delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiffs, Roberto and Maria Flores, appeal from the dismissal for want of prosecution of their complaint against the defendant, Theresa Dugan. The circuit court of Lake County denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a continuance of the trial date and dismissed the cause for want of prosecution. The appellate court, in a Rule 23 order (73 Ill. 2d R. 23) holding that a dismissal for want of prosecution was not a final and appealable order, dismissed the appeal. (90 Ill. App. 3d 1201.) The issue presented is whether a dismissal for want of prosecution, in light of the absolute right to refile the suit under section 24 of the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 83, par. 24a), is a final and appealable order under our Rule 301 (73 Ill. 2d R. 301). We granted plaintiffs leave to appeal (73 Ill. 2d R. 315).
In 1976 plaintiffs filed a personal injury action in the circuit court of Lake County for damages resulting from an automobile accident with the defendant. The case was tried before a jury, and a verdict was returned for the plaintiffs. Thereafter the trial judge granted defendant’s motion for a new trial. The appellate court denied the plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal from the order granting the new trial. (See 73 Ill. 2d R. 306.) The case was remanded to the trial court, and a new trial date was set for June 25, 1979. The judge was unable to hear the case on that date. Trial was specially reset for August 27, 1979, to accommodate the plaintiffs. The week of August 27 was a week customarily reserved for nonjury matters in Lake County. Plaintiffs’ counsel apparently was told by a clerk in the Lake County court administrator’s office one week prior to August 27 that the case would not be heard on the scheduled date. However, the trial judge informed plaintiffs’ counsel on August 24 that the case would be heard on August 27. The trial judge also in*111formed plaintiffs’ counsel that a clerk in the administrator’s office had no authority to tell an attorney that a particular case would not be heard. Plaintiffs’ attorney voiced his objection to the August 27 trial date. He stated that the plaintiffs’ physician would not be available to testify on that date. Plaintiffs’ physician was not subpoenaed as required under local rule, and the trial judge told plaintiffs’ attorney that in Lake County, if the doctor had not been subpoenaed, the fact that the doctor is unavailable is not a ground for a continuance.
On August 27, another attorney from plaintiffs’ counsel’s office appeared in court on behalf of plaintiffs. He presented a motion for a continuance because of the absence of plaintiffs’ physician and of the other attorney, who, he claimed, was involved in another matter in Cook County circuit court. The trial judge denied the motion and offered plaintiffs’ counsel the options of (1) proceeding to trial, (2) taking a voluntary dismissal, or (3) allowing a dismissal for want of prosecution. Counsel chose a dismissal for want of prosecution, and the trial court entered an order which stated that the cause was dismissed “for want of prosecution without prejudice to refile this suit within the time permitted by statute.” The judge later denied the plaintiffs’ petition to vacate the earlier order.
Plaintiffs argue that a dismissal for want of prosecution is a final and appealable order. The basis of plaintiffs’ argument is that the effect of the dismissal is to dispose of the cause and remove it from the court’s calendar, even though it is not a decision on the merits. Plaintiffs also argue that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to deny the continuance and dismiss the case. Defendants counter that a dismissal for want of prosecution is not a final and appealable order since the plaintiff has an absolute right to refile the cause.
We need not address whether the trial court abused its discretion because we hold that, in light of a plaintiff’s *112absolute right to refile this cause under section 24 of the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 83, par. 24a), an order dismissing a cause for want of prosecution is not a final and appealable order under Supreme Court Rule 301 (73 Ill. 2d R. 301).
The 1970 Constitution provides that “[a] ppeals from final judgments of a Circuit Court are a matter of right to the Appellate Court ***.” (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 6.) Also, the Constitution vests in this court the authority to make rules governing appeals. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, secs. 6, 16.) Accordingly, Supreme Court Rule 301 provides that “[e] very final judgment of a circuit court in a civil case is appealable as of right.” (73 Ill. 2d R. 301.) The appellate court, subject to exceptions for appeals from interlocutory orders specified in our rules, is without jurisdiction to review judgments, orders or decrees which are not final. (Village of Niles v. Szczesny (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 45.) The specified exceptions in our rules which allow appeals from interlocutory orders are not applicable in this case.
A final judgment has been defined as a determination by the court on the issues presented by the pleadings which ascertains and fixes absolutely and finally the rights of the parties in the lawsuit. (Towns v. Yellow Cab Co. (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 113, 119; 49 C.J.S. Judgments sec. 5 (1947).) We have also stated on many occasions that a judgment is final if it determines the litigation on the merits so that, if affirmed, the only thing remaining is to proceed with the execution of the judgment. (People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 167, 171; Village of Niles v. Szczesny (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 45, 48.) The order or judgment in this case, dismissing the cause for want of prosecution, is not a final order since the plaintiffs had an absolute right to refile the action against the same party or parties and to reallege the same causes of action. Aranda v. Hobart Manufacturing Corp. (1977), 66 Ill. 2d *113616; Franzese v. Trinko (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 136; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 83, par. 24a.
In determining the effect of a dismissal for want of prosecution as it relates to the finality of the judgment entered, it is appropriate to consider our Rule 273 (73 Ill. 2d R. 273), which provides:
“Unless the order of dismissal or a statute of this State otherwise specifies, an involuntary dismissal of an action, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.” (Emphasis added.)
In Kutnick v. Grant (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 177, this court considered the effect of Rule 273 in relation to a dismissal for want of prosecution and noted that section 24 of the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 83, par. 24a) is a statute which comes within the “otherwise specifies” provision of Rule 273. The court reasoned that the provisions of section 24 of the Limitations Act giving a plaintiff an absolute right to refile within one year following a dismissal for want of prosecution would be meaningless if Rule 273 were construed as making such a dismissal an adjudication on the merits. Thus, in Kutnick Rule 273 was held not to apply to dismissals for want of prosecution. In Kutnick the court noted that section 24 of the Limitations Act was amended to include dismissals for want of prosecution five months after Rule 273 became effective.
In People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 167, 171, this court, in discussing when an order is final so as to be appealable, stated:
“A judgment is final if it determines the litigation on the merits so that, if affirmed, the only thing remaining is to proceed with the execution of the judgment.”
If an order possesses such a degree of finality, it would clearly be res judicata and would prevent relitigating the *114issues involved. Although Kutnick did not deal with the question now before us, the holding in that case and the holding in Silverstein compel the conclusion that the order entered in this case dismissing plaintiffs ’ cause for want of prosecution was not a final and appealable order. Under section 24 of the Limitations Act, the plaintiffs could, within one year, re file the same complaint and relitigate the same issues to judgment. Therefore, since the plaintiffs had an absolute right to refile the action within the statutory limits, the order of dismissal could not terminate the litigation.
It should also be noted that the order in this case dismissing the cause for want of prosecution itself provided that it was not a final and appealable order by stating that the dismissal was entered “without prejudice to refile this suit within the time permitted by statute.” Although this language may have been superfluous in light of our holding discussed above, it clearly manifests the intent of the court that the order not be considered final and appealable. Similar language was included in an order considered in Arnold Schaffner, Inc. v. Goodman (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 729, 731, where the court stated:
“The order in the case at bar is on its face a nonappealable order because of the recitation 'without prejudiced [Citation.] Since plaintiff could have refiled the action within one year after the dismissal pursuant to section 24 of the Limitations Act [citations], the order did not terminate the litigation.” (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiffs have cited cases which, they contend, hold that an order dismissing a case for want of prosecution is final and appealable. We do not consider the cases cited to be helpful. The language in some of the cases is dicta. In some the question of the appealability of such an order was not raised, and in others the decisions were rendered prior to the effective date of the amendment to section 24 *115of the Limitations Act in 1967, which specifically provided that a case dismissed for want of prosecution fell within the provisions of that statute.
The result we reach may seem to be harsh in view of the argument made to this court that the plaintiffs have not in fact refiled their suit and affirmance would bar them from an adjudication on the merits. Also, plaintiffs contend that, if no appeal lies, there will be no way to determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion in dismissing the case for want of prosecution. The remedy of refiling created by section 24 of the Limitations Act is in fact a more expeditious and less expensive remedy than an appeal. Following the dismissal, plaintiffs could have refiled immediately, and a disposition on the merits could have been made much sooner than if the trial judge’s ruling had been appealed to the appellate court, reversed and remanded, and then set for trial on the merits. Also, the costs involved in refiling would have been substantially less than those involved in the appellate process.
Regardless of the apparent harshness of the result, the established law, as indicated above, requires that we hold the order dismissing the plaintiffs’ action for want of prosecution was not a final and appealable order, and the appellate court properly dismissed the appeal.
Judgment affirmed.