delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Will County, defendant, Kenneth Dilworth, was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver while on school property (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 561/2, par. 1407(b)(2)). The circuit court had earlier denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction, finding that his motion to suppress evidence should have been granted. (267 Ill. App. 3d 155.) We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal (145 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now reverse the appellate court.
FACTS
Defendant was a 15-year-old student at the Joliet Township High Schools Alternate School. The Alternate School is unlike a regular public school in that only students with behavioral disorders attend it. A little more than 100 students attended the school at the relevant times.
According to the Alternate School handbook, which was admitted into evidence, the goal of the school’s program is to create an environment that will allow students to modify their behavior in a positive direction. Students who improve their behavior are allowed to return to regular school. The school staff was listed as consisting of 11 teachers, four para-professionals, one social worker, one psychologist, one counselor, and, significantly, one liaison officer.
The liaison officer was Detective Francis Ruettiger. Ruettiger was a police officer employed by the Joliet police department and was assigned full-time to the Alternate School as a member of its staff. His primary purpose at the school was to prevent criminal activity. If he discovered criminal activity, he had the authority to arrest the offender and transport the offender to the *198police station. Ruettiger also handled some disciplinary problems. Like the teachers, Ruettiger was authorized to give a detention, but not a suspension. Only the school principal and the director could suspend a student.
On November 18, 1992, two teachers asked Ruetti-ger to search a student, Deshawn Weeks, for possession of drugs. The teachers informed Ruettiger that they had overheard Weeks telling other students that he had sold some drugs and would bring more drugs with him to school the following day. The next day, Ruettiger searched Weeks’ person in his office and found nothing. He then escorted Weeks back to his locker.
Defendant and Weeks met at their neighboring lockers. According to Ruettiger, the two adolescents began talking and giggling "like they put one over on [him].” Ruettiger further testified that they turned toward him and they were "looking, laughing at [him] like [he] was played for a fool.” Ruettiger noticed a flashlight in defendant’s hand and immediately thought that it might contain drugs. He grabbed the flashlight from defendant, unscrewed the top, and observed a bag containing a white chunky substance underneath the flashlight batteries. The substance later tested positive for the presence of cocaine. Defendant ran from the scene, but was captured by Ruettiger and transported to the police station. While there, defendant gave a statement admitting that he intended to sell the cocaine because he was tired of being poor.
Ruettiger explained that he had two reasons for seizing and searching the flashlight. He was suspicious that the flashlight contained drugs. Secondly, Ruettiger believed it was a violation of school rules to possess a flashlight on school grounds because a flashlight is a "blunt instrument.” The school’s disciplinary guidelines, of which all students must be informed when they enroll, prohibited the possession of "any object that can *199be construed to be a weapon.” Ruettiger had never seen a student with a flashlight at the school before. He admitted, however, that students were never specifically informed that flashlights were prohibited. Also, he did not consider a flashlight to be "contraband per se.”
Ruettiger further related that he had daily contact with each student at the Alternate School. Although he did not talk with each student individually every day, he did go into each classroom. Prior to arresting defendant, Ruettiger saw defendant during school several times a day and had always gotten along with him pretty well. On one occasion, two weeks before the arrest, a teacher had suspected defendant of selling drugs in class and asked Ruettiger to search him. Ruettiger did so and found nothing. At that time, defendant told Ruettiger that he did not have any drugs, but named another student who did. A search of the other student revealed marijuana and resulted in the student’s arrest.
Defendant’s teacher, Danica Grabavoy, testified that sometime soon after defendant was enrolled in the Alternate School, she reviewed the entire school handbook with him and his guardian. Among other things, the handbook explains the school’s policies and disciplinary guidelines. On a page entitled "Alternate School Search Procedures,” the handbook states:
"To protect the security, safety, and rights of other students and the staff at the Alternate School, we will search students. This search may include the student’s person, his/her belongings, and school locker. Search procedures may result from suspicions generated from direct observation or from information received from a third party.
Search is done to protect the safety of students. However, if in the process any illegal items or controlled substances are found in a search, these items and the student will be turned over to the police.” (Emphasis in original.)
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the evi*200dence found in his flashlight. He argued that Ruettiger’s seizure and search of the flashlight violated the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. The circuit court conducted a hearing in which it denied the motion. The court found that Ruettiger was acting as an agent for the staff of the Alternate School when he seized and searched the flashlight. Noting that the school staff must deal with difficult students, the court held that the proper fourth amendment standard to apply in this case was the reasonable suspicion standard for searches of students by school officials (New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985), 469 U.S. 325, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 105 S. Ct. 733), rather than the general standard of probable cause. Alternatively, the court found that even if Ruettiger was acting as a police officer, he had "reasonable cause” to believe that the flashlight contained contraband.
Defendant was tried as an adult in a stipulated bench trial. The circuit court found defendant guilty and sentenced him as an adult to the minimum four-year term of imprisonment.
As previously noted, the appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction outright based on its holding that his motion to suppress evidence should have been granted. The appellate court agreed with the lower court that the reasonable suspicion standard applied; however, it found that Ruettiger did not have reasonable suspicion to seize and search the flashlight. In the appellate court’s opinion, Ruettiger had only a mere "hunch” that the flashlight contained drugs.
ANALYSIS
The State contends that the circuit court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence for two reasons: (1) Ruettiger properly seized the flashlight as contraband because defendant’s possession of the flashlight violated the school’s disciplinary guidelines; *201and (2) Ruettiger had reasonable suspicion, as well as probable cause if required, to seize and search the flashlight. Defendant responds that Ruettiger’s seizure and search of his flashlight contravened the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
Generally, a circuit court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is subject to reversal only if manifestly erroneous. (People v. James (1994), 163 Ill. 2d 302, 310.) Here, however, neither the facts nor the credibility of witnesses is questioned. We therefore find it proper to conduct de novo review in this cause. See James, 163 Ill. 2d at 310, quoting People v. Foskey (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 66, 76.
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the Federal government shall not violate "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures ***.” (U.S. Const., amend. IV.) The fundamental purpose of this amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. (Camara v. Municipal Court (1967), 387 U.S. 523, 528, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 935, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 1730.) The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) extended this constitutional guarantee to searches and seizures conducted by State officials. Elkins v. United States (1960), 364 U.S. 206, 213, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 1675, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1442.
I
In New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985), 469 U.S. 325, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 105 S. Ct. 733, the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of searches of students by teachers and school officials. In T.L.O.,. a teacher discovered T.L.O., a 14-year-old high school student, smoking cigarettes in a lavatory in violation of *202a school rule. The teacher took T.L.O. to the principal’s office, where she was questioned by an assistant vice principal. T.L.O. denied that she had been smoking and claimed that she did not smoke at all. The school official demanded to see her purse, opened it, and found a pack of cigarettes. As the school official reached into the purse for the cigarettes, he noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers. In his experience, the possession of rolling papers by high school students was closely associated with the use of marijuana. A further, thorough search of the purse revealed a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, a substantial quantity of one-dollar bills, a list of names of students who apparently owed T.L.O. money, and two letters implicating T.L.O. in marijuana dealing. The school official turned this evidence over to the police after notifying T.L.O.’s mother. T.L.O.’s mother accompanied T.L.O. to police headquarters, where T.L.O. confessed to selling marijuana at the high school. The State subsequently brought delinquency charges against her in juvenile court. T.L.O. sought to suppress the evidence of marijuana dealing, claiming the search was unconstitutional.
The Court initially determined that the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution applies to searches of students conducted by public school officials. (T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333-36, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 729-31, 105 S. Ct. at 738-40.) In doing so, the Court rejected the argument that public school officials are exempt from the dictates of the fourth amendment because they act in loco parentis in their dealings with students. In loco pa-rentis, which literally means "[i]n the place of a parent” (Black’s Law Dictionary 403 (5th ed. 1983)), is a common law doctrine that means a parent " 'may ... delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco pa-rentis, and has such a portion of the power of the parent *203committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed.’ ” (Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (1995), 515 U.S. 646, 655, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564, 575, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2391, quoting W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 441 (1769).) The Court found such a view of things to be "not entirely 'consonant with compulsory education laws’ ” and to be inconsistent with its earlier decisions treating school officials as State actors for purposes of the due process and free speech clauses. (T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 731, 105 S. Ct. at 740, quoting Ingraham v. Wright (1977), 430 U.S. 651, 662, 51 L. Ed. 2d 711, 724, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1407.) Nonetheless, the Court emphasized that the State has a substantial interest in maintaining a proper educational environment for the schoolchildren entrusted to its custody and tutelage. "Even in schools that have been spared the most severe disciplinary problems, the preservation of order and a proper educational environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 733, 105 S. Ct. at 741.
The Court explicitly recognized that, under the fourth and fourteenth amendments, schoolchildren have legitimate expectations of privacy in possessions brought with them to school. "In short, schoolchildren may find it necessary to carry with them a variety of legitimate, noncontraband items, and there is no reason to conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights to privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto school grounds.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 733, 105 S. Ct. at 741.
In balancing the competing interests of a school’s need to maintain a proper educational environment and *204the schoolchild’s legitimate expectations of privacy, the Court held that teachers and school officials do not need a warrant before searching a student and need not adhere to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause. "Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.” (T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 734, 105 S. Ct. at 742.) The Court set forth a twofold inquiry for determining the reasonableness of any search. First, the action must be " 'justified at its inception’ second, the search as actually conducted' must be " 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’ ” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 734, 105 S. Ct. at 743, quoting Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 905, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879.
Applying the test to the facts, the Court found that the school official’s search of T.L.O.’s purse for cigarettes was reasonable, given the teacher’s report that T.L.O. had been smoking in the lavatory in violation of school rules and that T.L.O. denied doing so. The Court characterized the school official’s suspicion that T.L.O. had cigarettes in her purse as "the sort of 'commonsense conclusio[n] about human behavior’ upon which 'practical people’ — including government officials — are entitled to rely,” rather than "an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch.” ’ ” (T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 346, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 737,105 S. Ct. at 745, quoting United States v. Cortez (1981), 449 U.S. 411, 418, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, and Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 909, 88 S. Ct. at 1883.) The Court proceeded to find the further search for marijuana reasonable as well, given the school official’s observation of rolling papers. Consequently, the Court concluded that the evidence of marijuana dealing should have been admitted in T.L.O.’s juvenile delinquency proceedings.
*205II
The State first argues that Ruettiger properly seized defendant’s flashlight based solely on the Alternate School’s disciplinary guidelines, which prohibited the possession of "any object that can be construed to be a weapon.” The State maintains that the flashlight can be construed to be a weapon considering its blunt nature. Therefore, the State asserts, the flashlight was contraband per se in the context of this Alternate School and was properly seized and searched as such. (Illinois v. Andreas (1983), 463 U.S. 765, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1003, 103 S. Ct. 3319.) Although the circuit court made no ruling on this argument, a reviewing court may affirm the circuit court’s decision based on any grounds in the record. People v. Thomas (1995), 164 Ill. 2d 410, 419.
Counsel for the State conceded at oral argument that, under the above logic, school officials could automatically seize and search any flashlight carried onto school grounds. Moreover, counsel admitted that, under his interpretation of the school’s rule, any other blunt object, such as a book, could also be construed to be a weapon subject to automatic search and seizure. These are precisely the types of arbitrary invasions by government officials that the fourth amendment safeguards against. The State cannot compel attendance at public schools and then subject students to unreasonable searches of the legitimate, noncontraband items that they carry onto school grounds. (T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 105 S. Ct. 733.) Accordingly, we reject the State’s initial argument.
III
The State next contends that, under the totality of the circumstances, Ruettiger had reasonable suspicion, as well as probable cause if required, to seize and search the flashlight. Defendant responds that Ruettiger had neither; rather, he seized and searched the flashlight on *206a mere hunch in violation of defendant’s constitutional rights.
Before addressing these contentions, we must determine whether the proper fourth amendment standard to apply in this case is the less stringent reasonable suspicion standard for searches of students by school officials (T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 105 S. Ct. 733) or the general standard of probable cause. Defendant insists that because Ruettiger was a police officer, he was required to have probable cause to seize and search the flashlight.
The Court in T.L.O. stated that the standard of reasonableness applies to a search of a student "by a teacher or other school official.” (T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 734-35, 105 S. Ct. at 743.) In so ruling, however, the Court noted:
"We here consider only searches carried out by school authorities acting alone and on their own authority. This case does not present the question of the appropriate standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies, and we express no opinion on that question.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 n.7, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 735 n.7, 105 S. Ct. at 743 n.7.
Decisions filed after T.L.O: that involve police officers in school settings can generally be grouped into three categories: (1) those where school officials initiate a search or where police involvement is minimal, (2) those involving school police or liaison officers acting on their own authority, and (3) those where outside police officers initiate a search. Where school officials initiate the search or police involvement is minimal, most courts have held that the reasonable suspicion test obtains. (See, e.g., Cason v. Cook (8th Cir. 1987), 810 F.2d 188 (applying reasonable suspicion where a school official acted in conjunction with a liaison officer); Martens v. District No. 220, Board of Education (N.D. Ill. 1985), 620 F. Supp. *20729 (applying reasonable suspicion where an officer’s role in the search of a student was limited); Coronado v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), 835 S.W.2d 636 (applying reasonable suspicion where a school official, along with a sheriffs officer assigned to the school, conducted various searches of a student); In re Alexander B. (1990), 220 Cal. App. 3d 1572, 270 Cal. Rptr. 342 (applying reasonable suspicion where a school official initiated an investigation and requested police assistance); see generally Annot., 31 A.L.R.5th 229, 330, 376 (1995) (discussing several pre-T.L.O. and post-T.L.O. cases).) The same is true in cases involving school police or liaison officers acting on their own authority. (See In re S.F. (1992), 414 Pa. Super. 529, 531, 607 A.2d 793, 794 (applying reasonable suspicion to a search by a "plainclothes police officer for the School District of Philadelphia”); Wilcher v. State (Tex. Ct. App. 1994), 876 S.W.2d 466, 467 (applying reasonable suspicion where the searcher was "a police officer for the Houston Independent School District”). But see A.J.M. v. State (Fla. App. 1993), 617 So. 2d 1137 (holding that a school resource officer employed by a sheriffs office must have probable cause to search).) However, where outside police officers initiate a search, or where school officials act at the behest of law enforcement agencies, the probable cause standard has been applied. See, e.g., F.P. v. State (Fla. App. 1988), 528 So. 2d 1253 (applying probable cause where an outside police officer investigating an auto theft initiated the search of a student at school).
In the present case, the record shows that Detective Ruettiger was a liaison police officer on staff at the Alternate School, which is a high school for students with behavioral disorders. He worked there full-time, handling both criminal activity and disciplinary problems. Two teachers initially asked Ruettiger to search a student other than defendant for drugs. Once that *208search proved fruitless, he escorted the student back to his locker. The student met defendant at their neighboring lockers. In Ruettiger’s presence, the two adolescents began talking and giggling as if they had fooled Ruetti-ger. Ruettiger noticed a flashlight in defendant’s hand and immediately thought that it might contain drugs. He then seized and searched the flashlight, finding cocaine. Given this scenario, this case is best characterized as involving a liaison police officer conducting a search on his own initiative and authority, in furtherance of the school’s attempt to maintain a proper educational environment. We hold that the reasonable suspicion standard applies under these facts.
This holding is consistent with this court’s precedent. In In re Boykin (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 617, decided before T.L.O., this court applied a reasonableness standard to a search of a student at school. There, an assistant principal summoned two police officers to a Chicago high school. He informed the officers that he had received anonymous information that one of the students had a gun. The student was removed from his classroom and escorted to the hall, where the officers were waiting. After the student denied that he had a gun, one of the officers held the student’s arms while the other officer removed a gun from his pants pocket. The Boykin court simply held that the search was reasonable under the circumstances and therefore rejected the student’s claims that the search violated his rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and under section 6 of article II of the Illinois Constitution of 1870.
Our holding in this case also comports with Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (1995), 515 U.S. 646, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564,115 S. Ct. 2386 (upholding the constitutionality of drug tests for student athletes in public high schools). There, the United States Supreme Court *209utilized a three-prong test for determining whether special needs beyond normal law enforcement require a departure from the usual fourth amendment standard of probable cause and a warrant. The competing interests of the individual and the State were balanced by an examination of the following: (1) the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search intrudes, (2) the character of the search, and (3) the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue, and the efficacy of the means for meeting it.
An analysis of each of these three factors supports our holding that reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, is the proper fourth amendment standard to be applied in this case. As to the first factor, the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search intrudes, it must be remembered that we are dealing with schoolchildren here. In this respect, the Vernonia majority stated:
"Fourth Amendment rights *** are different in public schools than elsewhere; the 'reasonableness’ inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children. For their own good and that of their classmates, public school children are routinely required [to do a variety of things]. *** '[S]tudents within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population generally.’ T.L.O., 469 U.S., at 348 (Powell, J., concurring).” Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656-57, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 576-77, 115 S. Ct. at 2392.
The second factor is the character of the search. The intrusion complained of in this case is the seizure and search of defendant’s flashlight by a school liaison officer. Of utmost significance, the liaison officer had an individualized suspicion that defendant’s flashlight contained drugs. He confirmed his suspicion by searching only that flashlight. Thus, we find this search as conducted to be minimally intrusive.
The final factor — the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue, and the efficacy of the *210means for meeting it — also weighs in favor of the reasonable suspicion standard here. There is no doubt that the State has a compelling interest in providing a proper educational environment for students, which includes maintaining its schools free from the ravages of drugs. (See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 579-80, 115 S. Ct. at 2395; see generally T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 105 S. Ct. 733.) As to the efficacy of the means for meeting this interest, it is relevant that the search at issue took place at an alternate school for students with behavioral disorders. In order to maintain a proper educational environment at this particular school, school officials found it necessary to have a full-time police liaison as a member of its staff. The liaison officer assisted teachers and school officials with the difficult job of preserving order in this school. See Ver-nonia, 515 U.S. at 663, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 581, 115 S. Ct. at 2396 (noting that school teachers are ill-prepared to spot and bring to account drug abusé).
In sum, our consideration of the three Vernonia factors supports our application of the reasonable suspicion standard in the case at bar. The same concerns discussed above prompted the Supreme Court in T.L.O. and Ver-nonia to depart from the probable cause standard where schoolchildren were involved.
IV
The dissent does not agree that reasonable suspicion is the proper fourth amendment standard to be applied in this case. In reaching this conclusion, the dissent (1) wrongly claims that the Supreme Court in T.L.O. and Vernonia applied a reasonableness standard to the searches before them because of a "special relationship between student and teacher”; (2) improperly creates a distinction between liaison police officers permanently assigned to schools and "school police”; and (3) misconstrues Ruettiger’s testimony that his primary purpose *211at the school was to prevent criminal activity. The dissent’s analysis loses sight of the forest for the trees.
The main reason the Supreme Court majorities in T.L.O. and Vernonia lowered the fourth amendment standard applicable to searches of students at school was to protect and maintain a proper educational environment for all students, not because of any real or imagined "special relationship” between students and teachers. Professor LaFave discussed this subject at length in his treatise. He first commended the T.L.O. Court’s unequivocal rejection of the use of the in loco parentis doctrine as a basis for its holding. (4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 10.11(a), at 802-06 (3d ed. 1996) (hereinafter LaFave).)
" 'One of the things that makes in loco parentis such an erroneous phrase in this context is precisely the absence of a genuinely parental protective concern for the student who is threatened with the school’s power. It is presumably a characteristic of the use of parental force against a child that the force is tempered by understanding and love based on a close, intimate, and permanent child-parent relationship. What so many of the courts persist in talking about as a parental relationship between school and student is really a law enforcement relationship in which the general student society is protected from the harms of anti-social conduct.’ ” (LaFave § 10.11(a), at 806, quoting W. Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 768 (1974).)
Professor LaFave elaborated on what he considered to be a more proper theory behind school search cases:
"Ddt would appear that a strong case can be made that school searches, as a class, are directed to a rather special public concern — the maintenance of a proper educational environment — which is deserving of a high level of protection. This concern has, if anything, heightened in recent years. 'The problem of drug abuse among students has reached serious proportions and is increasingly recognized as a major national problem.’ The point is not simply that *212there are many drug offenses occurring, for certainly an increase in crime is alone no basis for abandoning the usual Fourth Amendment safeguards. Rather, it is the educational setting which is important. As one court has noted:
The school authorities have an obligation to maintain discipline over the students. It is recognized that, when large numbers of teenagers are gathered together in such an environment, their inexperience and lack of mature judgment can often create hazards to each other. Parents, who surrender their children to this type of environment, *** have a right to expect certain safeguards.
It is in the high school years particularly that parents are justifiably concerned that their children not become accustomed to antisocial behavior, such as the use of illegal drugs. The susceptibility to suggestion of students of high school age increases the danger. Thus, it is the affirmative obligation of the school authorities to investigate any charge that a student is using or possessing narcotics and to take appropriate steps, if the charge is substantiated.
In short, a high school 'is a special kind of place in which serious and dangerous wrongdoing is intolerable.’ The state, having compelled students to attend school and thus 'associate with the criminal few — or perhaps merely the immature and unwise few — closely and daily,’ thereby 'owes those students a safe and secure environment.’ ” (LaFave § 10.11(b), at 809-10.)
We agree with Professor LaFave’s observations.
Furthermore, as earlier noted, the Vernonia majority specifically found that students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population generally. We are convinced that, in this case, when the students’ lessened expectations of privacy are balanced against the Alternate School’s compelling interest in maintaining a proper educational environment for all its students, a departure *213from the usual probable cause standard is not only warranted, but required. Therefore, we reiterate that the Supreme Court’s decisions in T.L.O. and Vernonia support our application of the reasonable suspicion standard in this case.
The dissent also attempts to create a distinction between "school police” and liaison police officers permanently assigned to a school. The dissent apparently believes that "school police” can search with reasonable suspicion because they are "employed by and [are] ultimately responsible to the school district.” The dissent then asserts that, in contrast, liaison police officers permanently assigned to a school must have probable cause to search because they are "employed by and ultimately responsible to local law enforcement authorities.” We cannot agree that this distinction exists, or that it would be controlling even if it were to exist. We cite In re S.F. (1992), 414 Pa. Super. 529, 607 A.2d 793, and Wilcher v. State (Tex. Ct. App. 1994), 876 S.W.2d 466, as examples where courts have applied the reasonable suspicion standard to searches of students at school by school police or liaison officers acting on their own authority. In In re S.F., the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied the reasonable suspicion standard to a search of a student at school by a police officer. (In re S.F., 414 Pa. Super, at 531, 607 A.2d at 794.) The officer’s status in S.F. was undoubtedly quite similar to Ruettiger’s status here. The S.F. opinion specifically notes that the officer there had worked as a plainclothes police officer for the school district of Philadelphia for four years and that he personally had "made 15 to 20 narcotics arrests during that time.” (In re S.F., 414 Pa. Super, at 531, 607 A.2d at 794.) In Wilcher, the Texas appellate court applied the reasonable suspicion standard to a search of a student at school by a "police officer for the Houston Independent School District.” *214 (Wilcher, 876 S.W.2d at 467.) Although the officer there did not effect the arrest of the student herself, there is nothing in the opinion suggesting that she lacked the authority to do so. (See Wilcher, 876 S.W.2d 466.) We also fail to see how such a distinction would be material under the dissent’s analysis. The "special relationship” the dissent apparently finds controlling of this issue does not exist between students and "school police” to any greater degree than it does between students and liaison police officers.
Next, the dissent places undue emphasis on Ruetti-ger’s testimony that his primary purpose at the school was to prevent criminal activity. This statement must be viewed in context. Ruettiger’s overall purpose at the Alternate School was to assist other school officials in their attempt to maintain a proper educational environment for the students. As the record here reveals, Ruettiger was listed in the school handbook as a member of the Alternate School staff. He worked at the school full-time, handling both criminal activity and disciplinary problems. The teachers referred such problems to Ruettiger, as is evidenced by the teachers’ report to Ruettiger concerning Deshawn Weeks and an earlier report concerning defendant himself. Ruettiger also had daily contact with the students at the Alternate School. Under all these circumstances, Ruettiger is properly considered to be a school official.
Last, the dissent finds it fundamentally unfair to conclude that defendant has diminished privacy rights while a student at a public school, and then to charge and sentence defendant to four years in the penitentiary as an adult with evidence obtained as a result of his diminished privacy rights. Defendant has not argued, and we cannot say, that our General Assembly’s decision to punish as adults those young offenders who intend to sell drugs while on school grounds changes the *215constitutional standard to be applied. If anything, the legislature’s stiff penalty for defendant’s crime reflects a well-reasoned policy of zero tolerance for drugs in our troubled public schools.
For the reasons stated, we find that reasonable suspicion is the proper fourth amendment standard to be applied in the case sub judice.
V
There remains the question of the constitutionality of the search in this case. When evaluating the reasonableness of a search, "[e]ach case must stand or fall on its own set of concrete facts.” (People v. Galvin (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 153, 174.) "[T]he requirement of reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute certainty: 'sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment ... .’ ” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 346, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 737, 105 S. Ct. at 745, quoting Hill v. California (1971), 401 U.S. 797, 804, 28 L. Ed. 2d 484, 490, 91 S. Ct. 1106, 1111.
As earlier noted, the Court in T.L.O. set forth a twofold inquiry for determining whether, under all the circumstances, a search of a student is reasonable: the action must be justified at its inception, and the search as actually conducted must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. (T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 734,105 S. Ct. at 743.) The Court further explained:
"Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be 'justified at its inception’ when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 734-35, 105 S. Ct. at 743.
*216For Ruettiger’s search of defendant’s flashlight to have been justified at its inception, Ruettiger must have had reasonable grounds for suspecting that the flashlight contained drugs in violation of the law and the school rules. Two teachers had informed Ruettiger that they had overheard Deshawn Weeks telling other students that he had sold some drugs and would bring more drugs with him to school the following day. Ruettiger searched Weeks the next day, finding nothing. Ruettiger then walked Weeks back to his locker, where the defendant met with Weeks. The two teenagers began talking and giggling "like they put one over on [Ruettiger].” They turned toward Ruettiger and were "looking, laughing at [Ruettiger] like [he] was played for a fool.” Defendant was holding a flashlight in his hand. Ruettiger had never seen a student with a flashlight at the school before, so he considered it a very unusual item for defendant to have. The totality of these circumstances would lead a reasonable person to suspect that defendant was carrying drugs in his flashlight. Indeed, upon seeing the flashlight in defendant’s hand, Ruettiger testified that he immediately thought that it might contain drugs. Although an objective standard must be used in determining whether reasonable suspicion was present, the testimony of an officer as to his subjective feelings is one of the factors that may be considered in the totality of the circumstances. (Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d at 166-68.) Ruettiger’s testimony as to his subjective belief can thus be considered as additional support for our conclusion.
We also find that the search as conducted here was permissible in its scope. Ruettiger had individualized suspicion that defendant’s flashlight contained drugs. He seized and searched only that flashlight. This measure was reasonably related to the objectives of the search and was not excessively intrusive.
*217For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Ruetti-ger’s seizure and search of defendant’s flashlight was constitutional because it was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. We therefore reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
Appellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.