delivered the opinion of the court:
Before us are two criminal cases we have consolidated for review, People v. Adams, No. 75111, and People v. Valdez, No. 75654. Although these cases involve wholly unrelated facts, they share a common feature. In both cases the appellate court reversed the defendants’ convictions on the grounds that the State had failed to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt.
We granted the State leave to appeal in each case. (134 Ill. 2d R. 315.) For the reasons that follow, we agree with the appellate court’s conclusion that venue is a material allegation that must be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt along with the other elements of an offense. We hold, however, that the State did meet its burden of establishing venue in these cases. Accordingly, the judgments of the appellate court are reversed, and the cases are remanded for consideration of the remaining issues which the parties raised, but the appellate court did not reach.
In People v. Adams, the evidence showed that Edward Peterson owned a 1979 Chevrolet, which he allowed his live-in girlfriend to use. Peterson kept the car at the couple’s residence, which was located in the City of Chicago. On May 24, 1991, the girlfriend, Valerie Warren, lent the car to her uncle, Melvin Warren. By the next day, the car was gone. Valerie contacted the police to report it stolen.
Peterson next saw the car at the Chicago police pound on May 27. It had been towed there after the defendant, Donald Adams, crashed it on Interstate 290 near the community of Addison. Two days later, Adams flagged down a Chicago police officer and said that he wanted to turn himself in. Adams told the officer that "he had taken Ed Peterson’s car, he was mad at somebody.” He also stated that "he was left alone in the *337car and that he took the car and he crashed it at Addison.
The officer took Adams to the police station. There the officer discovered that a stolen car report listing Adams as the offender had been filed by Peterson. After the police advised Adams of his Miranda rights, he repeated his story about taking the car and crashing it. When the police asked him what had become of the keys, he took them out of his pocket. The Cook County State’s Attorney subsequently charged Adams by information with burglary and possession of a stolen vehicle.
At trial Adams did not deny that he had been in possession of Peterson’s car. Rather, his defense was that he had permission to use it. Adams claimed that he had a close relationship with Peterson’s girlfriend, Valerie, and that the two of them had driven around together in Peterson’s car on the night of May 24 and during the early morning hours of May 25. According to Adams, they purchased and used alcohol and cocaine. In Adams’ version of the story, they drove to Maywood at 2:30 a.m. to borrow money from Jessie Williams to buy drugs. The pair subsequently drove back to Chicago to buy cocaine. Adams claimed that when the drugs were used up, he left Valerie at a crack house and drove to Williams’ home a second time to borrow more money from him. There is no dispute that Maywood is located in Cook County, as, of course, is Chicago.
Disavowing his previous confession, Adams asserted that Valerie had given him permission to take the car on the second trip to Williams’ house and that he had intended to drive back to Valerie after he had borrowed the money. As previously noted, however, he ultimately crashed the car on the interstate near Addison, which is several miles and several highway exits northwest of Maywood. He was driving in the opposite direction of Maywood, although he claimed that the crash occurred *338when he was trying to make a u-turn. Adams never explained what he was doing on the highway, going west, except to say that he was trying to burn up some gas he had bought for the car.
Adams’ story was contested by the other witnesses at trial. Jessie Williams did confirm that he had loaned money to Adams twice during the early hours of May 25, but testified that he did not see Valerie in Adams’ company. Although Valerie admitted that she knew Adams, she denied dating him and denied seeing him on May 24. In addition, both Valerie and Ed Peterson testified that Adams had no authority to use the car.
Based on this evidence, the circuit court of Cook County, sitting without a jury, acquitted Adams of the burglary charge, but found him guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, in violation of section 4 — 103(a)(1) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 4 — 103(a)(1)). The court sentenced Adams to 30 months’ probation and ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $150, the cost of repairing the damage to Peterson’s car.
In the Valdez case, the record showed that on September 19, 1986,# the defendant, Gloria Valdez, boarded an airliner in Miami, along with two male associates, Victor Valdez and Raul Torres. The airliner was bound for Minneapolis-St. Paul, with one scheduled stop in Chicago.
All three individuals were holding one-way tickets. Gloria had purchased her ticket with cash on the day of departure using the name Louise A. Diaz. Victor and Raul had also bought their tickets that day using cash. The tickets bore consecutive serial numbers. Raul’s ticket was purchased under the name Guillermo Valdez.
After the three boarded the plane, a flight attendant noticed that Victor and Raul used the restroom separately, about 30 seconds after one another. The atten*339dant regarded this as unusual because people do not usually go to the restroom before takeoff. The attendant did not see any of the other passengers use the restroom before Victor and Raul did.
Before the plane departed, an airline ticket agent informed an airline service manager of the tickets Victor and Raul had purchased. The manager boarded the plane and advised Victor and Raul that they would have to disembark, which they did. The manager and airline security then searched the two and their luggage for weapons. When none were found, Victor and Raul were allowed to return to the plane.
After the plane departed, the flight attendant who had previously observed Victor and Raul searched the restroom they had used. He discovered four sandwich-type plastic bags containing cocaine. The bags were hidden under the liner of a trash receptacle located beneath the sink. The attendant initially locked the restroom door, but reopened it after talking to the captain. Later, during the flight, he saw Victor and Raul each try to use the restroom. The attendant testified that they were unable to do so because the facilities were occupied and that they then used a different lavatory across the aisle.
When the flight landed in Chicago for its one scheduled stop, Chicago police and agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency boarded the plane. The police seized the bags of cocaine from the restroom and they, along with the DEA agents, escorted Gloria, Victor and Raul from the plane.
During questioning by police in a passenger waiting room, Gloria denied that the drugs belonged to her, denied having any knowledge of the drugs, and denied knowing Victor and Raul. She stated that she was travelling to Minneapolis to see her son and to perform witchcraft for the sum of $300.
*340Gloria consented to a search of her purse. Authorities found six dollars and a cleaning ticket bearing the name Gloria Valdez. In addition, there were miscellaneous items, including material that "looked like bones or something.” Gloria explained that these were used in her witchcraft ritual.
After the search was concluded, police took Gloria’s photograph and fingerprints and allowed her to leave. They later discovered that her fingerprints matched latent prints on the tape used to seal the plastic bags of cocaine. As a result, Gloria was arrested for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in violation of section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 561h, par. 1401).
Over objection, the jury was instructed on constructive possession and accountability. The jury found her guilty, and the court sentenced her to 15 years in prison and imposed a fine of $50,000.
Adams and Gloria subsequently filed appeals in their respective cases. Each raised various grounds for reversal, but in both cases the appellate court reversed on the sole ground that the State had failed to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt. (Adams, No. 1 — 91— 3009 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23); Valdez, 249 Ill. App. 3d 1058.) The remaining issues raised by Adams and Gloria were not addressed.
In its appeal to this court, the State first argues that the appellate court erred in holding that venue must be proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. The State cites section 1 — 6(a) of the Crimiiial Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1 — 6(a)), which provides that "[a]ll objections of improper place of trial are waived by a defendant unless made before trial.” The State also invokes section 114 — 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 114 — 1). Subsection (a)(7) of that statute states that the *341court may dismiss an indictment, information or complaint on the grounds that the county is an improper place of trial "[u]pon the written motion of the defendant made prior to trial.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 114 — 1(a)(7).) Subsection (b) specifies that where such motions are not filed in a timely fashion, they shall not be considered and that the grounds for those motions, with some exceptions, "are waived.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 114 — 1(b).
Based on these statutes, the State contends that the General Assembly has now established that venue is not a substantive element of any criminal offense. In the State’s view, it is, instead, a personal, procedural right which is waived if not raised by a defendant prior to trial. Because neither Adams nor Gloria brought such a pretrial challenge here, the State asserts that they should have been barred from raising the question of venue later in the proceedings.
This court has recently reiterated its long-held view that venue is a material allegation which must be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt along with the other elements of an offense. (People v. Hagan (1991), 145 Ill. 2d 287, 300.) Contrary to the State’s argument, this rule has not been supplanted by the provisions of section 1 — 6(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1 — 6(a)) or section 114 — 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 114 — 1).
Those statutes provide a procedural mechanism for defendants to seek a change of venue in accordance with their constitutional right (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8) to be tried in the county where the crime is alleged to have taken place. (See People v. Carroll (1992), 260 Ill. App. 3d 319, 327.) They do not alter the State’s obligation to prove at trial that the county where the crime is alleged to have been committed is the county where the crime, *342in fact, took place. As the committee comments to section 1 — 6(a) explain, the waiver provision in that statute
"is in accord with the rule that if a defendant desires a change of venue he must apply therefor before trial commences. (See People v. Davis, 10 Ill. 2d 430, 140 N.E.2d 675 (1957), and People v. Gregory, 16 Ill. App. 2d 576, 149 N.E.2d 198 (1958).) It is not intended to change in any way the prosecution’s duty to allege the place where the offense was committed in accordance with the provisions of Section 1 — 6, and to prove such allegations in the usual manner.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS Ann. 5/1 — 6, Committee Comments — 1961, at 23 (West 1992).
In the two cases before us, neither Adams nor Gloria has claimed that venue was improper in the sense that the charging instruments alleged that the crimes were committed somewhere other than the counties where the trials were held. In each case the charging instruments alleged that the crimes occurred in Cook County, and in each case Cook County was the site of the trial.
The problem here is quite different. Defendants’ objections are not with the allegations of the charging instruments, but with the State’s failure to prove those allegations. This failure of proof is not a matter that defendants could possibly have been required to raise in a pretrial motion. The presumption of innocence relieved them of any obligation to contest the factual basis for the State’s case before trial commenced. See People v. McClellan (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 584, 587.
Because a pretrial motion was not required where, as here, the question of venue involved an alleged failure of proof, it necessarily follows that the absence of such a pretrial motion cannot divest defendants of their right to challenge the sufficiency of the venue evidence following conviction. The question of venue was therefore properly considered by the appellate court in these cases. For the reasons which follow, however, the *343appellate court erred in concluding that the State had not met its burden of proving venue beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the Adams case, the appellate court reversed the conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle, which was alleged to have been committed in Cook County, because "testimony indicated that the offense may have occurred in another county.” This statement suggests that the appellate court may not have been mindful of the proper standard of review. We recently reiterated that a court of review may not reverse a guilty verdict unless the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was so palpably contrary to the verdict, so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. We further held that a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact, and that it may not reverse a conviction verdict if any rational trier of fact could have reached the conclusion below. People v. Harre (1993), 155 Ill. 2d 392, 398.
Under this standard, there is no basis for disturbing the trial court’s verdict. The vehicle started out in Cook County, where Peterson, the owner, and his girlfriend, Valerie, lived. By Adams’ own account, he ultimately gained exclusive possession of the automobile and drove it in Cook County. Both Valerie and Peterson testified that he had no authorization to do so.
Adams contends that his conviction must nevertheless be set aside because the State failed to show that he intended to permanently deprive Peterson of the vehicle. In Adams’ view, the most he was guilty of was "joyriding.” We note, however, that the intent to deprive an owner of his property may be inferred simply from the act of taking another’s property. Likewise, it may be inferred from the lack of evidence of intent to return the property or to leave it in a place where the owner *344could safely recover it. See People v. Pozdoll (1992), 230 Ill. App. 3d 887, 890.
Here, Adams confessed to police that he had taken Peterson’s car, and the evidence showed that his flight in the vehicle ended only after he crashed it on the highway. Until that time, he was headed away from Chicago and Valerie. Although he claimed that he intended to return the car to Valerie after using up all the gas, the trier of fact was not required, in light of the totality of the circumstances shown by the evidence, to accept his version of the facts. The totality of the circumstances here supports a conclusion that Adams possessed the requisite intent and that he possessed that intent in Cook County where he took exclusive and unauthorized possession of the car. The appellate court therefore erred in reversing Adams’ conviction on the ground that the State had failed to meet its burden of establishing venue.
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the appellate court’s reversal of Gloria Valdez’s conviction. As we have discussed, the jury in Gloria’s case was instructed on theories of accountability and constructive possession. Based on our review of the evidence, there was an adequate basis for the jury to conclude that Gloria’s associates maintained constructive possession of the illegal drugs in Cook County and that Gloria is liable for the offense under principles of accountability.
In reversing the jury’s verdict, the appellate court focused on the question of constructive possession. It believed that there could be no constructive possession in Cook County because neither Gloria nor her associates had control of the restroom where the drugs were hidden. That, however, was not required.
In reviewing a conviction for possession of a controlled substance, the dispositive issue is not whether a defendant had control over the place where the drugs were found, but whether the defendant had possession *345of the drugs themselves. Proof that a defendant had control over the premises where the drugs were located can help resolve this issue because it gives rise to an inference of knowledge and possession of the drugs (People v. Jones (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 1143, 1148), but it is not a prerequisite for conviction. Indeed, not only does a defendant not need to control the premises, he does not even need to have actual, personal, present dominion over the drugs themselves. (People v. Frieberg (1992), 147 Ill. 2d 326, 361.) Constructive possession may exist even where an individual is no longer in physical control of the drugs, provided that he once had physical control of the drugs with intent to exercise control in his own behalf, and he has not abandoned them and no other person has obtained possession. People v. Fox (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 581, 585.
In this case, the jury could certainly have concluded that Gloria’s associates had physical control of the drugs with intent to exercise control in their own behalf. Evidence showed that the two carried the cocaine on board and hid it in the restroom. No other person obtained possession of the drugs prior to their seizure by police in Cook County, and no serious claim can be made that the drugs were ever abandoned. Gloria’s associates concealed them in the restroom only so they could escape detection until the plane reached its destination. Constructive possession therefore existed, and it existed in Cook County. Accordingly, as in Adams, the appellate court erred in reversing Gloria’s conviction on the ground that the State had failed to meet its burden of establishing venue.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the appellate court are reversed, and these causes are remanded to the appellate court for consideration of the remaining issues which the parties raised, but the appellate court did not reach.
Reversed and remanded.