delivered the opinion of the court:
Raymond Scott Larsen was convicted of murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 9—1) following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, and sentenced to a term of 100 to 300 years’ imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed (47 Ill. App. 3d 9), and we granted the defendant’s petition for leave to appeal (58 Ill. 2d R. 315).
The facts of the case are fuUy set out in the appellate court opinion, and will be restated only to the extent necessary on this appeal. The defendant admitted having committed the homicide but relied upon the affirmative defense of insanity at the time of the slaying. (The defendant earlier had been examined by Dr. Robert Reifman and found fit to stand trial.) The People filed a *350written pretrial motion to require the defendant to submit to examination by a State-designated psychiatrist (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 115—6). There was one day’s delay between the hearing on the People’s motion and entry of the order allowing it, to permit the designation of the psychiatrist and the date and place of examination. At the hearing, the court indicated its intention to enter an order granting the motion upon being furnished the pertinent information by the prosecution, and an assistant State’s Attorney stated: “I will inform counsel of the name, location and time, if he likes, of the psychiatric examination. At this time I have not set it up.” The order was entered August 16, 1973 (the following day), appointing Dr. Robert Reifman, assistant director of the Psychiatric Institute of the Circuit Court of Cook County, to conduct an examination “on August 23, 1973, or on any date subsequent, necessary to complete such examination.” The defendant’s counsel did not receive notice of the location and time, or of the name of the psychiatrist prior to the examination, which was conducted on August 24, 1973.
At trial, the defendant offered the testimony of his psychiatrist, Dr. Marvin Ziporyn, who was of the opinion that the defendant suffered from organic brain syndrome associated with cerebral trauma. Dr. Ziporyn’s response to a hypothetical question incorporating the defendant’s life history and behavior was that the hypothetical person had a mental defect, that he had the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, but that he lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. In addition, lay testimony was given concerning the circumstances of the defendant’s unhappy childhood in support of the insanity defense.
Based upon the court-ordered psychiatric examination, Dr. Reifman testified for the People on rebuttal that the defendant had an antisocial personality, but was not suffering from organic brain syndrome. He responded to a *351hypothetical question positing the defendant’s life experience and activities by concluding that such a person did not suffer from a mental defect or disease and had substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirement of the law and to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. The People offered evidence that the defendant had no disciplinary problems while living and working within a minimum security area of the penitentiary from which he had been furloughed for good behavior at the time of the murder. A prosecution witness also testified as to remarks the defendant had made while taking a rifle and money from her apartment at gunpoint on the day of the killing, which was offered to show he appreciated the criminality of his conduct.
The principal questions raised by the defendant are (1) whether our Rule 413 (58 Ill. 2d R. 413) requires that the defendant and his counsel be given reasonable notice of the time and place of the ordered psychiatric examination, and (2) whether the court-appointed psychiatrist’s examination was a “critical stage” of the prosecution that entitled the defendant to the presence of counsel. Rule 413 reads in part:
“(a) The person of the accused. Notwithstanding the initiation of judicial proceedings, and subject to constitutional limitations, a judicial officer may require the accused, among other things, to:
* * *
(ix) submit to a reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body.
(b) Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall be given by the State to the accused and his counsel, who shall have the right to be present. ***” 58 Ill. 2d R. 413.
The defendant contends that the psychiatric examination ordered on the People’s motion and conducted by a psychiatrist of the People’s choosing was a “medical *352inspection of his body.” If that is so, he argues, the rule requires giving reasonable notice of its time and place, as well as conferring the right to the presence of his counsel. We do not, however, consider that the psychiatric examination was a “medical inspection” of the type contemplated by the rule. The specific authority to order a psychiatric examination for purposes of the People’s independent ascertainment of an accused’s mental condition at the time of a criminal occurrence, with reference to the affirmative defense of insanity, is not founded on Rule 413, but on statute. Section 115—6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 115—6) provides:
“Appointment of Psychiatrist. If the defendant has given notice that he may rely upon the defense of insanity *** or if the facts and circumstances of the case justify a reasonable belief that the aforesaid defenses may be raised, the Court shall, on motion of the State, order the defendant to submit to examination by at least one psychiatrist, to be named by the prosecuting attorney.
*** The reports of such experts shall be made available to the defense. Any statements made by defendant to such experts shall not be admissible against the defendant unless he raises the defense of insanity *** in which case they shall be admissible only on the issue of whether he was insane ***.”
The legislature has expressly provided in the statute that experts’ reports be made available to the defense. It is significant that no provision was made by the legislature for the presence of counsel at the examination. It is the statute and not Rule 413 that establishes the procedures in a criminal proceeding with respect to a court-ordered psychiatric examination on the People’s motion when it appears that a defendant may raise the affirmative defense of insanity. The submissions that may be required under Rule 413(a), and which give a right to the presence of counsel under 413(b), obviously relate to physical evi*353den ce. A mental examination is not one of the possible submissions enumerated in Rule 413(a), and clearly it is not intended to be comprehended by “medical inspection of his body” as that term is used in the rule. This is illustrated by the fact that specific reference is made to “mental examinations” in Rule 413(c), and correlatively in Rule 412(a)(iv) allowing reciprocal discovery, among other tests, of any expert reports of “mental examinations” upon written motion.
The defendant also contends that Dr. Reifman’s psychiatric examination constituted a critical stage of the prosecutorial proceedings and gave rise to a constitutional right to the presence of counsel. United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S. Ct. 1926, and Thornton v. Corcoran (D.C. Cir. 1969), 407 F.2d 695, are cited as supporting this position. In Wade, the Supreme Court held that a post-indictment lineup, due to its inherent suggestability and grave potential for prejudice, was such a critical stage. When the issue is raised, the Supreme Court said, a court must “analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.” (388 U.S. 218, 227, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 1157, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1932.) The purpose underlying the right to counsel’s presence at any critical stage is “to preserve the defendant’s basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself.” United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218, 227, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 1157, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1932.
In Thornton v. Corcoran (D.C. Cir. 1969), 407 F.2d 695, the petitioner sought a writ of mandamus directing the district court to issue an order permitting his counsel and psychiatrist to attend a hospital staff conference concerning the petitioner’s competency to stand trial and *354his mental condition at the time of the offense he allegedly committed. The court refused to issue the writ saying that mandamus was not an appropriate remedy, ha dicta, however, the court observed that the petitioner’s claim was “anything but frivolous.” (See 407 F.2d 695, 698-702.) In a separate opinion, then Circuit Judge Burger disagreed with the dicta. Likening the hospital staff conference to a Civil Rights Commission investigation (see Hannah v. Larche (1960), 363 U.S. 420, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1307, 80 S. Ct. 1502), he stated that it “ ‘is purely investigative and fact-finding. It does not adjudicate. It does not hold trials or determine anyone’s civil or criminal liability. It does not issue orders. Nor does it indict, punish, or impose any legal sanctions. It does not make determinations depriving anyone of his life, liberty, or property. In short *** [it] does not and cannot take any affirmative action which will affect an individual’s legal rights. The only purpose of its existence is to find facts ***.’ [363 U.S. 420, 441, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1307, 1321, 80 S. Ct. 1502, 1514.] ” (407 F.2d 695, 711.) And he further noted:
“There is no legal basis for equating a Medical Staff Conference to a ‘confrontation’ either in the traditional sense or within the meaning of Wade-Gilbert. Those cases apply only to critical prosecutive stages. The vice of requiring a sensitive diagnostic process to be conducted as though it were an adversary matter seems too obvious to need discussion. The value of that process is undermined by anything which inhibits the free exchange of views; the integrity of the process makes privacy imperative. The presence of a lawyer for the patient at a staff conference would obviously inhibit the free expression and exchange of ideas which normally occurs. The check on the processes *** is the power to cross examine ***.
*355The legal method of inquiry is unsuited to the medical investigation to be conducted. Medical diagnostic procedures should not be inhibited by non-medical notions of procedural ‘due process.’ Indeed it is far more consonant with the sympathetic relationship existing between Doctor and patient that the medical inquiry be divested as much as possible of an adversary character. Our approach should encourage an attitude of cooperation rather than partisanship; emphasis must be on the common pursuit for an objective, uninhibited inquiry, uncluttered by the techniques and devices of the courtroom.” 407 F.2d 695, 711.
The great majority of courts that have considered the question both prior and subsequent to Thornton have held that there is no right to have counsel present at the examination. These decisions include: United States v. Trapnell (2d Cir. 1974), 495 F.2d 22; United States v. Greene (7th Cir. 1974), 497 F.2d 1068, cert. denied (1975), 420 U.S. 909, 42 L. Ed. 2d 839, 95 S. Ct. 828; United States ex rel. Stukes v. Shovlin (3d Cir. 1972), 464 F.2d 1211; United States v. Mattson (9th Cir. 1972), 469 F.2d 1234, cert. denied (1973), 410 U.S. 986, 36 L. Ed. 2d 183, 93 S. Ct. 1513; United States v. Smith (5th Cir. 1971), 436 F.2d 787; United States v. Bohle (7th Cir. 1971), 445 F.2d 54; United States v. Baird (2d Cir. 1969), 414 F.2d 700, cert. denied (1970), 396 U.S. 1005, 24 L. Ed. 2d 497, 90 S. Ct. 559; United States ex rel. Wax v. Pate (7th Cir. 1969), 409 F.2d 498, cert. denied (1969), 396 U.S. 830, 24 L. Ed. 2d 81, 90 S. Ct. 83; United States v. Albright (4th Cir. 1968), 388 F.2d 719; United States v. Fletcher (D.D.C. 1971), 329 F. Supp. 160; People v. Martin (1971), 386 Mich. 407, 192 N.W.2d 215, cert. denied (1972), 408 U.S. 929, 33 L. Ed. 2d 342, 92 S. Ct. 2505; State v. Whitlow (1965), 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763; *356 State v. Wilson (1971), 26 Ohio App. 2d 23, 268 N.E.2d 814; Commonwealth v. Stukes (1969), 435 Pa. 535, 257 A.2d 828. There have been contrary decisions: Lee v. County Court (1971), 27 N.Y.2d 432, 267 N.E.2d 452, cert. denied (1971), 404 U.S. 823, 30 L. Ed. 2d 50, 92 S. Ct. 46 (counsel’s role limited to passive observer); In re Spencer (1965), 63 Cal. 2d 400, 406 P.2d 33, 46 Cal. Rptr. 753 (but certain procedural safeguards held sufficient to justify exclusion of counsel at examination).
A psychiatric examination is to be distinguished from a lineup. An examination by a qualified, court-appointed expert is not inherently suggestive, and it does not ordinarily pose a grave potential for substantial prejudice. We consider that the defendant’s rights were adequately safeguarded by the opportunity to present his own expert psychiatric testimony at trial, to cross-examine Dr. Reifman as to his methodology and conclusions, and by the statutory prohibition against the defendant’s statements being admitted into evidence on any issue other than his affirmative defense of insanity (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 115—6). We do not find anything in the record to suggest that the presence of the defendant’s counsel was required to insure his right to a fair trial.
There are also contentions by the defendant that the assistant State’s Attorney made a “specific promise,” at the hearing on the motion, to give notice of the time and place of the examination and the name of the psychiatrist, and that the defendant was prevented from receiving the benefit of counsel’s advice prior to examination. The assistant State’s Attorney’s offer to “inform counsel of the name, location and time, if he likes,” was conditional at best and must be deemed waived. According to the record, no request was made by the defendant’s attorney to be so advised. The record does not show any prejudice because there was no notification. The court had indicated at the hearing that the State’s motion would be allowed, and the *357order, signed the following day, provided that the examination was not to be conducted until at least one week after the order was entered. Considering the circumstances, there was adequate opportunity for the defendant to have consulted with his attorney.
For the reasons given the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.