delivered the opinion of the court:
For the sake of clarity, we shall present the procedural background and discussion of these two consolidated interlocutory appeals, cause No. 71813 (Skyline) and cause No. 71815 (Daiwa Bank), separately.
Richard Pfaff (Pfaff), plaintiff, filed an action against Chrysler Corporation (Chrysler), a Delaware corporation, in the circuit court of Cook County, alleging a violation *40of the Structural Work Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 60 et seq.) and common law negligence. Venue was transferred to the circuit court of Boone County, where Chrysler filed a third-party complaint against Skyline Industrial Services, Inc. (Skyline), Pfaff s employer, ostensibly a Michigan corporation. Following a ruling striking and dismissing several counts of the third-party complaint, Chrysler filed an action against Skyline in the circuit court of Wayne County, Michigan. Skyline then successfully moved the Boone County, Illinois, circuit court to permanently enjoin Chrysler from proceeding in the Michigan action. Chrysler appealed the trial court’s decision to our appellate court. The appellate court reversed. (208 Ill. App. 3d 910.) We granted Skyline’s petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill. 2d R. 315) and consolidated Skyline’s appeal with the Daiwa Bank appeal.
Chrysler subsequently filed a motion in this court to dismiss Skyline’s appeal, which motion was taken with the case. The motion to dismiss Skyline’s appeal is hereby denied.
For reasons which follow, we affirm the decision of the appellate court, which reversed the order of injunction entered by the trial court.
The Daiwa Bank, Limited (Daiwa), filed a mortgage foreclosure action on real property, held in trust, located in Carpentersville, Kane County, Illinois. La Salle National Trust, N.A., as trustee, and Lakes of Dundee Development Venture (the joint venture), as beneficial owner, were named as defendants. The action additionally sought damages for fraud and breach of contract against the joint venture and Monzer Hourani, Parsifal Corporation, Hourani Family Trust and Hourani International Corporation (the Hourani defendants), as guarantors of the mortgage loan. The Hourani defendants then *41filed a lender liability action in the State district court of Harris County, Texas, against Daiwa Bank and Coventry Development Associates Chicago, Limited (Coventry), a partner in the joint venture.
Daiwa filed a motion in the Kane County circuit court to permanently enjoin the Hourani defendants from proceeding against Daiwa Bank in the Texas action. Daiwa’s motion to enjoin was granted by the trial court and the Hourani defendants appealed to our appellate court. The appellate court reversed. (207 Ill. App. 3d 1112 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).) We allowed Daiwa’s petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill. 2d R. 315), ordering consolidation with Skyline’s appeal.
The Hourani defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, which was taken with the case. We now deny the motion to dismiss the appeal. Furthermore, for reasons which follow, we affirm the decision of the appellate court, which reversed the trial court’s grant of an injunction.
The two issues we must resolve are: (1) what constitutes the proper standard for enjoining the prosecution of a subsequent action filed in a sister State court; and (2) whether issuance of the permanent injunctions restraining Chrysler and the Hourani defendants from prosecuting actions in other States’ courts was a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion.
The Standard of Analysis
On appeal, Skyline and Daiwa Bank contend that the appellate court misapprehended the standard of analysis utilized in determining whether to enjoin a party from proceeding with litigation in another State.
*42Skyline and Daiwa argue that the appellate court recognizes a dual standard. Where the action in the other jurisdiction is instituted before the Illinois action, the court may only enjoin a litigant from instituting or proceeding with a foreign suit which will result in fraud, gross wrong or oppression. (See Block & Co. v. Storm Printing Co. (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 92, 95; Lowe v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 637, 644.) Conversely, where the action in the other jurisdiction is instituted after the Illinois action, Skyline and Daiwa contend, a lesser standard applies and the court may enjoin a litigant merely if the foreign action appears “oppressive, vexatious, annoying, harassing, or unduly interfere[s] with the progress of a prior instituted local action." (See Block & Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d at 95-96; Lowe, 96 Ill. App. 3d at 645; National Hockey League v. Intermart, Inc. (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1077; Wells v. Wells (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 91, 93.) Daiwa further contends that in making the determination of the propriety of injunctive relief in these circumstances, courts are to look to whether complete relief can be obtained in the Illinois action, and if so, the filing of a foreign suit on the same issues will be deemed vexatious and harassing. See National Hockey League, 127 Ill. App. 3d at 1078; Lowe, 96 Ill. App. 3d at 645.
Chrysler and the Hourani defendants assert that the appellate court correctly recognized that controlling precedent has established but one standard of analysis, i.e., the issuance of an injunction where the foreign proceeding will result in fraud, gross wrong or oppression, regardless of any priority of filing suit. Royal League v. Kavanagh (1908), 233 Ill. 175, 183; Illinois Life Insurance Co. v. Prentiss (1917), 277 Ill. 383, 386; see Chicago & Eastern Illinois R.R. Co. v. Reserve Insurance Co. (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 206, 209; American Re-Insur *43 ance Co. v. MGIC Investment Corp. (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 316, 322.
It has long been established in Illinois that a court of equity has the power to restrain a person over whom it has jurisdiction from instituting a suit (Harris v. Pullman (1876), 84 Ill. 20, 28) or proceeding with suit in a foreign State (James v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co. (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 356, 363; Crawley v. Bauchens (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 360, 366). Courts do not, in such cases, pretend to direct or control the foreign court, but the decree acts solely upon the party. The jurisdiction rests on the authority vested in courts of equity over persons within the limits of their jurisdiction and who are amenable to process, to stay acts contrary to equity and good conscience. Royal League v. Kavanagh (1908), 233 Ill. 175, 183.
The exercise of such power by equity courts in Illinois is considered to be a matter of great delicacy, to be “invoked with great restraint to avoid distressing conflicts and reciprocal interference with jurisdiction.” James, 14 Ill. 2d at 363; cf. Cole v. Cunningham (1889), 133 U.S. 107, 121, 33 L. Ed. 538, 544-45, 10 S. Ct. 269, 274 (extreme delicacy, however, should not deter the court from controlling the conduct of a party within its jurisdiction to prevent oppression or fraud, as no rule of interstate comity forbids such exercise).
In Royal League, 233 Ill. at 183, a fraternal insurance society filed a bill for an injunction in the circuit court of Cook County, seeking to restrain a beneficiary from instituting an action in Missouri to recover benefits under the policy. At the time the bill was filed in Illinois, there was no previously filed and pending action in Missouri. This court established a standard of analysis by its statements that courts possessed the undoubted authority to restrain a litigant from prosecuting a foreign action which would result in fraud, gross wrong or op*44pression, but that a litigant ought not be restrained “unless a clear equity is presented requiring the interposition of the court to prevent a manifest wrong and injustice.” (Royal League, 233 Ill. at 183.) “To justify equitable interposition it must be made to appear that an equitable right will otherwise be denied the party seeking relief.” (Royal League, 233 Ill. at 183.) The Royal League court thus affirmed the denial of injunctive relief on the basis that it was not inequitable for a litigant to pursue an action in a forum which could afford him a better remedy.
In Illinois Life Insurance Co. v. Prentiss (1917), 277 Ill. 383, the beneficiary of an insurance policy first filed suit in the circuit court of Cook County to recover benefits under the policy. The insurance company then sought to enjoin the beneficiary from filing suit in Missouri to recover benefits under the policy. In determining the appropriateness of an injunction, Prentiss reiterated the standard of analysis enunciated in Royal League. (Prentiss, 277 Ill. at 385-86.) The court relied upon the Royal League standard even though the Illinois action was filed first. The court then applied Royal League and determined that injunctive relief was inappropriate, as the application of the more favorable Missouri procedural law in the foreign suit did not constitute a manifest wrong or oppression.
Daiwa contends that Royal League and Prentiss did not concern the situation where successively filed actions which are pending simultaneously were maintainable, as in the present case. We believe that distinction is irrelevant, considering that in Prentiss the first action was then pending in Illinois and this court, nonetheless, applied the Royal League standard. Furthermore, contrary to Daiwa’s assertions, Prentiss touched upon the issue of priority of suit. The Prentiss court noted, “The bare fact that a suit on this policy has been begun and is now *45pending in this State, in the absence of equitable considerations, furnishes no ground to enjoin appellant from pursuing his claim in a foreign jurisdiction ***.” (.Prentiss, 277 Ill. at 387-88.) Thus, this court did not allow any possible deference shown to prior-acquired jurisdiction, even that of an Illinois court, to diminish the requirement that a clear equity be presented before injunctive relief was appropriate.
Older Illinois appellate decisions have also relied upon the standard established by Royal League and Prentiss, regardless of whether suit was first filed in Illinois or the foreign State. In Catherwood v. Hokanson (1916), 201 Ill. App. 462, suit was filed in Illinois seeking the construction of a will creating a trust. Defendants filed an action in Indiana. The plaintiffs then sought to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with the Indiana action. The Indiana action essentially duplicated the Illinois action, but also requested a partition of certain real property located in Indiana. Quoting verbatim the standard established by Royal League, the court held that the facts did not justify enjoining the defendants, and so reversed the grant of injunctive relief.
In Brinkerhoff v. Huntley (1921), 223 Ill. App. 580, the defendants filed a suit to quiet title in South Dakota. The plaintiff then filed a bill in Illinois, seeking to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with their South Dakota action. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s grant of an injunction on the basis that the standard established by Royal League had not been met and complete relief was obtainable in South Dakota. The court did not give any consideration to the fact that a prior action was pending in South Dakota.
A trio of divorce cases further illustrates that the Royal League standard has been consistently applied by our appellate court without consideration to priority of filing suit. See Kahn v. Kahn (1945), 325 Ill. App. 137, *46146-47 (Royal League relied upon as standard of analysis in affirming the denial of a motion to dissolve an injunction, where an Illinois action commenced first and plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from instituting a second action in Nevada); Russell v. Russell (1946), 329 Ill. App. 580, 586 (Royal League relied upon in affirming the grant of an injunction, where Illinois action commenced first and plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from proceeding with a subsequently filed Nevada action); Kleinschmidt v. Kleinschmidt (1951), 343 Ill. App. 539, 547 (Royal League relied upon to reverse the grant of an injunction, where first divorce action was filed by husband in Florida and wife filed second divorce action in Illinois, which action also sought to enjoin the husband from proceeding in Florida).
It is Skyline and Daiwa’s position that a dual standard was developed in James v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co. (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 356. In James, the plaintiff filed a wrongful death action in Illinois against the defendant railroad company. The defendant, however, obtained a temporary injunction in Michigan, where the plaintiff resided, restraining her from prosecuting the Illinois action. Plaintiff moved in the Illinois action for a counterinjunction, a temporary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the Michigan injunction. The motion was denied and plaintiff appealed. Following plaintiffs arrest by Michigan authorities for contempt and the issuance of a second injunction by the Michigan court, this court entered orders restraining defendant from proceeding in Michigan.
On appeal, the court viewed the case as involving two issues, the operative effect of the foreign injunction on the pending Illinois litigation, and the propriety of the issuance of the counterinjunction. In discussing the effect of the foreign injunction, the court made the statement upon which Skyline, Daiwa and subsequent appellate de*47cisions so heavily rely to support a dual standard. “Illinois has consistently followed the course of refusing to restrain the prosecution of a prior instituted action pending in a sister State unless a clear equity is presented requiring the interposition of the court to prevent a manifest wrong and injustice ***.” (Emphasis added.) (James, 14 Ill. 2d at 363.) The opinion indicates that considerations of comity form the basis for this practice by Illinois courts. The opinion then concludes that comity does not, however, conversely compel an Illinois court to recognize a foreign injunction restraining litigants from prosecuting a previously instituted Illinois case.
The statement upon which Skyline and Daiwa so heavily rely occurs in the context of the James court’s discussion of whether to yield to considerations of comity and afford recognition to the Michigan injunction. We do not believe that the court intended by this statement that an application of the Royal League standard should turn upon any priority in filing suit. The court’s discussion, rather, indicates that principles of comity, more so than equity, prevent Illinois courts from granting injunctive relief under circumstances where there exists a prior instituted foreign action. (See Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 896, 899 (1949).) To say that Illinois will refrain because of comity from restraining a party when a sister State has first acquired jurisdiction is not to say that our courts should enjoin actions based on something less than the prevention of manifest wrong and oppression whenever Illinois acquires jurisdiction first. James does not stand for the proposition that the Royal League standard is diminished and a less stringent equitable analysis is appropriate where a foreign action is filed after an Illinois action.
The James court then discussed the second issue before it, the propriety of a counterinjunction restraining the defendant railroad. The James court cited the basic *48principle that a court has the authority to enjoin proceedings in another court in order to protect its jurisdiction. (James, 14 Ill. 2d at 368.) The court determined that it could not ignore the strong factual evidence of coercion in the record before it and recognized that the intended effect of the Michigan injunction was to wrest jurisdiction from the Illinois court. “[T]he Michigan injunction was in everything but form an order restraining the Illinois court and determining the cases it may properly try.” (James, 14 Ill. 2d at 368.) The court, accordingly, reversed and remanded for issuance of an injunction.
James represents a strong remedy in the face of equally strong circumstances: the jurisdiction of an Illinois court was threatened by foreign injunction, not by the mere institution of the foreign action. Accordingly, James does not support the proposition that the mere institution of a subsequent foreign action threatens the first-acquired jurisdiction of Illinois courts sufficient to justify an injunction.
Crawley v. Bauchens (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 360, further confirms our view that James did not develop a dual standard. In Crawley, a divorce decree was granted in Illinois, awarding custody of the couple’s minor child to the former wife. She and her new spouse subsequently instituted adoption proceedings in Panama, where they and the child resided. Upon the former wife’s visit to Illinois, the former husband filed post-divorce proceedings, requesting that his ex-wife be held in contempt and seeking to restrain her from removing the child from Illinois and proceeding with the Panama adoption. Citing Prentiss, this court stated that an injunction is called for only “when the prosecution of the action in another jurisdiction would result in fraud, gross wrong or oppression.” (Crawley, 57 Ill. 2d at 366.) Despite that the Panamanian action was instituted after the Illinois divorce pro*49ceeding, this court did not consider that that fact allowed for a less stringent standard of analysis.
Skyline and Daiwa, however, cite to several appellate decisions which interpret James as developing a dual standard on the basis of the priority of filing suit. Block & Co. v. Storm Printing Co. (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 92, is the seminal case. The court in Block & Co. wrongly interpreted James’ emphasis on the policy of protecting first-acquired jurisdiction and its statement concerning a “prior instituted action” as a justification to reject the Royal League standard. Citing no Illinois decisions, Block & Co. concludes that in cases where the foreign action is instituted after the Illinois action, it is appropriate to enjoin a litigant merely on the basis that the foreign action appears to be “oppressive, vexatious, annoying, harassing, or unduly interfere[s] with the progress of a prior instituted local action.” Block & Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d at 95; see Lowe v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 637, 645; National Hockey League v. Intermart, Inc. (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1077 (injunction appropriate when foreign action either likely to result in fraud or gross wrong or oppression, or appears to be “oppressive, vexatious, annoying, or harassing, or [causes] undue interference”).
Indeed, our appellate court has considered the oppressive, vexatious or harassing character of a subsequent foreign action as a consideration in the standard of analysis. (See Catherwood v. Hokanson (1916), 201 Ill. App. 462, 466 (court relied upon the Royal League standard of analysis, acknowledging as well that “when complete relief can be had where litigation is pending, the institution of foreign proceedings will be regarded ‘as a vexatious harassing of the opposite party’ ”); see Lowe v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 637; Wells v. Wells (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 91, 93 (where the court looked to the Royal League standard *50for its overriding analysis and considered the nature of subsequent proceedings (“vexatious harassing”) as a factor in that analysis); Chicago & Eastern Illinois R.R. Co. v. Reserve Insurance Co. (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 206, 209 (Royal League relied upon as standard of analysis and grant of injunction reversed as no substantial evidence of harassing litigation was presented).) However, these cases do not support Skyline and Daiwa’s view that a court need not look to the more stringent Royal League standard simply on the basis that the Illinois action is instituted before the foreign action, or that complete relief can be had in the pending litigation. See 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions §221 (1969).
We conclude that the appropriate standard for determining whether to restrain a party from prosecuting an out-of-State action is stated in Royal League. An injunction in such circumstances is appropriate only when prosecution of the foreign action would result in fraud or gross wrong or oppression, or when a clear equity is presented which requires such restraint to prevent a manifest wrong and injustice. (Royal League, 233 Ill. at 183.) This standard is appropriate regardless of whether the foreign action is filed before or after the Illinois action. The fact that a subsequent foreign action may be vexatious and harassing is but a consideration in the overriding standard of analysis, as opposed to being a standard in and of itself.
Plaintiff Pfaff was employed by Skyline and sustained injuries while working on or about railroad cars located on premises owned by Chrysler. Pfaff filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against Chrysler alleging common law negligence and a violation of the *51Structural Work Act. The cause was transferred to the circuit court of Boone County on Chrysler’s forum non conveniens motion. Pfaff then amended his complaint, naming J.P. Cullen & Sons, Inc., and J.P. Cullen & Son Construction Corporation (Cullen) as additional defendants.
Chrysler responded to Pfaff’s action by filing a third-party complaint against Skyline and Cullen. The first eight counts of the complaint sought recovery against Skyline, alleging common law indemnity (count I); contribution (count II); contractual indemnification against losses and related defense costs (count III); contractual indemnification against losses and related defense costs resulting from violations of the Structural Work Act (count IV); a breach of contract for failure to purchase liability insurance (count VI) (no count V appeared); breach of express and implied warranties for the failure to perform in a good and workmanlike manner, resulting in an entitlement to indemnification or contribution (count VII); breach of a contractual duty “to accept full responsibility for injuries” suffered by employees, resulting in an entitlement to indemnification against losses and defense costs (count VIII); and breach of a contractual duty to defend and hold harmless, whereby Chrysler sought “complete indemnification” against any judgments or settlements, including defense costs (count IX).
Chrysler’s contractual claims were based upon several written purchase order agreements entered into between Chrysler and Skyline in Michigan. The agreements stated that, with respect to certain possible allegations of negligence which could potentially form the basis for indemnification, Michigan law was to apply.
Skyline filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court considered to be pursuant to section 2 — 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 — 615). On June 29, 1989, following a hearing on *52the motion, the trial court struck count I, on the basis that common law indemnity for one’s own negligence is not recognized in Illinois (Allison v. Shell Oil Co. (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 26). With respect to the several counts alleging contractual indemnity (III, IV, VII, VIII and IX), the trial court first determined that choice-of-law considerations required the application of Illinois law, regardless of the parties’ contractual election concerning governing law (Donaldson v. Fluor Engineers, Inc. (1988), 169 Ill. App. 3d 759). The trial court then applied Illinois law, and determined that contractual indemnification against one’s own negligence was prohibited. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 29, par. 61.) The trial court observed that counts III, IV, VII, VIII and IX were essentially actions for contractual indemnity and therefore struck those counts as legally insufficient. The trial court also struck for factual insufficiency count VI, which alleged a breach of contract for failure to purchase insurance. In responding to Chrysler’s query as to whether the counts were dismissed with prejudice, the trial court stated:
“I don’t know if the — as I said, some of these I don’t see how they can be cured because of the nature of them. The one with regard to insurance, they may try to allege something else. I don’t know. Do you want an opportunity to amend?”
In response to a subsequent request by Skyline for clarification as to whether the ruling was with prejudice as to all counts except the breach of contract count, the trial court explained that it wished to allow Chrysler to plead over “these other counts that I have dismissed” so as to preserve any objections to the ruling. The resulting order granted the motion to dismiss, stating that counts I, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII and IX were stricken without prejudice and with leave to amend. The trial court disallowed the inclusion in the order of dismissal his ruling that Illinois law governed the parties’ indemnification *53contract clause. Skyline did not thereafter seek entry of a final order of dismissal.
Chrysler subsequently filed an amended third-party complaint which reasserted the contribution, common law and contractual indemnity counts, and amended the count pertaining to the procurement of insurance. Skyline moved to dismiss the amended complaint, asserting the recognized invalidity of indemnity in Illinois. Without responding to Skyline’s motion to dismiss, Chrysler filed a second-amended third-party complaint which alleged only contribution causes of action against Skyline and Cullen. Skyline did not raise any objections to the filing of the second-amended third-party complaint.
Skyline subsequently filed a second motion seeking to dismiss the previously stricken counts, pursuant to section 2 — 615, and a ruling pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) that there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of such order of dismissal. For support, Skyline alleged that Chrysler had previously advised Skyline that it would withdraw its first-amended third-party complaint and file a second-amended complaint solely under the Illinois Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 301 et seq.). Skyline alleged that Chrysler’s action in doing so revealed that Chrysler conceded that its allegations of indemnity were legally insufficient. Skyline also alleged that Chrysler had filed suit against Skyline in the circuit court of Wayne County, Michigan, seeking a recovery based on the same causes of action previously rejected by the Boone County trial court.
A copy of Chrysler’s Michigan complaint was attached to Skyline’s dismissal motion. The complaint generally alleged that the contract between Chrysler and Skyline, evidenced by the purchase order agreements, was formed in Michigan. Count I of Chrysler’s Michigan complaint alleged that Skyline breached its contractual *54obligations to: (1) assume Chrysler’s defense, hold harmless and indemnify Chrysler against “all costs, expenses and other sums which it may be required to pay” because of the Boone County action; and (2) secure liability insurance. Count II sought a declaratory judgment as to Skyline’s contractual obligation to defend, hold harmless and indemnify Chrysler against costs and expenses incurred in defense of the Boone County action.
Before the trial court ruled on Skyline’s dismissal motion, Skyline amended the motion, requesting that Chrysler be enjoined from proceeding with the Michigan action on the theory that Chrysler was collaterally estopped from relitigating the causes of action previously stricken. Chrysler responded, alleging, inter alia, that because Skyline had filed a responsive pleading in the Michigan action, including a motion for summary judgment or stay of proceedings, Skyline’s motion to enjoin should be denied.
A hearing on Skyline’s amended motion to dismiss was held on July 19, 1990. Chrysler agreed that the contractual indemnity causes which comprised the Michigan action had been previously before the Illinois trial court. Chrysler contended, however, that the causes were dismissed with leave to amend, were subsequently amended, and then withdrawn from Boone County. According to Chrysler, it then filed the Michigan action and properly brought the contractual claims within the jurisdiction whose law governed the contract. Chrysler argued that, therefore, no indemnity or breach of contract claims remained pending before the Boone County court and that no final order' had ever been entered by the court.
The trial court found that it had made no final ruling with respect to the indemnity and breach of contract claims previously stricken and dismissed and that it could yet reconsider that ruling:
*55“In looking at this, what we have is certain causes of action that were filed by way of a counterclaim in Illinois. And they were ruled on in Illinois, most of which were ruled as not — not stating a cause of action or there was some defense which the [c]ourt felt was meritorious under the law. That was not a final judgment ***.
* * *
[T]he matter is already under litigation and already been ruled on and it’s still pending before this [c]ourt by virtue of the fact it’s not a final and appealable order.
* * *
Your claim has been dismissed. It’s not appealable yet, but there’s no final order here, but there is a ruling from the [cjourt ***. I could reconsider my ruling, I could uphold my ruling ***.” (Emphasis added.)
The trial court rejected Skyline’s collateral estoppel argument as a basis for an injunction, finding that the indemnity and breach of contract claims remained pending before the court. The trial court also rejected Skyline’s alternative request for a Rule 304(a) finding of appealability (134 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) with respect to the order striking and dismissing those claims. The trial court, however, enjoined Chrysler from proceeding with the Michigan action, on the basis that Chrysler’s conduct in doing so undermined the court’s jurisdiction and such relief was necessary to protect “the proceedings and to protect litigants before it from multiple lawsuits on the same issues.” Chrysler appealed.
Chrysler’s Pending Motion to Dismiss Skyline’s Appeal
On January 16, 1992, Chrysler filed in this court a motion to dismiss Skyline’s appeal predicated upon a purported settlement of Pfaff’s personal injury action by the parties and a voluntary dismissal with prejudice of that action on January 15, 1992. Attached to the motion was a copy of the order of dismissal which stated that the parties had stipulated to the dismissal and that *56Chrysler’s second-amended third-party complaint against Skyline, alleging contribution, was also dismissed with prejudice.
On January 21, 1992, Skyline filed its objection to Chrysler’s motion to dismiss the appeal on the basis that the order dismissing the cause was entered ex parte-, Skyline had not agreed to waive its worker’s compensation lien and had not participated in or agreed to any settlement of the Pfaff personal injury action; nor had Chrysler agreed to release its contractual indemnification causes of action filed in Michigan or conceded that dismissal of the Pfaff case would have res judicata effect upon the claims pending before the Michigan court. Skyline further advised this court that Skyline had filed a motion to vacate the dismissal of the cause in the trial court and that a hearing on the motion was scheduled for January 22, 1992. On January 22,1992, we ordered that Chrysler’s motion to dismiss Skyline’s appeal be taken with the case.
Also on January 22, 1992, the trial court heard arguments on Skyline’s motion to vacate the order of dismissal. The trial court indicated that it did not approve of the wording of the order of dismissal or its ex parte nature, and vacated the order. The trial court observed, however, that the third-party plaintiff, Chrysler, and Cullen could not be prevented from voluntarily dismissing their claims against one another. In such case, the trial court indicated, it would require that any order of dismissal specify that the entire case, including the contractual indemnification causes against Skyline, be dismissed with prejudice. The trial court stated that Chrysler had abandoned the contractual indemnity claims previously before the court. Thus, the court stated that it did not want the order of dismissal to be interpreted as preserving those claims for future litigation.
*57Following this discussion, Pfaff’s counsel stated that plaintiff would accept Chrysler and Cullen’s offer of settlement and motioned to dismiss the cause. Chrysler and Cullen initially joined in the motion; however, after a brief recess, Chrysler withdrew its motion because Chrysler could not agree to settle and dismiss the cause by means of the order proposed by the trial court. Plaintiff, accordingly, also withdrew his motion to dismiss.
Chrysler now argues that Skyline has interfered with the settlement of the underlying personal injury action for no reason other than to keep this appeal alive. We disagree. It is clear that Skyline opposed the trial court’s order, purportedly dismissing the entire cause, because the order failed to state that Chrysler’s previously alleged claims for contractual indemnity were dismissed with prejudice. Skyline’s opposition goes to an essential element of this appeal: the actual status of these claims at the time Chrysler was enjoined. Under these circumstances, we hardly think Skyline’s opposition was manufactured merely to preserve its appeal. Whether Skyline has any legal basis to argue that its participation was necessary to the settlement of the underlying personal injury action is beside the point. The status of the previously stricken indemnity and breach of contract claims remained unclear. Skyline had reason to oppose the trial court’s order dismissing the underlying action.
Chrysler also contends that the trial court “refused to enter any dismissal order, even if a settlement could be reached which would include the satisfaction of Skyline’s Worker’s Compensation Lien, unless Chrysler also agreed to dismiss its independent contractual cause of action pending against Skyline in Michigan.” Chrysler’s argument misstates the record. The trial court agreed to an order which would dismiss the entire Illinois “cause.”
We have considered the pleadings in support of and in opposition to Chrysler’s motion, as well as a record of *58proceedings before the trial court on January 22, 1992. Thus, as a preliminary matter, we deny Chrysler’s motion to dismiss this appeal.
Skyline asserts that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to enjoin Chrysler from proceeding with the Michigan action. In Skyline’s view, the decision was proper, even assuming arguendo an application of the Royal League standard, because Chrysler is attempting to engage in forum shopping and evade Illinois law and jurisdiction by proceeding in Michigan.
As stated previously, the trial court has the authority to restrain the prosecution of a foreign action which will result in fraud or gross wrong or oppression; a clear equity must be presented requiring the interposition of the court to prevent manifest wrong and injustice. (Royal League, 233 Ill. at 183.) What constitutes a wrong and injustice requiring the court’s interposition must necessarily depend upon the particular facts of the case. (Catherwood v. Hokanson, 201 Ill. App. at 465.) There is no general rule as to what circumstance constitutes a proper case for the exercise of the trial court’s discretion. (See Wabash Ry. Co. v. Lindsey (1933), 269 Ill. App. 152, 159.) The granting of an injunction will depend on specific circumstances as to whether equitable considerations in favor of granting the injunction outweigh the legal right of the party who instituted the foreign action. See Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 896, 900 (1949).
The trial court granted Skyline’s motion, enjoining Chrysler from proceeding with the Michigan litigation, on the basis that Chrysler’s conduct undermined the court’s jurisdiction to determine matters which were pending before the court. In ruling on the matter, the trial court stated that it was relying on its “inherent au*59thority” to protect its proceedings and the litigants before it “from multiple lawsuits on the same issues.”
Skyline contends that Chrysler’s conduct evidences its effort to circumvent the jurisdiction of Illinois courts. According to Skyline, Chrysler invoked the jurisdiction of Illinois courts by filing the third-party action against Skyline and requested the trial court render substantive rulings on the merits of the litigation, but once the trial court entered unfavorable rulings, Chrysler filed the Michigan action. Skyline further asserts that Chrysler’s Michigan action alleges the same theories of recovery which the Illinois court considered and rejected, and raises a choice-of-law issue which the Illinois court had already determined (that Illinois law governed the parties’ rights under their purchase agreement). Skyline argues that, consequently, manifest wrong and gross injustice results not only to Skyline, but to all Illinois trial courts.
In Royal League, an Illinois resident threatened to institute a foreign action in Missouri against another Illinois citizen because the foreign law governing suicide bylaws was more favorable. This court stated:
“It is not enough that there may be reason to anticipate a difference of opinion between the two courts, and that the courts of the foreign State would arrive at a judgment different from the decisions of the courts in the State of the residence of the parties. [Citation.] It is not inequitable for a party to prosecute a legal demand against another in any forum that will take legal jurisdiction of the case, merely because that forum will afford him a better remedy than that of his domicile. To justify equitable interposition it must be made to appear that an equitable right will otherwise be denied the party seeking relief.” Royal League, 233 Ill. at 183.
In Prentiss, an Illinois resident filed an action in Illinois against an Illinois corporation to recover benefits under an insurance policy and then threatened to file a *60second action in Missouri to take advantage of more favorable procedural law concerning trial by jury. This court held that there was no deprivation of a substantive right resulting in wrong or oppression simply because the corporation would not be entitled to the same procedure in Missouri as it was afforded in Illinois. This court further stated:
“A party has the legal right to bring his action in any court which has jurisdiction of the subject matter and which can obtain jurisdiction of the parties. ***
*** The bare fact that a suit on this policy has been begun and is now pending in this State, in the absence of equitable considerations, furnishes no ground to enjoin [a party] from suing his claim in a foreign jurisdiction, although the cause of action is the same ***. *** That it may be inconvenient for [a party] to go to a foreign State to try [an action], or that the maintenance of two suits will cause double litigation and added expense, is insufficient cause for an injunction ***.” (Prentiss, 277 Ill. at 387-88.)
Thus, Royal League and Prentiss demonstrate a strong policy against enjoining the prosecution of a foreign action merely because of inconvenience or simultaneous, duplicative litigation, or where a litigant simply wishes to avail himself of more favorable law.
The Prentiss decision allowed, however, that the prosecution of foreign actions may be enjoined where such actions are brought to avoid or defeat the operation of the laws of the State where both parties to the suit reside. (Prentiss, 277 Ill. at 391.) As examples, Prentiss referred to cases which were brought for the purpose of evading local exemption laws or to secure preferences over other creditors under the foreign jurisdiction’s law. (Prentiss, 277 Ill. at 391.) Skyline argues that Prentiss thereby supports Skyline’s position because the holding in Prentiss is limited to instances where a party loses merely the benefit of advantageous *61procedural law by proceeding with the foreign action. Skyline contends that, in contrast here, Chrysler has sought to evade not merely procedural law, but the very jurisdiction of the trial court.
At the outset, we must consider the status of the indemnity and breach of contract counts which were stricken and dismissed without prejudice from Chrysler’s original third-party complaint. Chrysler filed an amended third-party complaint fully incorporating these claims, but then filed a second-amended complaint which alleged only contribution causes and did not plead over the indemnity and breach of contract claims. Skyline did not object to the filing of Chrysler’s second-amended complaint or move for entry of a final order of dismissal as to the stricken pleadings. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2—615(d); see also Doner v. Phoenix Joint Stock Land Bank (1942), 381 Ill. 106, 108-09 (final order of dismissal may be entered after entry of order sustaining motion to strike and dismiss); Heinrich v. Peabody International Corp. (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 344 (final order dismissing indemnity counts is appealable, despite the survival of other counts which are separately based on distinct theories of recovery).
Illinois courts adhere to the well-established principle that where an amendment is complete in itself and does not refer to or adopt the prior pleading, the earlier pleading ceases to be a part of the record for most purposes, being in effect abandoned and withdrawn. (Bowman v. County of Lake (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 268, 272.) Allegations in a former complaint, not incorporated in the final amended complaint, are deemed waived; when a party files such an amended complaint, he thereby waives any objection to the trial court’s ruling on the former complaint. See Foxcroft Townhome Owners Association v. Hoffman Rosner Corp. (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 150, 153, citing Bowman, 29 Ill. 2d at 272.
*62In the present case, Chrysler abandoned and withdrew its original complaint, alleging, inter alia, indemnification and breach of contract, when it failed to incorporate those allegations in its second-amended third-party complaint. Thus, the former allegations of indemnification and breach of contract were waived; and Chrysler waived objection to the trial court’s ruling striking and dismissing those causes of action. Thus, contrary to the view of the trial court, these claims were not “under litigation here as to whether [Chrysler had] a valid claim or not.” The trial court simply cannot protect its jurisdiction to decide matters which Chrysler has conceded were appropriately stricken and dismissed.
Nonetheless, Skyline contends that the trial court made “substantive rulings on the merits,” which “Chrysler requested,” by striking and dismissing the indemnity and breach of contract counts. We do not agree. The trial court’s ruling was evidenced by an order, striking and dismissing the claims which stated that the ruling was “without prejudice” and granted leave to amend. The order was not final, as amendment was possible (see Stutzke v. Edwards (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 832; Commercial National Bank v. Northwest Bank (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 1050), and its language reflects that the trial court’s ruling striking and dismissing the indemnity and breach of contract counts was not an adjudication on the merits. (See 134 Ill. 2d R. 273 (an involuntary dismissal, with certain exceptions, operates as an adjudication on the merits, unless order of dismissal “otherwise specifies”).) Significantly, the record reflects that the trial court stated several times that its order was not final and, thus, rejected Skyline’s collateral estoppel argument. The trial court declined as well from making a Rule 304(a) finding as to the order’s appealability.
We recognize, as pointed out by the dissent, that substance rather than form may determine whether a gen-
*63eral order of dismissal represents a final adjudication. (See St. Joseph Data Service, Inc. v. Thomas Jefferson Life (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 935; O’Fallon Development Company, Inc. v. City of O’Fallon (1976), 43 Ill. App. 3d 348.) However, we decline to engage in any interpretation of an order which so affirmatively indicates on its face that a final adjudication was not made. (See Flores v. Dugan (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 108, 114 (holding that inclusion in an order of the phrase “without prejudice” clearly manifests the intent of the trial court that its order not be considered final and appealable); see also Renzuli v. Zoning Board of Appeals (1988), 176 Ill. App. 3d 661, 663 (holding that an order is nonappealable “on its face” because of the recitation of “without prejudice”); J. Eck & Son v. R.H. Donnelly Corp. (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 1090; O’Hara v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 131.) This is not a case where certain “magic words” indicative of a final decision on the merits were not included in a dismissal order such that it becomes necessary to look to the substance of the order. (See McMann v. Pucinski (1991), 218 Ill. App. 3d 101, 106.) To do so, under these circumstances, would significantly undermine the clarity and uniformity achieved by Rule 273(a) in this area of the law.
Accordingly, there was nothing to prevent Chrysler from proceeding elsewhere as though the stricken and dismissed actions had never been commenced. (See Gilbert v. Braniff International Corp. (7th Cir. 1978), 579 F.2d 411 (holding that State court dismissal granting leave to amend was not a final order which precluded plaintiff from adjudicating the dismissed claims later in Federal court); 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §484 (1969); see also Baley v. Tonti (1988), 174 Ill. App. 3d 828 (plaintiff refiled complaint in another jurisdiction, although complaint was previously stricken with leave to *64amend and then abandoned).) The jurisdiction of the trial court was not evaded simply because Chrysler chose to refile actions elsewhere which the court had stricken and dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. Even assuming, however, that dismissal of the indemnity and breach of contract counts constituted a final order, we would hesitate to recognize a right to injunctive relief since, under such circumstances, Skyline would then possess an adequate remedy by virtue of either principles of res judicata or in reliance on the full faith and credit provision of the Federal Constitution (U.S. Const., art. IV, §1).
Moreover, by filing in Michigan, Chrysler has not necessarily gained the benefit of more favorable substantive law. With the exception of a claim based on breach of contract for the failure to procure insurance, the Michigan complaint seeks a recovery and judgment based on contractual indemnification. Michigan Compiled Laws §691.991 (1987), titled “Void Construction Contracts,” provides that agreements to indemnify for liability for damages resulting from one’s sole negligence is against public policy, void and unenforceable. Michigan’s law is quite similar in scope and purpose to the Illinois Construction Contract Indemnification for Negligence Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 29, par. 61), on which the trial court relied to dismiss Chrysler’s contractual indemnity counts. Both Acts were intended to arrest efforts to contractually avoid liability for negligence. (See Davis v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 494; Sentry Insurance Co. v. National Steel Corp. (1985), 147 Mich. App. 214, 382 N.W.2d 753.) We do not find that Chrysler’s conduct falls within that class of cases identified by Prentiss as avoiding or defeating local law or jurisdiction.
Skyline, however, relies on James v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co. (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 356, as further sup*65port for its position that injunctive relief is necessary to prevent the circumvention of Illinois courts’ jurisdiction. Skyline points to the statement in James that a court which first obtained jurisdiction over the merits of a cause should be permitted to retain jurisdiction until final adjudication without interference from courts of other States. (James, 14 Ill. 2d at 366.) We find James to be distinguishable from the instant case on this point. In James, the Illinois court’s jurisdiction over the pending matter was subject to actual defeat if the foreign injunction were enforced. By contrast, in the instant case, the jurisdiction which the trial court sought to protect concerned causes of action which had been stricken and dismissed, and then subsequently abandoned and withdrawn. Even assuming that the trial court retained jurisdiction to decide those matters, its jurisdiction was not threatened with defeat by a foreign injunction.
Skyline fails to recognize that the mere pendency of the Michigan in personam proceeding did not threaten the jurisdiction of the Illinois trial court; jurisdiction merely became concurrent. (See Kline v. Burke Construction Co. (1922), 260 U.S. 226, 67 L. Ed. 226, 43 S. Ct. 79 (in personam subject matter jurisdiction over an issue not threatened by the existence of another action for the same cause in another jurisdiction); Black & Decker Corp. v. Sanyei American Corp. (N.D. Ill. 1986), 650 E Supp. 406 (parallel in personam proceedings should ordinarily be allowed to proceed simultaneously); see also American Re-Insurance Co. v. MGIC Investment Corp., 73 Ill. App. 3d 316; Chicago & Eastern R.R. Co. v. Reserve Insurance Co., 59 Ill. App. 3d 206 (where an Illinois court and a sister State court exercised concurrent jurisdiction over the same matter).) We are reminded that a party possesses a general right “to press his action in any jurisdiction which he may see fit and in as many of them as he chooses”; a court of equity will *66not interfere with that right unless such prosecution results in fraud, gross wrong or oppression. Prentiss, 277 Ill. at 387.
Skyline’s authorities condemning “judge shopping” and forum shopping (Balciunas v. Duff (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 176; Contreras v. Citibank (1990), 198 Ill. App. 3d 1059) do not persuade us. In Contreras, plaintiffs filed a class action in the chancery division of the Cook County circuit court, seeking to collaterally attack default judgments rendered by the municipal department, although the plaintiffs had entered into settlement agreements and abandoned their defenses to those judgments under sections 2 — 1301(e), 2 — 1401 (vacation of judgments), and section 2 — 301 (special appearance contesting personal jurisdiction) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, pars. 2 — 1301(e), 2 — 1401, 2— 301). The appellate court determined that the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure could not be circumvented by collateral attack, and characterized the plaintiffs’ conduct as forum shopping. In Balciunas, this court expressed its disapproval of parties’ appearing on a motion before one judge in the attempt to gain entry of a more favorable order than that previously entered by another judge. We believe that the procedural posture of the present case is significantly distinguishable from Contreras or Balciunas to justify our rejection of those cases as persuasive authority here.
In our view, Chrysler has not avoided or defeated the laws of Illinois so as to require equitable interposition. Chrysler’s filing of claims in Michigan, which had been stricken and dismissed without prejudice by a nonfinal order in Illinois, does not represent an avoidance of the jurisdiction of the Illinois trial court nor a circumvention of its ruling. We do not agree with Skyline’s blanket statement that “[w]hen a party files a foreign action after receiving an unfavorable ruling, that party avoids *67and rejects the court’s jurisdiction simply because the court did not do what the party wanted.” Our position is not changed by the fact that by refiling in Michigan, Chrysler may benefit from a liberal interpretation by a Michigan court of Michigan’s law voiding construction-related contractual indemnity agreements. Skyline had the opportunity in Illinois both to object to Chrysler’s second-amended complaint and to request entry of a final judgment as to the causes which were stricken and dismissed. In the absence of such action at law by Skyline, the trial court could not fairly rely on its equitable authority to protect Skyline or its own subject matter jurisdiction. Equitable considerations in favor of granting the injunction simply do not outweigh the legal right of Chrysler to proceed in Michigan. While the trial court recognized that Chrysler may have gained by Skyline’s failure to act, that gain alone does not mean that Skyline has suffered a manifest wrong and injustice as interpreted by Illinois courts. Chrysler’s proceeding in Michigan does not result in a fraud or gross wrong or oppression justifying equitable interposition by the trial court.
Neither ought we invoke equity to render a final judgment as to the dismissed and stricken claims and consequently uphold the injunction under principles of collateral estoppel, as the dissent requests. Skyline did not move for final judgment and the trial court expressly and affirmatively rejected finality as well as any consequent applicability of collateral estoppel as the basis for its grant of the injunction. Based on this record, we cannot conclude that a final judgment should have been entered or that equitable considerations favor doing so now.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred by enjoining Chrysler from proceeding with the Michigan action.
A joint venture, Lakes of Dundee Development Venture, was formed between Coventry Development Associates Chicago, Ltd. (Coventry), and Lakes of Dundee Development Corporation to develop a 44-acre apartment complex in Carpentersville, Kane County, Illinois. Defendant Monzer Hourani is the president of Lakes of Dundee Development Corporation. Daiwa Bank agreed to provide $9.95 million in construction financing for the project.
The loan agreement was secured by: (1) a note signed by the joint venture, the beneficial owner of the property, and La Salle National Trust, which holds title to the property as trustee; (2) a mortgage; (3) a guaranty signed by the Hourani defendants; and (4) an indemnity agreement signed by the joint venture and the Hourani defendants. All of the documents were executed on July 3, 1990, and all provided that Illinois law governed the terms. Daiwa had disbursed $670,631 of the loan proceeds by July 17,1990.
The loan documents warranted and represented that as of July 3, 1990, no actions or suits were pending against the joint venture or any guarantor which might materially adversely affect their financial condition or ability to perform their obligations to Daiwa. On August 2, 1990, Daiwa learned that the Resolution Trust Corporation had filed a $7.5 million suit against Monzer Hourani in the Federal district court of Texas (the RTC litigation). The suit alleged that Hourani was the guarantor on a defaulted loan made by a defunct savings and loan.
On August 9, 1990, Daiwa filed the present mortgage foreclosure action in the circuit court of Kane County. *69The complaint seeks foreclosure of the mortgage and damages against all the defendants for breach of contract. The complaint also seeks damages from the joint venture and Monzer Hourani because of their alleged fraud in failing to disclose the RTC litigation and Hourani’s financial condition. Daiwa is a foreign corporation doing business in, among other States, Illinois and Texas; Monzer Hourani and all defendant entities, with the exception of one Hourani defendant, are Texas citizens.
On September 15, 1990, the Hourani defendants, the joint venture, and a number of other real estate development entities (Texas plaintiffs) filed an action in the State district court of Harris County, Texas, against Daiwa, Coventry, and two Coventry-related entities. The Texas complaint alleged that Daiwa had breached the loan agreement by failing to fund and failing to allow an opportunity to cure the claimed breach. With respect to both Daiwa and Coventry, the complaint alleged fraud throughout the negotiation of the loan agreement by Daiwa and Coventry, to the extent that the Hourani defendants’ interests in three joint ventures (the joint venture’s project in Illinois, a project in Minnesota and a project in Texas) were compromised, and coercion of plaintiffs under threat of economic duress in the signing of the loan agreement. As against Coventry alone, the complaint alleged breach of a fiduciary duty and breach of a duty of fair dealing because of the alleged conspiracy with Daiwa, fraud and coercion. The complaint sought recovery of compensatory and punitive damages. Trial was scheduled for December 17,1990.
On September 28, 1990, the Hourani defendants answered the Kane County action, and also asserted as affirmative defenses many of the allegations made by the plaintiffs in the Texas litigation (Daiwa’s alleged breach for failure to permit an opportunity to cure; Daiwa’s *70knowledge of litigation pending against Monzer Hourani prior to execution of those agreements thereby constituting waiver; and Daiwa’s assertion of breach so as to avoid the contract).
On October 2, 1990, Coventry attempted to intervene in the Kane County litigation by answering and presenting a counterclaim against the Hourani defendants, arising out of the joint venture agreements. On October 9, 1990, the Texas court enjoined Coventry from intervening in the Kane County suit and entered a separate order which designated a Hourani defendant as the managing venturer for purposes of defending the joint venture in the Kane County litigation. Those orders do not affect our decision here.
On October 10, 1990, the trial court heard arguments on a motion by Daiwa which sought to permanently enjoin the Hourani defendants from proceeding against Daiwa in the Texas litigation or elsewhere. The trial court found that full and complete relief could best be provided by Illinois courts, that Illinois had jurisdiction over the dispute prior to Texas, that as between “the parties to this court” (emphasis in original), the same subject matter was involved in both lawsuits, and that Daiwa would suffer injustice and irreparable harm were the defendants allowed to proceed in Texas. The trial court consequently enjoined the Hourani defendants from proceeding against Daiwa in Texas or elsewhere. The injunction did not, however, prevent the Hourani defendants from proceeding against Coventry in Texas, nor did it prevent plaintiffs in the Texas litigation, other than the Hourani defendants, from proceeding against Daiwa. The Hourani defendants, however, settled their claims against Coventry on the eve of the Texas trial date.
The Hourani defendants subsequently appealed the trial court’s grant of injunction. The appellate court re*71versed. Daiwa petitioned for leave to appeal to this court. The Hourani defendants moved to dismiss the petition on grounds that the cause was rendered moot because the trial court had dismissed the complaint. On August 8, 1991, we denied the motion to dismiss the petition. We later granted the petition and consolidated the appeal with that of Skyline.
The Hourani Defendants’ Pending Motion to Dismiss Daiwa’s Appeal
The Hourani defendants then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and suspend the briefing schedule (134 Ill. 2d R. 361) based on the dismissal of the underlying complaint by the trial court on July 30, 1991, and Daiwa’s removal of the Texas litigation on September 13, 1991, to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. We take judicial notice of a January 21, 1992, order issued by the Texas Federal court, which remanded the Texas litigation to the Texas State district court. We also take judicial notice of the recent Illinois appellate decision, Daiwa Bank, Ltd. v. La Salle National Trust, N.A. (1992), 229 Ill. App. 3d 366, which reversed the trial court’s order dismissing the complaint. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Daiwa’s appeal has been denied.
Daiwa contends that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in restraining the Hourani defendants from prosecuting their Texas action because the Illinois action was filed first and complete relief was best afforded to the parties in Illinois. Daiwa relies on Wells v. Wells (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 91, 93, which stated that “where complete relief can be had where litigation is pending, the institution of foreign proceedings will be regarded ‘as vexatious harassing of the opposite party.’ ” *72Daiwa further maintains that the injunction was necessary, even under the Royal League standard, to protect the trial court’s jurisdiction over the matter in light of the Hourani defendants’ “rush to judgment” in Texas. Daiwa’s argument is premised upon its view that the Hourani defendants’ Texas claims against Daiwa essentially comprise its defenses in Illinois. Daiwa asserts that the Hourani defendants’ Texas claims against Daiwa are separate from the Hourani defendants’ claims against Coventry in that action.
The Hourani defendants argue that an injunction is not warranted under these facts so as to prevent any fraud or gross wrong or oppression. (See Royal League, 233 Ill. at 183.) Defendants contend that neither multiple lawsuits nor the possibility of inconsistent adjudications can suffice as the basis to enjoin them. Furthermore, even assuming that that fact is determinative of the issue, defendants contend that complete relief cannot be afforded the parties in the Illinois action, as demonstrated by National Hockey League v. Intermart, Inc. (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 1072. The Hourani defendants’ position is premised upon their view that the Hourani defendants’ Texas claims are separate from the Illinois litigation.
The trial court’s findings indicate that it employed a truncated analysis: Illinois acquired jurisdiction first; Illinois courts could best afford complete relief to the parties; and the two pending matters were the same. As we have stated, while such considerations are appropriate, they are not the sum total of the analysis which a court must employ. Wells, 36 Ill. App. 3d at 93, amply demonstrates this point.
Consequently, we first consider whether the permanent injunction was necessary to prevent fraud or gross wrong or oppression. (See Royal League, 233 Ill. at 183.) Daiwa contends that an injunction was necessary to pro*73tect the trial court’s jurisdiction. Daiwa relies on PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Investment Co. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 291, 307, as demonstrating that in an in rem proceeding, such as the mortgage foreclosure action here, an injunction is appropriate to protect the court’s jurisdiction over the property, mortgage and notes, which jurisdiction must be exercised to the exclusion of other courts.
PSL Realty Co. is readily distinguishable from the instant case. PSL Realty Co. recognized that a Federal court which exercised prior in rem jurisdiction over the mortgage foreclosure action and enjoined our appellate court from proceeding with a related receivership action was entitled to maintain and exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts. This court, accordingly, voided many of the orders issued by the appellate court which interfered with the Federal court’s jurisdiction. Recognition of the Federal court’s jurisdiction was extended, however, because of the established principle that as between a prior Federal and subsequent State court action, both exercising in rem jurisdiction, the court which first acquires jurisdiction has exclusive jurisdiction. (See Mandeville v. Canterbury (1943), 318 U.S. 47, 48-49, 87 L. Ed. 605, 607, 63 S. Ct. 472, 473; see generally 14 Ill. L. & Prac. Courts §261 (1968).) PSL Realty Co. does not support the view that a State court’s first-acquired in rem jurisdiction is exclusive as between States and that an injunction is necessary to protect that jurisdiction. To that extent, we reject PSL Realty Co. as persuasive authority in this context.
In the present case, the trial court’s jurisdiction over the mortgage foreclosure action, which included allegations of fraud and breach of contract, was not interfered with or threatened by the in personam proceeding in Texas. (Cf. Carey v. Neal, Cortina & Associates (1991), 216 Realty . App. 3d 51 (exercise of in rem and in personam jurisdiction over a mortgage foreclosure action and a re-
*74lated tort action by two State courts).) The Illinois action seeks to determine legal rights to the property and liability on the loan agreements, and requests damages and rescission. The Texas action seeks a personal judgment against Daiwa and Coventry and damages arising out of a fraudulent scheme, which Daiwa and Coventry allegedly perpetrated in securing the loan agreements. We conclude that the subject matter jurisdiction of the Texas court does not preclude or arrest the jurisdiction of the Illinois court; defendants’ Texas claims do not affect title to the Kane County property, nor do they prevent the Illinois court from adjudicating rights to the property and any obligations under the notes and mortgage. (Cf. Black & Decker Corp. v. Sanyei American Corp. (N.D. Ill. 1986), 650 F. Supp. 406, 408 (while courts have power to enjoin persons from prosecuting suit in foreign jurisdiction, a fundamental corollary to concurrent jurisdiction must be respected: parallel proceedings on same in personam claims should ordinarily be allowed to proceed simultaneously, at least until a judgment is reached and res judicata can be pled); Light v. Light (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 502, 512 (pendency of Missouri post-divorce petition did not oust jurisdiction of Illinois court to register the Missouri divorce decree).) Furthermore, any possible inconsistency in rulings or judgments may be rectified by resort to principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata.
The record also does not reflect that the Texas proceedings unduly burdened or inconvenienced Daiwa, beyond that which is usual to simultaneous interstate proceedings. Mere inconvenience and the expense of defending the Texas action do not constitute a manifest wrong or injustice adequate to justify an injunction. (See James, 14 Ill. 2d at 363; Wells, 36 Ill. App. 3d at 93.) Neither does the prospect of a second, possibly duplicative proceeding suffice as a basis to enjoin the Hourani defendants. See Prentiss, 277 Ill. at 388.
*75Consideration must also be given to whether complete relief can be afforded the parties in Illinois such that the Texas litigation could be regarded as vexatious and harassing. While we agree with Daiwa that the Hourani defendants’ Texas claims essentially comprise their affirmative defenses in the Illinois litigation, we do not believe that those defenses and claims are coextensive; the Hourani defendants’ Texas claims against Daiwa are broader. In the Texas litigation, the Hourani defendants seek compensatory and punitive damages from Daiwa for fraudulent misrepresentation with respect to the Hourani defendants’ interests in three joint ventures, none of which is at issue in Illinois. The common issue in the two actions may well be the nature of the alleged loan agreement default; however, the Texas action also concerns the damaging effect of that default, allegedly orchestrated by Daiwa and Coventry, upon the Hourani defendants’ three joint ventures with Coventry. Neither the Hourani defendants nor the other Texas plaintiffs therefore could be afforded complete relief in the Illinois mortgage foreclosure action. That Daiwa might only have complete relief in Illinois because the res is located here is beside the point. We take judicial notice of the fact that the entirety of the Texas plaintiffs’ claims against Coventry have been dismissed. (See Daiwa Bank, Ltd. v. La Salle National Trust, N.A. (1992), 229 Ill. App. 3d 366.) However, that fact does not alter our decision that the Hourani defendants’ pending Texas claims against Daiwa are not susceptible to complete relief in the Illinois court. See National Hockey League v. Intermart, Inc. (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1078 (complete relief could not be had where foreign action was against defendants who were not parties to the Illinois action); Catherwood v. Hokanson, 201 Ill. App. at 466 (complete relief not available where foreign action *76sought a partition, a form of relief not obtainable in that case in Illinois).
Lastly, even though relief could not be afforded all parties in Illinois, the record does not reveal the Texas litigation to be vexatious and harassing as those terms are commonly interpreted. (See 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions §221 (1969).) In sum, we are not presented with a record which reflects that the trial court’s discretionary decision enjoining the Hourani defendants was warranted. See Tabor & Co. v. McNall (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 593, 596.
Accordingly, in cause No. 71813 (Skyline) we affirm the appellate court judgment, which reversed the order of injunction entered by the circuit court.
In cause No. 71815 (Daiwa), we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which reversed the grant of permanent injunction by the circuit court.
No. 71813 — Affirmed.
No. 71815 — Affirmed.