“Though unsoundness of mind once shown to exist may be presumed to continue, the presumption is not conclusive.”
Many of the pronouncements made by our Supreme Court in Shepherd v. Yokum, 323 Ill 328, 154 NE 156 (1926), apply here:
*351“The probate of wills is governed entirely by the statute, and when the statutory requirements are complied with, no others can be prescribed.” (P 332.)
“In the absence of proof of fraud, forgery, compulsion or other improper conduct both the probate court and the circuit court are required to admit a will to probate upon proof that the requirements of the statute have been complied with.” (P 333.)
“The court is not required to find from the testimony of the witnesses that the testator was, in fact, of sound mind and memory when he executed the will. . . . If the subscribing witnesses testify that they believed the testator was of sound mind and memory when he executed the will the probate court must accept their view, even though it may be of the opinion that their belief was not well founded or was erroneous. The probate court has no power to weigh the evidence further than to determine if a prima facie case has been made out. It was not intended by the legislature that all things which will invalidate a will should be cognizable by the court to which an application for probate is addressed.
“. . . It is not the duty of a proponent to show that the will is valid in all respects. It is only his duty to make proof of the essentials mentioned in the statute. When he has done this a prima facie case entitling the will to probate has been made out. Neither the probate court, nor the circuit court on appeal, has power to refuse a will to probate upon any ground whatsoever other than a failure of the proponent to make proper proof of the requirements mentioned in section 2, or because proof of fraud, forgery, compulsion or other improper conduct ap*352pears which is deemed sufficient to invalidate or destroy the will. ... In Stuke v. Glaser, 223 Ill 316, the term ‘fraud,’ used in the proviso, was held to relate to such conduct as a trick or device by which a person may be induced to sign the paper under the impression it is something else, or to the alteration of the will after it is signed, or the substitution of another paper for part of the will after it has been signed, and matters of like character. This definition of ‘fraud’ was later approved in Buerger v. Buerger, supra. The terms ‘compulsion’ and ‘other improper conduct’ were also defined in the last mentioned case. Compulsion was said to refer to actual constraint or pressure, physical or otherwise, amounting to duress, or threats to compel the execution of the instrument. ‘Other improper conduct,’ following the specific words ‘fraud’ and ‘compulsion,’ was said to refer to other acts of a kind similar to those specifically mentioned. It is therefore apparent that undue influence is not included within the purview of section 2 of the Wills act by specific mention or by necessary implication.” (Pp 334-335.)
“When a prima facie case has been made out warranting the admission of a will to probate, and no proof has been made of fraud, forgery, compulsion or other improper conduct sufficient to invalidate or destroy it, an objector has done all the law permits him to do in that proceeding. ... If he has any countervailing testimony upon the testator’s sanity, or as to his capacity to make a will, or whether he made it under unlawful constraint, he must resort to his bill in chancery.” (P 336.)
See, also, In re Estate of Guinane, 65 Ill App2d 193, 213 NE2d 30 (1965).
In our opinion, the foregoing authorities provide the guidelines to be used in the instant appeal. The new *353Judicial Article (Article VI, effective January 1, 1964), which in effect eliminated the Probate Court and probate appeals to and trials de novo in the Circuit Court, does not call for the use of new guidelines. We conclude that neither the provisions of the Probate Act nor the pronouncements of our Supreme Court required the proponents of the instant will, at the proceedings for the admission of the will to probate, to inform the court of the still pending conservatorship of the testator.
Therefore, we hold that the alleged failure by the proponents of the will to inform the court (denied by them), of the pending conservatorship of the testator, was not a basis, under section 69, on which to charge the proponents with fraud on the court or improper conduct in the admission of the will to probate or as a ground to vacate and set aside the order of December 10, 1965, admitting the will of June 28,1965, to probate.
As the instant will was properly admitted to probate under section 69, it follows that the section 72 petition filed December 21, 1966, was not filed within the statutory period provided by section 90 for a will contest, and the Circuit Court was without jurisdiction to entertain it.
For the reasons given, it was proper for the trial court to strike and dismiss the instant petition to set aside the admission of the will and to contest its validity, and the order is affirmed.
Affirmed.
ADESKO, J., concurs.