delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal by plaintiffs from a judgment order dismissing their second amended complaint for a declaratory judgment against the Director of the Department of Registration and Education of the State of Illinois and holding that the complaint presented no justiciable controversy. Plaintiffs seek a construction that naprapathy be declared a legitimate system of treating human ailments within the purview of subsection 2 of section 5 of the Medical Practice Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, chap. 91, par. 5,) and that examination and licensing of practitioners of that system be declared a legitimate subject of regulation thereunder. They assert that the defendant Director, by refusing to examine and license, has prevented them from practicing in violation of their constitutional rights of due process and equal protection.
The complaint identifies the 38 parties plaintiff only as students who “have been and are being trained to treat *74human ailtne'nts • without' drügs or medicines' and without operative surgery by that system or. method of treating human ailments- known as naprapathy,” It alleges nothing moré than that an- actual controversy- exists and that- the defendant as Director refuses to recognize the practice of naprapathy and does not give examinations to practitioners of the system.
At the outset we are confronted with the question of whether the complaint states a cause of action under- the provisions of the declaratory judgment section of the Civil Practice Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, chap, no, par. 57.1.) It provides in part: “The court may, in cases of actual controversy, make binding declarations, of rights, - * * * at the- instance of anyone interested in the controversy, * * *.” That provision does not authorize a court to grant declarations of rights involving mere abstract propositions of law without regard to the interests of the parties. An actual controversy must' exist before a declaration of rights may be made. (Exchange Nat. Bank v. County of Cook, 6 Ill.2d 419; Spalding v. City of Granite City, 415 Ill. 274.) Applying the foregoing to -this case, we find that the complaint is deficient in two respects. First, the allegations of schooling and training do not establish that plaintiffs have a sufficient interest in the subject matter to maintain a declarator}'- action. Second, since there is no attempt to define naprapathy, nor does that system of treatment come within the- ambit of judicial notice, it cannot be ascertained whether an actual controversy exists. As was aptly argued by the defendant, for aught that appears, naprapathy may be but a variant of osteopathy or chiropractic, both of which are already regulated by the Medical Practice Act. In our opinion the complaint does not present a justiciable question.
The judgment of the superior court of Cook County is affirmed. . . --
■ Judgment affirmed-.