delivered the opinion of the court.
Plaintiffs appeal from a decree dismissing their complaint for want of equity at the close of plaintiffs’ evidence before a master in chancery. The transfer to this court of plaintiffs’ direct appeal to the Supreme Court disposed of plaintiffs’ theory that a freehold is involved.
The record shows that on February 24, 1949, plaintiff Henry J. Brubaker and defendant J. H. Lahman jointly accepted a letter of intent to purchase a U. S. Navy surplus plant at Rockdale, Illinois, from the "War Assets Administrator. The price was $875,000, payable over a ten year period. A plant consisted of approximately 26 acres, improved with buildings, containing about 700,000 square feet of space. Brubaker *425and Lahman made initial deposits of $30,000. On April 27, 1949, Lahman, Brubaker, and his wife Civilla, formed an Illinois corporation, Interlake Industries Corporation, for the purpose of taking title to and possession of the property.
On May 26, 1949, Brubaker, because of illness, assigned to Lahman all of his right, title and interest in the letter of intent of February 24, 1949. Lahman agreed to assume, perform and discharge all of the terms and obligations of the letter of intent; to assume payment of specified outstanding Brubaker notes; to pay Brubaker the sum of $1100, and to reserve for Brubaker a one-tenth interest in the common stock of Interlake Industries or any other corporation that might become the successor to the letter of intent.
On June 22, 1949, in exchange for Interlake stock, Lahman assigned his interest in the War Assets Administration letter of intent to Interlake. Of the stock then received by Lahman, he assigned 1,000 shares of common to Civilla J. Brubaker, and stock certificate No. 14 was issued to her.
Lahman, prior to 1949, had been borrowing money at high interest rates from defendant W. E. Gould & Company, which was in the business of lending money, primarily to corporations. After June 1949, Gould & Company commenced making substantial loans to Interlake, for which it received notes of Interlake. Inter-lake also picked up outstanding Lahman notes held by Gould & Company by the substitution of Interlake notes.
In 1950, Lahman and Interlake were in serious financial distress, Gould & Company held Lahman and Interlake notes and some Lahman “NSF” checks. After negotiations, Lahman and defendant W. E. Gould, principal owner of W. E. Gould & Company and acting on its behalf, entered into a contract on May 29, 1950, intending to take Lahman completely out of *426Interlake and to pnt W. E. Gould & Company in full control as owner of all its stock. At that time Lahman, although the owner of 75% of the stock of Interlake, agreed to deliver to Gould & Company all of the outstanding stock of Interlake. Gould and Gould & Company agreed to “turn back” to Lahman and to Inter-lake, notes totalling $179,000, of which $67,000 were Lahman’s and $112,000 were Interlake’s. In addition, Lahman was to receive $11,000 in cash.
On June 1, 1950, Gould & Company took over Inter-lake and its properties, and Lahman stepped out completely. Gould was elected president of Interlake at a meeting purportedly held by all the shareholders on June 5, 1950, at which time, the record indicates, Gould or Gould & Company had possession of only Lahman’s 75%. With the exception of the 1,000 shares held by the Brubakers, Lahman delivered to Gould the balance of the. outstanding stock of Interlake shortly after May 29,1950.
Up to this point, Lahman and Brubaker remained friendly and frequently saw each other. Lahman had told Brubaker of Interlake’s difficulties in meeting the plant contract payments, and that he was going “to have to unload to somebody and it probably would be Gould.” Finally Lahman told Brubaker that he had “made a deal with Gould & Company to carry the ball from there on,” and that he had sold all of his interest in Interlake to Gould. Later, Lahman told Brubaker that the Gould deal included delivery of the 1,000 shares of the Interlake common held by the Brubakers, with no consideration to them. Several weeks later, Lahman started urging the Brubakers to return their Interlake stock to him, in order that he could give it to Gould. He stated that it was their duty to do so, that the stock was worthless, and he was in great distress and might go to jail if he did not get it. After *427some delay, the Brubakers informed Lahman they would talk it over with their attorney, Sidney 0. Simon, known to Lahman.
Simon, over a period of four months, had a number of conferences with Lahman and with Brubaker, separately and together. Lahman persisted in his statements that he was very heavily involved with Gould and had received a threatening letter — he had to have the Brubaker shares to deliver to Gould. The Brubakers did not want to give up their Interlake stock and were openly suspicious that Lahman had a collateral agreement with Gould for the return of Lahman’s interest in Interlake. Lahman persisted in stating that he had given the stock to the Brubakers without consideration and felt that, as he was in difficulties, it was Brubaker’s “Christian duty” to return the shares. Finally Lahman agreed to pay the Brubakers $5,000 in payment of some past due Lahman notes, which Brubaker held, and they agreed to give the stock to him.
On May 9, 1951, at a meeting at Simon’s office attended by Lahman and Brubaker, Lahman gave his $5,000 check to Brubaker, and Brubaker gave to Lahman stock certificate No. 14 for 1,000 shares of Inter-lake common, endorsed by Civilla J. Brubaker. At that time Lahman delivered to Brubaker his affidavit, prepared by Simon, which stated that since June 1, 1950, he. (Lahman) had no “interest of any kind or character, present or reversionary,” in any of the shares of stock or real property of Interlake Industries; that the certificate representing 1,000 shares of Interlake common stock “is being sold and delivered by Civilla J. Brubaker based on the above and only to enable affiant to fulfill his contract”; and that the affidavit was made for the purpose of inducing her to deliver to Lahman the stock certificate. Lahman delivered the stock certificate to Gould that day, and *428Interlace issued a new certificate to Gould & Company for the Brubaker shares.
On May 15, 1955, Lahman, as plaintiff, filed a complaint in equity in the Circuit Court of Cook County against W. E. Gould and Gould & Company, as defendants, Case No. 55 C 7294, in which Lahman alleges inter alia that the Lahman-Gould agreement of May 29, 1950, was executed under such circumstances that Lahman has the right to recover his shares in Inter-lake from Gould & Company upon doing equity, which he offered to do in his complaint.
In the Lahman-Gould complaint (copy of which is in evidence), Lahman alleges that the purported “sell out” of May 29, 1950, “was understood to be a further collateral protection to defendants and an accounting would be made from time to time.” He further alleges that the defendants and their attorney, Israel Dordek, on or before April 4, 1955, knowing that Lahman was under subpoena by the U. S. Government as a witness in the case of United States of America v. Roberts Enterprises, Inc. No. 53 C 967, summoned Lahman to defendants’ office and admonished him and “suborned the perjury of plaintiff under duress or threat as alleged that plaintiff testify falsely that the sellout of May 29, 1950, was legal and proper and that under duress plaintiff so testified and similarly in the case of Harold Ronin v. Lahman in the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 52 C 187, when in truth and in fact the transaction was for collateral as hereinabove alleged more particularly.”
Plaintiffs filed the instant complaint on September 9,1955, after making a demand upon Gould and Gould & Company for the return of their Interlake stock. The complaint consists of four counts, all based on the theory that Gould and Lahman entered into a conspiracy and committed fraudulent acts, so as to defraud plaintiffs of their Interlake common stock and *429of a one-half interest in the Navy surplus plant now owned by Interlake. They seek a rescission of the assignment of their interest in the real estate, a rescission of the transfer of their stock certificate, an accounting, and a receiver for Interlake. All defendants answered, denying the charges, and the cause was referred to a master in chancery.
The hearings before the master commenced on January 15, 1956, and plaintiffs closed their proofs on October 31, 1957. All defendants then moved for a finding for defendants under Section 64(5) of the Civil Practice Act. On March 12, 1959, the death of W. E. Gould was suggested as of December 21, 1958, by Harriet B. Gould, executor of his will. She answered the complaint “without prejudice to all proceedings heretofore had.” She also moved to exclude the testimony of the Brubakers and Lahman and adopted the motion of the defendants for a finding and decree in their favor. The report of the master in chancery is dated May 27,1959. The witnesses include both plaintiffs, their attorney, Sidney 0. Simon, and defendants Lahman and W. E. Gould, who were called as witnesses under Section 60.
In his report the master found that plaintiffs were guilty of laches; that the evidence submitted by plaintiffs failed to sustain the allegations of the complaint on any of its counts; and recommended that the motion of all defendants for a finding and decree at the close of plaintiffs’ evidence be allowed in all respects. The chancellor overruled all exceptions to the master’s report, sustained the motions of defendants for a finding and decree, approved master’s fees in the sum of $13,031.30, and dismissed the complaint for want of equity at plaintiffs’ costs.
Subsequent to the entry of the decree, the chancellor entered an order directing the payment by plaintiffs of fees occasioned by the appointment of a re*430ceiver for Interlake. This appointment was made on the petition of plaintiffs during the pendency of the hearings before the master and was later reversed by this court. (Brubaker v. Gould, 19 Ill App2d 412, 152 NE2d 485.) Plaintiffs appeal from the decree of dismissal, the order allowing master’s fees, and the order allowing receivership fees. They also ask for a review of the order of this court reversing the appointment of the receiver.
The principal question is whether the chancellor erred in entering a decree of dismissal at the close of plaintiffs’ evidence. The. motion of all the defendants at the close of plaintiffs’ case was a procedural means of submitting the whole case to the court for a determination of the merits. In ruling on the motion, the court was required to weigh the evidence offered on behalf of the plaintiffs. Section 64(5), Civil Practice Act. (Banks v. Gregory (1959), 16 Ill2d 227, 231, 157 NE2d 12.) If there was any substantial evidence tending to prove plaintiffs’ allegations, the motion should have been denied. (City of West Frankfort v. Fullop (1955), 6 Ill2d 609, 617, 129 NE2d 682.) In passing upon the motion, it is the duty of the court to weigh and consider the evidence to ascertain if there is enough substantial evidence to sustain a decree for plaintiff in the absence of rebutting evidence. (Fewkes v. Borah (1941), 376 Ill 596, 600, 35 NE2d 69; Banks v. Gregory, 16 Ill2d 227, 157 NE2d 12.)
The evidence in the instant appeal is voluminous, as the prior factual summarization indicates. Considering plaintiffs’ evidence, it is our conclusion that some of the findings approved and confirmed by the court are correct. Nevertheless, wé believe the decisive findings are contrary to the evidence and are erroneous.
The finding that plaintiffs were guilty of laches in filing their complaint for relief on the stock *431transaction is contrary to the evidence. Plaintiffs delivered their stock to Lahman on May 9, 1951, and on that day he delivered it to Gould. This is the transaction which plaintiffs seek to rescind and set aside on the ground of fraud. The LahmanGould suit was filed on May 15, 1955, and the instant suit was filed on September 9, 1955. There has been no change of stock ownership since May, 1951. Mere delay will not bar relief, where the injured party was ignorant of the fraud and filed his complaint within a reasonable time after acquiring knowledge of it. (Bremer v. Bremer (1952), 411 Ill 454, 468, 104 NE2d 299.) Neither Gould, Gould & Company nor Lahman have been prejudiced by the alleged delay of Brubaker in commencing the instant action, and no defendant has changed his position in reliance on plaintiffs’ failure to take action at an earlier date. McCartney v. McCartney (1956), 8 Ill2d 494, 500, 134 NE2d 789.
"We agree that plaintiffs’ evidence does not sustain any of the allegations that Lahman, by means of fraudulent misrepresentations, procured the assignment of May 25, 1949, of Brubaker’s one-half interest in the letter of intent for the purchase of the surplus plant. The evidence is clear that the terms of the agreement of May 25, 1949, resulted from discussions initiated by Mrs. Brubaker because of Brubaker’s illness. The record shows that Lahman complied with his part of the agreement. On cross-examination, Brubaker testified, “I was never called upon to pay that so that this deal of May 25, 1949 really cleaned me up as far as what I had in the Rockdale deal and gave me 10% of the stock. ... I didn’t see anything wrong with this deal of May 25,1949 as is evidenced by that contract. I didn’t see anything wrong with it then and I don’t see anything wrong with it now just so far as that deal is concerned.”
*432As to the transfer of Brubaker Interlake stock, we believe that the evidence offered by plaintiffs sustains the allegations that the May 9, 1951, assignment was procured by Lahman by means of false and fraudulent misrepresentations, deliberately made with the intent to defraud the Brubakers of their complete interest in the stock.
Lahman freely admitted that he spent months trying to persuade the Brubakers to give up their stock; that there was a discussion prior to May 9, 1951, about Brubaker starting a lawsuit against Gould, in which Simon said he thought the Brubakers had a good lawsuit if Lahman joined as plaintiff; that Brubaker said to Lahman, in Simon’s office, “Harold, look, I think I am doing you a favor by not giving you these shares. We cannot only enforce our rights on this but probably do you a lot of good,” and at that time he (Lahman) said to Brubaker, “This is a debt of honor with me, I got the money from Gould when I couldn’t get it any place else and I am not the kind of man that welches on obligations. I have made a commitment to Gould to deliver all the shares and I am not only honor bound, I am morally bound and also legally bound to deliver them, and that I am in for all kinds of trouble if I don’t deliver them.”
Lahman admitted making the affidavit of May 9, 1951, in which he stated he “had no interest of any kind or character, present or reversionary,” in any of the shares of Interlake or its real estate. Lahman admitted the allegations of the amended complaint in the Lahman-Gould lawsuit, and also admitted that it was true that Gould assured Lahman that “even though this would be called a sellout, it was understood to be a further collateral protection to defendants and an accounting would be made from time to time.”
We think a reasonable conclusion from this evidence is that Lahman deliberately signed the affidavit, knowing that the basic representations were false, in *433order to induce the Brubakers to give up their Inter-lake stock and to foreclose them of any future rights in the stock, although he (Lahman) had an oral agreement with Gould that the delivery of the Brubaker stock to Gould was intended to be only additional collateral for Gould, and that Lahman, at the time of the execution of the false affidavit, believed he would ultimately recover all the Interlake stock from Gould.
Fraud is established by evidence of circumstances and facts which are inconsistent with an honest purpose and which convinces the mind of the existence of fraud. The proof should be clear and convincing in its nature, so as to leave the mind well satisfied that each element has been established. (In re Estate of Baumgarth (1960), 23 Ill App2d 319, 326, 163 NE2d 201; 19 ILP, Fraud, 47.) We conclude that plaintiffs’ evidence, with all reasonable intendments, is sufficiently clear and convincing in its nature so as to establish actionable fraud by Lahman in securing the Brubaker stock. Malewski v. Mackiewich (1935), 282 Ill App 593, 601.
We do not agree with the contention that there is no evidence that Gould and Gould & Company had any knowledge of Lahman’s stock negotiations with plaintiffs. In admitting the affidavit of May 9, 1951, Lahman said, “I swore to it and signed it. The truth is that I had to sign whatever they put before me because I was under so much duress to pick up this particular certificate of stock belonging to Civilla J. Brubaker that I had to sign it in order to get the stock to deliver to W. E. Gould & Company. I was under duress from W. E. Gould. That is all.”
Lahman testified further that he was completely under the domination and control of Gould and said he “was economically, spiritually and every other way subservient to Mr. Gould”; that after entering into the agreement with Gould on May 29, 1950, he had frequent conversations with Gould about the Brubaker *434stock, in which Gould made urgent demands for the stock. At one time Gould said that “it was now near a year since the date of the agreement and it was up to me to get this stock of Brubaker’s and fulfill the terms of the contract of May 29, 1950. I told him that I was having difficulty. I said the Brubakers were reluctant to surrender their stock; that they were refusing to give it up. Mr. Gould said that if it was a question of money that I should offer Mr. Brubaker money — clo anything in order to get the stock — and so I began to approach Mr. Brubaker from a monetary standpoint then, and ascertained either through him or his attorney I don’t recall which, what he would require to surrender the stock. I don’t think I ever had any talk with Mr. Gould as to what steps he might deem necessary to enforce my obligation. . . . When I got the stock from Brubaker I took it over the same day and delivered it to Gould.”
Finding as we do that plaintiffs’ evidence as to Lahman’s conduct in securing title to the Brubaker stock established fraud, we also believe that Lahman’s conduct, taken in connection with the LahmanGould contract of May 29, 1950, and the subsequent conversations between Gould and Lahman, wherein Gould repeatedly demanded that Lahman secure the Brubaker stock, in which Gould told Lahman to “do anything in order to get the stock,” is legitimate ground for the conclusion that there was a conspiracy between Lahman and Gould to secure the Brubakers’ Interlake stock by any means whatever, legal or illegal, and that Lahman acted as Gould’s tool in the negotiations. Lahman had to get the stock to give to Gould pursuant to their contract of May 29, 1950, and Gould wanted the stock to complete the ownership and control of Interlake by Gould & Company.
As was stated in Majewski v. Gallina (1959), 17 Ill 2d 92, 99, 160 NE2d 783:
*435“While fraud is never presumed, a conspiracy, as alleged herein, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must, very nearly always from the nature of things, be established by circumstantial evidence and legitimate inferences arising therefrom. (Commercial Merchants Bank and Trust Co. v. Kloth, 360 Ill 294, 306.) These inferences depend largely upon the common-sense knowledge of the motives and intentions of men in like circumstances. (Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Kelley-How-Thomson Co. (8th cir) 64 F2d 834, 837; Garlick v. Imgruet, 340 Ill 136, 143.) Thus, fraud may be inferred from the nature of the acts complained of, the. individual and collective interest of the alleged conspirators, the situation, the intimacy and relation of the parties at the time of the commission of the acts, and generally all the circumstances preceding and attending the culmination of the claimed conspiracy. (People v. Small, 319 Ill 437.) In this connection the court stated in People v. Small, 319 Ill 437, at p 449: ‘It is seldom that any one act, taken by itself, will establish a conspiracy but when taken in connection with other acts it may appear clearly that the series of wrongful acts result from concerted and associated action. Considered separately the acts of the conspiracy are rarely of an unequivocally guilty character, and they can be properly estimated only when connected with all the surrounding circumstances.’ ”
Considering the Brubaker to Lahman to Gould transfer of the Interlake stock in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, we believe plaintiffs’ evidence is sufficient to sustain the charge that both Gould and Lahman conspired to and did fraudulently secure the Brubaker stock.
*436 Our disposition of this appeal requires that the cause “be remanded to the trial court with directions to proceed as though the motion had been denied by the trial court or waived.” (Civ Prac Act, §64(5).) This necessitates our considering the order of the trial court sustaining “the motion of Harriet B. Gould, Executor of the Will of W. E. Gould, Deceased, to exclude and strike the testimony of the plaintiffs Henry J. Brubaker and Civilla Brubaker.” This motion was made on the ground that the “Plaintiffs are incompetent witnesses against this Defendant under Section 2 of the Evidence Act.”
The defendant executor contends that this motion was properly sustained because W. E. Gould died December 21, 1958, before he had an opportunity to testify on his own behalf. Smith v. Billings (1898), 177 Ill 446, 53 NE 81, is cited as conclusive on this point. An examination of that case indicates that the determinative facts are not similar. There the question for decision was whether the complainant was entitled to have his deposition considered by the court upon the final determination of the cause. Complainant’s deposition had been taken during the lifetime of the decedent, the adverse party, and had been filed in the court where the cause was pending. It had been offered and read in evidence. Plaintiff announced his case was closed, and the matter was continued to a day certain. In the interim, the defendant died, his death was suggested, and his executors were made parties defendant. On their motion, the court excluded the testimony of the complainant as to transactions, conversations and communications between him and the deceased defendant. No further testimony being offered, the court dismissed the complaint for want of equity.
In its reasoning, the court said that the theory of Section 2 is (p 451) “that inasmuch as the deceased *437 cannot speak the living should not be allowed to do so; ... it is the spirit and intention of the statute to preserve equality between the parties to a transaction out of which the action or proceeding grows.” The court quoted from an Iowa case to express the rule by which the competency of testimony under Section 2 must be tested (p 452):
“. . . it was deemed wise to provide that if one could not, by reason of death, give his version neither shall the other. The want of opportunity to assist in the preparation of the cause by the decedent is not the sole ground for excluding the testimony of the survivor, nor by any means the principal ground. The prime reason is found in the inability of the party to oppose his statements, — his testimony, — to that of the surviving adversary, and this has been more than once announced as the reason of the law.”
Applying this reasoning to the instant case, it was error to exclude the testimony of the plaintiffs as against the defendant executor. W. E. Gould testified at length, under Section 60 of the Civil Practice Act, as to his dealings with Lahman, Interlake and the Brubakers. Then he was examined by his own attorney and the attorney for Lahman. Gould testified in opposition to the testimony of the plaintiffs and was provided with full opportunity to give his version of the facts as opposed to the version of plaintiffs. All of this occurred before plaintiffs closed their proofs. On January 13, 1958, Gould made a motion for a finding in his favor at the close of plaintiffs’ case. If Gould deemed further testimony on his part important, he had ample opportunity to testify after plaintiffs closed proofs and before he died, over a year later, on December 21, 1958. The basic reasons for the rule of exclusion under Section 2 are not present here. At *438this posture of the case, with plaintiffs proofs closed, we believe all of the testimony taken in this case during the lifetime of W. E. Gould should stand.
Plaintiffs contend that the master’s fee allowed, of $13,031.30, are excessive and wholly unreasonable. Plaintiffs question the amount of time reported by the master and argue that the hours of work do not warrant the charges made. The record does not show any proof of the necessity for or the reasonable value of the various items reported in two master’s certificates of fees and charges, which include 247 hours at $50 per hour for the master’s services.
The allowance of master’s fees rests largely in the discretion of the trial court. The sum to be paid “should be based upon the time necessarily devoted to the work, the intricacy of the proof, and the complications of fact and law involved in preparing the report of his findings and conclusions.” (Horan v. Blowitz (1958), 13 Ill2d 126, 133, 148 NE2d 445.) A master’s hearings are conducted in his private law office, and the cost of operating a law office today is considerable. However, in the absence of proof of justification, we think a flat hourly rate of $50 for a master’s services is excessive. As this case is being remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, a full hearing should be had by the trial court as to the proper services of the master and the reasonableness of his fees.
Plaintiffs also contend that the decision of this court which reversed the appointment of a receiver (Brubaker v. Gould, 19 Ill App2d 412, 152 NE2d 485) is erroneous and should be reviewed. We do not agree. Our conclusions as to plaintiffs’ evidence in the instant appeal do not require any modification of the views of this court expressed in the opinion filed in the previous appeal.
*439However, as contended by plaintiffs, a hearing should have been had in the trial court upon the merits and reasonableness of the fees allowed the receiver, his attorney and a public accountant. It was not proper for the trial court, in this case, to enter judgments against the plaintiffs for these fees, without evidence being submitted in support of the charges. The record reflects nothing upon which to base a finding as to the merits or reasonableness of the fees. Upon remandment, a hearing should be had as to the reasonableness of these fees.
It is our conclusion that the court erred in sustaining the motion of all defendants for a finding and decree in their favor, at the close of the plaintiffs’ evidence. We believe there is substantial evidence in the record, to prove the allegations of plaintiffs’ complaint that the transfer by them of their Interlake common stock was accomplished by a conspiracy to defraud plaintiffs of their stock, participated in by J. H. Lahman, W. E. Gould and W. E. Gould & Company.
In the absence, upon remandment, of the presentation of rebutting evidence by defendants, plaintiffs’ evidence in this record is sufficient for a decree in their favor for the return to them of their Interlake stock as of May 9,1951, with such further proceedings for an accounting as then may be proper, based upon plaintiffs’ rights as Interlake shareholders.
Accordingly, the orders approving the master’s fees and receivership fees, and the decree of dismissal of the Superior Court, are reversed. The cause is remanded with directions to overrule the defendants’ motion to dismiss and, under Section 64 of the Civil Practice Act, to hear any evidence presented by the defendants and any rebuttal evidence by the plaintiffs, and to proceed in a manner not inconsistent with the *440views here expressed. Costs in this court will he against the defendant appellees.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
BURMAN, J., concurs.
ENGLISH, J., dissents.